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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
J. TAYLOR, an individual; I 
Plaintiff, I Case No. CV 08-01 765 
GARY D. BABBITT, an individual; D. JOHN 
ASHBU, an individual; PATRICK V. 
COLLINS, an individual; RICHARD A. 
RILEY, an individual; HAWLEY TROXELL 
ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; JANE DOES I-X, 
&own individuals; 
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO AMEND 
COMPLAINT 
Defendants. 
Defendants, by and through their counsel of record, Elarn & Burke, P.A., hereby submit the 
following memorandum in opposition of plaintiffs motion of amend his complaint. 
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM LN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT - 1 
The Court bas been provided briefs fsd heard oral ents on Rule 12@)(6) Motions to 
Dismss in t h s  md the compr;srrion case filed by plaintiff agakst the Clements, Brown & McNichols 
law fim. The Motions to Dismiss were based on the legal principles of lack of privity, lack of 
shding ,  lack of duty, and the litigation privilege. Plainties proposed mended complaint alleging 
direct claims suffiers h m  the same legal deficiencies as the original complaint. Insofar as p1aintifPs 
proposed mended complaint alleges derivative claims, these claims also fail as a matter of law. 
MENDXNC THE COMPLAINT WOULD BE A WTILE ACT 
Under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), when a party moves for leave to amend his 
pleading "leave shall be fi-eely given whenever justice so requires." Whether to permit an amended 
pleading is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. McCann v. McCann, 138 Idaho 228, 
61 P.3d.585 (2002); Hines v Nines, 129 Idaho 847,934 P.2d 20 (1997); Hinkle v. k-lriney, 126 Idaho 
993, 895 P.2d 594 (Ct.App. 1995). In determining whether an amended complaint should be 
allowed, the court may consider whether the new claims proposed to be inserted into the action by 
the amended complaint state a valid claim or whether the opposing party has an available defense 
to the newly added claim. Spur Products Corporation v. Stoel Rives LLP, 142 Idaho 41,44,122 P.3d 
300 303 (2005); Black Canyon Racquetball Club, Inc., v. Idaho First Nut '1. Bank, 1 19 Idaho 17 1, 
804 P.2d 900 (1 991). See also Estate ofBecker v. Callahan, 140 Idaho 522,527,96 P.3d 623,628 
(2004) ("A court may consider whether the allegations sought to be added to the complaint state a 
valid claim in determining whether to grant leave to amend the complaint.") See also Stonewall 
Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Co., 132 Idaho 31 8, 971 P.2d 11 42 (1 998); Bissett v. State, 
11 1 Idaho 865,727 P.2d 1293 (Ct-App. 1986). 
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT - 2 . . 
The trial court should decline to grant leave to amend where the amendment would be a htile 
act. Wells v. United States L fe  Ins. Ca. 119 Idaho 160, 804 P.2d 333 (CtApp. 1991). An 
"amendment is htile if the [pleadings], ras mended, would not sumive a motion to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim upon whch relief can be granted.'' U S. v. Union Carp., 194 F.R.D. 223,237 
(E.D.Pa. 2000). See also Gragossian v. Cardinal &alth Inize., 2008 WL 2 157004, at * l (S.D.Ca1. 
2008) (It would be futile to allow leave to mend "where the proposed complaint contained only 
conclusory allegations without supporting facts."); K Mane Ei'ls, S.A. v. International Flavors and 
Fragrances Inc., 2008 WL 2559345, at *2 (D.N.J. 2008) ("LA proposed amendment is futile when 
it cannot withstand a motion to dismiss. To s w i v e  a motion to dismiss, the complaint's factual 
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption 
that all the allegations are true.") (citations and internal punctuation omitted); In re Ever-esh 
Beverages, Inc., 238 B,R, 558, 571 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (""Elven liberal construction has its limits. 
'[Flor the pleading must at least set forth sufficient information for the court to determine whether 
some recognized legal theory exists on which relief could be afforded the pleader.") 
AMENDING THE COMPLAINT WOULD BE FUTILE WHERE 
THE PLAINTIFF CANNOT STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION 
With respect to Reed Taylor's so-called direct claims, leave to mend should be denied 
because, as a matter of law, Mr. Taylor has not and, indeed, cannot state a cause of action against 
counsel for opposing parties. While the trial court cannot consider the sufficiency of the evidence 
in deciding whether to allow the proposed amendment, Spur Products Corporation v. Stoel Rives 
LLP, 142 Idaho 41,44,122 P.3d 300 303 (2005), sufficiency of the evidence is not an issue here 
because the attempt to sue attorneys not in privity with the plaintiff is barred as a matter of law. 
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM LN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT - 3 
A. As a Maser sf Law, the Defendants Owed No Duly to Plahaff 
The question of whether a legal duty exists is a question of law for the court to decide. 
2008 WL 3905436, at "5  @dab0 2008); Estate ofBeckr v. Callahan, 140 Idaho 522,525,96 P.2d 
3d 623,627 (2004); Daleiden V. Jeferson Cow& Joint SGhooZ Dist. No. 2Sf,139 Xd&o 466,468, 
80 P.3d 1067,1069 (2003); Ud' v. Czlster Gounq, 136 Idaho 386,389,34 P.3d 1069,1072 (2001); 
Boots ex re:. Boots v. Winter$, 145 Id&o 389, 179 P.2d 352, 356 (Ct.App. 2008). Except in the 
naxow circmstance of an attorney draAing testamentary insments ,  an attorney owes no duty 
under Idaho law to third parties who are not his clients. Harrigfeld v. Hancock, 140 Idaho 134: 139, 
90 P.3d 884, 889 (2004). The proposed amended amplaint does not allege any facts that would 
come within the P;Tarri&Zd exception. Therefore, it should be held as a matter of law thar the 
defendants cannot be held liable to Is&. Taylor under any theory professional negligence. 
B. As a Maner of Law, Plaiatiff Lacks S t a n h g  to Sue Other Parties' Counsel 
The issue of whether the plaintiff has standing is a question of law. Thompson v. City of 
Lewiston, 137 Idaho 473, 50 P.3d 488 (2002); Young v. City oJ;Ketchunz, 137 Idaho 102,44 P.3d 
11 57 (2002); Osmunson v. State, 135 Idaho 292, 17 P.3d 236 (2000); StudentLoan f i n d  ofIdaho, 
Pnc. v. Payette County, 125 Idaho 824, 875 P.2d 236 (Ct.App. 1994). As a matter of law, Reed 
Taylor lacks standing to sue lawyers who do not represent him for an alleged breach of duty. It 
would be a futile act to grant leave to amend the complaint where it fails to allege a viable cause of 
action for breach of duty, whether denominated legal malpractice or breach of fiduciary duty. 
In Taylor v. Maile, 142 Idaho 253, 127 P.3d 156 (2005), the Taylors, as remainder 
beneficiaries of a trust, attempted to sue the trustee's attorney for legal malpractice. AAer a thorough 
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT - 4 
discussion of the Hrarridefd factors, the Court affinned dismissal under Rule 12@)(6) of the claim 
of malpractice against tbe aeomey: 
The third a u n t  of the coaplaint wserts a professional malpractice claim 
agajnst Mr. Maile and this count is precluded by the general rule espoused in 
Harriafeld that m a~orney-client relationship with the plaintiff is a prerequisite for 
holding the aaomey liable for negligence in the pe~omance  of legal services. 
Id. at 259, 127 P.3d 156. 
The Court in Maile also upheld dismissal of the claim of breach of fiduciary duty against the 
attorney because he bad assumed no fiduciary duty to them; he was acting as counsel for the 
fiduciary rather than as a fiduciary himself. In the present case, the amended complaint alleges no 
facts which would give rise either to a duty of care or a fiduciary duty on the part of the defendants 
to Mr. Taylor. It would be a futile act to grant leave to amend the complaint merely to assert 
nonviable claims. 
C. As a Matter of Law, Plaintiff Lacks Privity with Defendants 
The issue of whether plaintiff and defendants were in privity in the circumstances of the 
present case is an issue of law to be decided by the court, not an issue of fact for the jury, In the 
absence of privity, the plaintiff has no cause of action against defendants for malpractice, Harrigfeld 
v* Hancock, 140 Idaho 134,139,90 P.3d 884, 889 (2004), or breach of fiduciary duty, Taylor v. 
Maile, 142 Idaho 253, 127 P.3d 156 (2005). Since the proposed amended complaint fails to allege 
any facts which would establish privity, leave to amend is not warranted. 
D. As a Matter of Law, Plaintiff Has No Cause of Actian under the I.C.P.A. 
Statutory construction is a pure question of law. Cordova v. Bonneville County Joint School 
Dist. No. 93,144 Idaho 637,167 P.3d 774,778 (2007); Hayden Lake Fire ProtectionDist. v. Alcoi-n, 
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT - 5 
141 Idaho 388,398,111 P.3d 73,82 (2005); Cmw'rd v. Dept. ofl=orrection, 133 Idaho 633,635, 
991 P.2d 358, 360 (1999); J. R. Simplot &lo. v. Idaho State Tax Com'n ., 120 Idaho 849, 853, 820 
P.2d 1206, "110 (1991). 
In the proposed amended complaint, plaintiff Reed Taylor at-tempts to allege a direct cause 
of action for breach of the Idaho Consmer Protection Act, Idaho Code $548-601 k o u g h  48-619. 
However, a private cause of action may be asserted under that Act only by a "person who purchases 
ur leases goods or services and thereby suffers any ascertainable loss of money or property. . . ." 
Idaho Code 5 48-608. The amended complaint does not contain allegations that Reed Taylor 
purchased goods or services fi-om any of the defendants. Granting leave to amend to bring a fatally 
flawed claim under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act would be a futile act. 
E. As a Matter of Law, Plaintiff's Purported Claims for Conspiracy and Tortious 
Interference Are Deficient 
Plaintiff seeks to allege causes of action in I s  amended complaint for tortious interference 
with contract and civil conspiracy. However, the proposed amended complaint fails to allege that 
the defendants acted in any capacity other than as counsel for their corporate clients. The 
relationship of attorney-client is one of principal and agent. Jarman v. Hale, 112 Idaho 270, 73 1 
P.2d 8 13 (1986); Honvitz v. Holabird & Root, 212 111.2d 1, 8 16 N.W.2d 772 (2004). As a matter 
of law, an agent cannot conspire with h s  principal. Afton Energy, Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 122 
Idaho 333,340,834 P.2d 850,857 (1992); Skarbrevikv. Cohen, England & Whitfield, 23 1 Cal.App. 
3d 692,282 Cal.Rptr. 627 (1991). An attorney does not "conspire" with his own client merely by 
giving advice. "To hold otherwise would be h tosaying that 'a defendant could conspire with h s  
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT - 6 
L; ;C) 
right a m ,  which held, aimed, and fired the fatal weapon-"Tischer v. Estate of Flax, 816 A.2d I ,  
Nor c m  the agent be held to have intederecl with hfs pTincipal's con&act. RECO Const. Go., 
Inc. v. J-U-B Engineers, he . ,  145 Idaho 719, 184 P,3d 844 (2008); JenIn"m v. Boise Cascade Corp. 
141 Idaho 233,108 P.3d 380 (2005); Tlzomas v. 1MedicaE Center Physicians, P.A., 138 Idaho 200,61 
P.3d 557 (2002); Leon v. Boise State Universiq, 125 Idaho 365, 870 P.2d 1324 (1994); Ostrander 
v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. ofIdaho, Inc., 123 Idaho 650,654, 851 P.2d 946,950 (1993). 
Accordingly, the proposed amended complaint does not allege actionable claims against the 
defendant attorneys for civil conspiracy or tortious interference with their client's contract with 
plaintiff. Leave to amend should not be granted wlth respect to these ostensible claims. 
F. As a Matter of Law, Defendants Are Shielded from Suit by the Litigation 
Privilege 
The existence of an immunity or privilege is a question of law. Nation v. State, Dept. of" 
Correction, 144 Idaho 177, 158 P.3d 953 (2007); Rincover v. State, Dept. offinance, Securities 
Rzlreau, 128 Idaho 653, 917 P.2d 1293 (1996); Smith v. Reddy , 882 F.Supp. 497 (D.Md. 1995 ) 
Sanchez v. Coxon, 175 Ariz. 93,854 P.2d 126 (1993); Darragh v. Superior Court, 183 Ariz. 79,900 
P.2d 121 5 (Ariz.App. 1995). 
The defendants named in the proposed amended complaint are entitled to avail themselves 
of the defense of litigation immunity or privilege. "An attorney owes no duty to a thud party in an 
adversarial relationship." Bowman v. Two, 104 Wash.2d 1 8 1,188,704 P.2d 140 (1 085). "Existence 
of a duty to an adversary pasty beyond the courtesy and respect owed all participants in the legal 
process. . . would interfere with the undivided loyalty an attorney owes a client and would diminish 
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT - 7 
an attorney" ability to achieve the most advmtageous position Ebr a client." Id. at 189. Accord, 2% 
Chapman Children's Trust v. Porter & Hedges, L.L.P., 32 S.W.3d 419 (Tex.App. 2000); hflzode v, 
s, 288 Mont. 278,957 P.2d 1 124 (1998); &rcia v. Rodey, Ifz'ckson, S b a s  A& & Robb, P.R., 
106 N.M. 757,750 P.2d 118 (1988); Fi-iedman v. Dozorc, 412 Mich. 1,312 N.W.2d 585 (1981 ), 
As aeomeys for pasties adverse to Reed Taylor, defendants are not subject to suit by him for 
their actions taken in connection with litigation. Insofar as the mended complaint attempts to state 
claims based on defendants' litigation strategy, positions taken in open court, cooperation with co- 
counsel in defending against Mr. Taylor's claims, or other matters collaterally related to pending 
litigation such as pawent of litigation expenses, resisting the opposing party's attempts to possess 
property, or negotiating, or declining to negotiate, with opposing counsel, defendant's actions are 
privileged as a matter of law. The proposed mended complaint is an exercise in futility because it 
merely seeks to advance claims whch cannot survive assertion of the defense of litigation privilege. 
G. As a Matter of Law, Plaintiff's Purported Claim for Conversion Does Not State 
a Claim upon which Relief Can Be Granted 
Plaintiff attempts in h s  amended complaint to plead his claim for conversion in slightly 
dif5erent terns, which are nonetheless insufficient to state a claim. Because plaintiff's conversion 
allegations do not raise any justiciable issue, it would be futile to grant leave to amend. 
Plaintiff's theory seems to be that the defendants can be held liable for conversion if it can be 
shown that their fees were paid with the proceeds of assets in which the plaintiff alleges he possesses 
a perfected security interest. If plaintiff's conversion theory were to be accepted, every person who 
accepts payment fi-om a client or customer for services rendered would be subject to suit for 
conversion by the secured creditor of such client or customer. The Uniforn Commercial Code rejects 
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT - 8 
:;&I' 
this approach. In Lake Ontario Production Credit Associa2"ion ofRochester v. Grove Hogan, 138 
A.D.2d 930,526 N.V. S.2d 985 (1 9821), a debtor sold cows in wKch the plaintiff possessed a pedectd 
ty interest. At least p&o@the p c e d s  h n z  the sale of the cows was used. to pay the debtor's 
aaomeys. The court held that the secwd creditor could trace the proceeds from the sale of the 
collateral only imo-far as such proceeds remained in. the hands of the debtor. The law firm wkch 
rcmived p a p e n t  from the sale of collateral took free of any claim by the secured creditor. While 
the UCC lkas been mended aPld rmmbered since the date of the Grove Hogan case, the concept 
contkues under cunent version of the Gode. See Idaho Code 5 28-9-332 whch makes it clear that 
persons who in good faith receive papen t  of money from a debtor for services rendered take free 
and clear of any security interest in such. money. 
With respect to assets remaining in the hands of Hawley Troxell's clients, any perfected 
security interest plaintiff may have (assuming for the sake of argument that plaintiff possesses a 
perfected security interest) is governed by existing commercial law principles. Either such security 
interest is traceable to proceeds or not, depending on application of the provisions of the Unifom 
Comercial Gode. Hawltey Troxell is not liable for conversion simply because it acts as counsel for 
one or more debtors who challenge the validity of the debt and the alleged security interest. Among 
other tfungs, the litigation privilege bars any claim for civil damages against opposing attorneys for 
statements made or actions taken, including the assertion of defenses with which the plaintiff 
disagrees, in the course of representation of an opposing party in litigation. Kahala Royal COT. v. 
Goodsill Anderson Quinn & Stifel, 1 13 Hawai'i 25 1, 15 1 P.3d 732 (2007). 
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT - 9 
.; 62' 
For the Erst time, plaintiff Reed Taylor alleges in mended complaintc that be 
is entitled to bring not only direct claims on his own behalf, but also a shareholder" derivative action. 
"This is the primary and perhaps only substantive change to the complaht.' A "derivative proceeding" 
is defined in Idaho Code 8 30-1-740 as a civil suit on behalf of a domestic or, in limited 
circmstances, foreign corporation. As discussed in greater detail below, kfr. Taylor improperly 
tends to conflate his individual claims with the so-called derivative claims. 
The shareholder's derivative action was developed as an extraordinary equitable device to 
enable shareholders to enforce a corporate right that the corporation failed to assert on its own behalf. 
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805,811 (Del. 1984). 
The nature of the derivative proceeding is two-fold. First, it is the equivalent of a 
suit by the shareholders to compel the corporation to sue. Second, it is [a] suit by the 
corporation, asserted by the shareholder on its behalf, against those who are liable to 
it. The corporation is the real party in interest and the shareholder is only a nominal 
plaintiff. The substantive claim belongs to the corporation. . . . 
13 Mr. Fletcher et al,, Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations 5 594 1.10 (1 995 Rev.) 
"Because a corporation exists as a separate legal entity, the shareholders have no direct cause 
of action or right of recovery against those who have harrned it. The shareholders may, however, 
bring a derivative suit to enforce the corporation's rights and redress its injuries when the board of 
directors fails or refuses to do so." Grossett v. Wenaas, 72 Cal Rptr.3d 129, 135,42 Cal.4th 1100, 
It is doubtful whether the purported derivative claims are properly classified as such. Paragraph13 of the 
proposed amended complaint alleges that Reed Taylor is entitled to bring derivative claims but then asserts that he is 
personally entitled to "recover and possess all fitnds, damages andfor property recovered &om all direct and 
derivative causes of action." It is a fimdamental principle that derivative claims belong to the corporation, not the 
shareholder(s) who bring the derivative action on the corporation's behalf. 
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT - 10 
1 108, I 75 P.3d 1 184,1189 (2008). A shareholder may not maintain an action on h s  own behalf for 
a wrong done by a third person to the corporation on the theory that such wrong devalued h s  stock 
because such an a c ~ o n  would lead to multitudinous litigation. Suffer v. General Petroleu 
28 Gal 2d 525,530, 170 P.2d 898 (1946). "When a derivative action is successful, the corporation 
is the only party that benefits from at any recovev; the shaseholders derive no benefit 'except the 
indirect benefit resulting from a realization upon the corporation's assets."' Grossett v. Wenaas, 
supra, 72 Cal Rptr.3d at 135,42 Cal.4th at 1108, 175 P.3d at 1 190 (2008). 
A. Reed Taylor Is Not a Shareholder 
Idaho Code (j 30-1-741 provides that a person cannot commence or maintain a derivative 
proceexitingunless he "[wlas a shareholder at the time of the act or omission complained of or became 
a shareholder through transfer by operation of law &om one (1) who was a shareholder at that time." 
The proposed anended complaint does not allege that Mr. Taylor was a shareholder at the time of the 
acts complained of. His status is that of former shareholder whose stock was redeemed and who now 
seeks to recover the balance owing notwithstanding the insolvency of the corporation. This does not 
qualify k m  as a "shareholder." He ceased to be a shareholder when h s  stock was redeemed. 
Whether or not he will ever again become a shareholder by operation of law or otherwise remains to 
be seen. Nor does h s  security interest in the stock of AIA Insurance, Inc., make hlm a shareholder. 
Whether or not his security interest is enforceable and, if so, whether he possesses any right other than 
to sell the collateral in a comercially reasonable manner has not been adjudicated. 
B. Reed Taylor Does Not Fairly Represent the Interests of the Corporations 
The second criterion of Idaho Code 5 30-1-741 is that the shareholder bringing the derivative 
action "fairly and adequately represents the interests of the corporation in enforcing the right of the 
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT - 11 
corporation." It is impossible to conceive of any way that Reed Taylor can be said to represent the 
interest of AIA Services or AIA Inswance, or the larger cornunity of shareholdas. In every respect, 
h s  personal interest is adverse to the corporations lurd hostile to the irnterests of other shaseholders. 
Paynnent of even a subsbtial portion of the balance due for the rdemption ofhis stock will bankrupt 
the corporations and leave n o t h g  for other  shareholder^.^ 
F d e m o r e ,  because of the conflict of interest that Reed Taylor has with the corporations and 
all other shareholders, his attorneys cannot property serve as counsel in a derivative action. See, e. 
g., New Cmuiford YirZley, Ltd v. Benedict , 847 P.2d 642 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that the 
"existence of other litigation between a [derivative action] plaintiff and the same [derivative] 
defendants in which that plaintiff seeks to have the defendants' assets applied to the satisfaction of 
a personal claim, rather than transferred to the corporation, represents a serious conflict of interest'" 
and concluding that "plaintiffs present counsel also have an irreconcilable conflict so that they 
cannot continue to represent the other shareholders, including other named plaintiffs" in the derivative 
action). See also Cuenther v.Pac. TeZecom Inc., 123 F.R.D. 341,346-47 (D.Or. 1988) (explaining 
that the court was "compelled to exercise [its] discretion in favor of disqualifying plaintiff's present 
attorneys from representing the remaining plaintiffs" because of a similar conflict). 
CONCLUSION 
The proposed amended complaint adds nothrng to Reed Taylor's ostensible direct claims. 
Such claims still are not valid for a variety of reasons, including lack of privity, lack of standing, and 
2 See, for example, ?/ 17 of the proposed mended complaint, which alleges that the debt allegedly owing by 
ALA Services to Reed Taylor exceeds its assets by $3 million, and ?/ 29 of the proposed amended complaint which 
alleges that AIA Services is insolvent and unable to pay the amount allegedly owing to Reed Taylor. 
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lack of a duty owed to h m  on behalf of the defendant aeameys, all of which are matters of law, not 
contest& facts. Also as a matter of law, Reed Taylor cannot sue directly under the Idaho Consumer 
Protecfcion Act because he did not parchase goods or services fiom the defendm%, Nar does he 
possess a cause of action against the aaomey defendms for conspiracy or tortious inte~erence with 
conkact because, as a rnatter of law, an agent cannot conspire with h s  principal or intedere with h s  
principal's con&act. Under the UCC, the mere payment of legal fees by the AIA corporations does 
not constihte conversion. Finally, the litigation privilege as a matter of law precludes claims against 
the attorney defendants named in the amended complaint based on their litigation-related actions. 
Since all of the direct causes of action whch Reed Taylor attempts to plead in his amended complaint 
are deficient, it would be a futile act to grant h s  motion to amend. 
With respect to Reed Taylor's purported derivative claims, the amended complaint is also 
deficient. He is neither a shareholder nor a party who can be said to fairly represent the AIA 
corporations. His interest is inimical to the interests of the corporations and to the interest of other 
shareholders. Therefore, he is not a party qualified to bring a shareholder derivative action. The 
C o w  should decline to grant leave to amend the complaint where the amendment would merely be 
a futile act. 
DATED this 5 day of November, 2008. 
ELAM & BURKE, P.A. 
By: 
k d e s  D. LaRue, Of the Firm 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ,$ day of November, 2008,I caused a true and correct 
copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following in the manner indicated 
below: 
Michael S. Bissell U.S. Mail 
CAMPBELL BISSELL & K ~ Y ,  PLLC Hand Delivery 
7 South Howard Street, Ste. 416 - Federal Express 
Spokane, WA 99201 Facsimile Transmission (509) 455-71 11 
J@S D. LaRue 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTHCT OF THE 
STATE: OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual, ) 
) CASE NO. CV08-01765 
Plaintiff, 1 
) OPINION AND O D E R  ON 
v. ) DEFENDANTS' MOTION 
) TO DISMISS AND PLAINTIFF'S 
GARY D. BABBITT, an individual; D. JOHN ) MOTION TO AMEND 
ASHBY, an individual; PATRICK V. ) COMPLAINT 
COLLINS, an individual; RICEIARD A 1 
RILEY, an individual; HAWLEY TROXELL ) 
ENNIS & HAWLEY, LLP an Idaho limited ) 
liability partnership; JANE DOES I-X, 
unknown individuals; 1 
Defendants. 
) 
This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Plaintiffs Motion 
to Amend Complaint. A hearing on the Motion to Dismiss was held on October 16,2008 and a 
hearing on Plaintiffs Motion to Amend Complaint was held on December 4,2008. Plaintiff 
Reed Taylor was represented by attorney Michael S. Bissell. Defendants Babbitt, Ashby, 
Collins, Riley and the law firm of Hawley T'roxell Ennis & Wawley were represented by attorney 
James D. LaRue. The Court. having read the motion and briefs of the parties, having considered 
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the record in the maeer, having tiexd oral arguments of counsel and being h l ly  advised in the 
matter, hereby renders its decision. 
F A C T U A L A N D P R O C E D ~ B A C K G R O U N D  
The above-entitled matter is rooted in the underlying case of Taylor v. AL4 et al., Nez 
Perce County Case No. CV07-00208. The issues in the underlying case are complex and its 
procedural hrstory leng-thy, though the matter has yet to go to trial or be fully adjudicated. Reed 
Taylor's complaint in the underlying case, amended five times, asserts eleven claims including 
one for default of a $6 million promissory note issued to Reed Taylor by the corporate 
defendants as part of a buy-out or retirement package. In order to understand the claims being 
asserted in the instant matter, certain events in the underlying case must be reviewed. 
On January 29,2007, Reed Taylor filed suit against AIA Services Corporation, AIA 
Insurance, inc., John Taylor, Connie Taylor, Bryan Freeman and JoLee Duclos. AIA Insurance, 
Inc. is a business entity under the umbrella of AIA Services Corporation. At the time of the 
filing of the lawsuit, John Taylor was the CEO of the corporations and a board member along 
with Bryan Freeman and JoLee ~uc lo s . '  Connie Taylor, the former wife of John Taylor, held a 
community property interest in the corporations. Following the filing of the lawsuit, attorney 
Michael McNichols was retained to represent AIA Services, AIA Insurance and John Taylor; 
attorney David Gittens was retained to represent Bryan Freeman and JoLee Duclos; attorney Jon 
Hally was retained to represent Connie Taylor. 
On February 27,2007, upon motion by the Defendants, the Court granted a temporary 
restraining order against Reed Taylor after he attempted to exercise management authority over 
' Bryan Freeman and JoLee Duclos resigned as board members shortly after the lawsuit was filed and two new 
board members were appointed to replace them. 
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Court made no determination relative to other terns in the extensive buy-out agreement between 
AIA Insurance Corporation and Reed Taylor, such as the effect on voting shares and receivables 
upon default of the promissory note. Those issues were not before the Court in the context o 
motion for partial summary judgment and, therehre, have yet to be determined. 
After twenty-one months of niotions and hearings in the underlying case, after trial dates 
bad been set and reset, and with a number of motions still pending before the Court, Reed Taylor 
filed the above-entitled action against aeorneys Babbitt, Ashby, Collins and Riley and the law 
firm of 14awley Troxell Ennis & I-fawley, cunent counsel for the corporations in the underlying 
case. In his action, filed August 8,2008, Reed Taylor asserts the following claims against 
Defendants: (1) aiding and abetting or assisting others in the comiss ion of tortious acts in the 
underlying case; (2) conversion and misappropriation of AIA corporate assets; (3) violations of 
Idaho's Consumer Protection Act, I.C. 5 48-601 et seq.; and, (4) professional negligence andior 
breach of fiduciary duties. Defendants, through counsel, filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to 
I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) along with briefmg. Reed Taylor filed briefing in opposition and on October 
16,2008, the Court heard oral arguments of counsel. 
One day prior to the Court's hearing on Defendants' Notion to Dismiss, Plaintiff filed a 
motion to amend his complaint, attaching his proposed amended pleading. Upon order of the 
Court, the Motion to Amend Complaint was heard on December 4,2008 and the Court will 
address the matter herein. 
STANDARD ON MOTION TO DISMISS 
In ruling on a motion to dismiss pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), a court is to review all 
facts and inferences in favor of the non-moving party and ask whether a claim for relief has been 
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stated. Rohr v. Rahr, f 28 Idabo 137, 141,911 P.2d 133, 137 (1996). In the instant matter, the 
arguments made by the parties incorporated events and actions that have occurred in the 
underlying case of Taylor v. RL4, et al. Therefore, in making its analysis in the instmt matter 
and pursumt to I.R.E. 20 1, the Court will take judicial notice of the underlying case in toto. 
ANALYSIS 
{A) DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS 
The issues raised in the instant matter are less daunting and complex than the lengthy 
briefs and pleadings would make them appear at first blush.' As stated by Reed Taylor in his 
opposition brief, the gravamen of lus Complaint is that Defendants aided and abetted John 
Taylor and others in committing torts against Reed Taylor and acted to deprive Reed Taylor of 
money and property to which he is ~n t i t l ed .~  
Plaintiff's core contention is that Defendants are acting in violation of Idaho's 
Professional Rules of Conduct by representing all of the corporate defendants in the underlying 
case and by entering into a joint defense agreement with the other named defendants. Plaintiff 
argues that by their actions, Defendants have aided and abetted John Taylor and others in the 
commission of tortious acts that have resulted in significant financial damage to Reed Taylor. 
The Defendants in the instant case were retained to represent AIA Insurance, AIA 
Services and CropUSA after previous counsel for the AIA corporations had obtained a 
preliminary injunction from the Court that ordered the operations of the corporations to remain 
unchanged until the claims asserted by Reed Taylor have been adjudicated. The injunction was 
Plaintiffs Complaint is twenty-three pages in length. Defendants' brief in support of the motion to dismiss is 
thirty-six pages in length. Plaintiffs brief in opposition is fifty-seven pages in length. 
4 Plaintiffs Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, at page 18. 
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sought after Reed Taylor self-declased the promissory note in default, self-declared himself the 
sole shareholder of the corporations and then anempted to take over physical and operational 
control of the corporations, all without the benefit of a judicial finding on the iss 
The Court has reviewed in camera (a) written correspondence to the defendants in the 
underlying matter from the law firm of Hawley Troxell Emis and Hawley, (b) the witten 
representation agreements entered into by the codefendants who are represented by the law firm, 
and (c) the written joint defense agreements entered into by the defendants in the underlying 
case. After reviewing the documents and the applicable Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, 
the Court is persuaded the Defendant attorneys and law firm are well versed in the rules and have 
met the criteria necessary to represent clients with potential conflicts of interest. The various 
documents are well-drafted, effectively address the concerns and requirements of the 
professional rules of conduct and protect and preserve any potential claims that may arise 
between the clients. 
Of particular concern to the Plaintiff is the joint defense agreement between the 
defendants in the underlying case. The purpose behind joint defense agreements is to allow 
defendants in the same litigation to communicate and share documents without the 
communications andor documents becoming subject to discovery where those communications 
andor documents are otherwise non-discoverable or fall within the attorney-client privilege. In 
the underlying case, many of Reed Taylor's claims challenge interests that the corporations and 
the individual board members have in common and, therefore, require a common defense. It is 
only reasonable that a degree of cooperation must take place between counsel for the 
corporations and counsel for the individual board members, as the corporation is incapable of 
communicating with its counsel except through those individuals who run the corporations. 
Taylor v. Babbitt, et al. 
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C o n t r q  to the position asserted by Plaintiff, entering into a joint defense agcernent does 
not prc~hibit he codekndmts fiom asserting claims against each other if such claims are 
wananted. Rather, it provides the parties ce~$ain protections in regard to their communications 
with each other on those areas of c o m o n  defense and c o m o n  interest. The joint defense 
privilege, or c o m o n  interest rule, is merely an extension of the aeomey-client privilege in that 
it protects communications between the parties when they are part of an on-going and joint effort 
to set up a c o m o n  defense strategy in connection with actual or prospective litigation. Intex 
Recreation Corp. v. Team Worldwide Corp., 471 F.Supp.2d 1 I (D.D.C.2007). The joint defense 
privilege applies not only to comunications but also to documents protected by the work 
product doctrine. Id. The circumstances in the instant matter require a degree of cooperation 
between the defendants in the underlying case and, therefore, the Court finds the joint defense 
agreements reasonable and within the standards allowed by Idaho's Professional Rules of 
Conduct. 
Having put to rest the questions of joint representation and joint defense agreements, the 
Court's analysis moves to the Defendants assertion that PlaintifT's claims in the instant matter 
should be dismissed as a matter of law based on the theory of litigation privilege, a doctrine that 
has yet to be addressed by Idaho's appellate courts. Nevertheless, numerous other jurisdictions 
have addressed the doctrine at length, providing the Court with direction as to the applicability of 
the privilege. 
The courts in West Virginia have addressed the litigation privilege on a number of 
occasions. In Clurk v. Druckman, 624 S.E.2d 864,218 W.Va. 427 (W.Va.2005), the plaintiff, a 
physician and former defendant in a medical malpractice suit, asserted claims in negligence 
against counsel for the plaintiff in the malpractice lawsuit. The Clark Court, looking first at the 
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duties of xi attorney, found an inflexible requirement that atrtorneys diligently, l'aii-hhlly and 
legitimately p e r h m  every act necessary to protect, conserve and advance the interests of their 
Clark v Druekurtan, 624 S .E.2d at 858. The Court then noted that its research revealed 
no case law that would support Clark's assertion that an aaarney owes a duty to an opposing 
party, such that breach ofthe duty would subject an atrtorney to liability. Id. at 869. The Court 
stated, "This Court can find no justification for imposing a duty of care in favor of an opposing 
party upon counsel. Imposition of such a duty can only work to the detriment of counsel's own 
client and would adversely impact counsel's duty of zealous advocacy for his or her own client 
and would create an impossible and unjustified conflict of interest.'"d. 
Court's that have had the opportunity to address the litigation privilege recognize the 
adversarial system would be turned on its head if parties to a lawsuit are allowed to bring claims 
in tort andlor legal malpractice against opposing counsel for conduct done within the scope of 
litigation. While attorneys rnust not knowingly counsel or assist a client in committing a crime 
or fraud5, Idaho's Rules of Professional Conduct require an attorney to pursue matters on behalf 
of a client despite opposition, obstruction or personal inconvenience to the attorney and require 
an attorney to take whatever lawful and ethical measures are required to vindicate a client's 
cause or endeavor. I.R.P.C., Rule 1.3[1] 
The doctrine of litigation privilege appears intended to create a safety zone for attorneys 
so that they may zealously advocate for their client without fear of retribution. The Supreme 
Court of Appeals of West Virginia aptly described the scope and purpose of the litigation 
privilege in Czar-k v. Druckman, 624 S.E.2d 864, 218 W.Va. 427 (2005). 
In her concurring opinion in Rarefield v. DPIC Companies, Inc., 2 15 W.Va. 544, 
600 S.E.2d 256 (2004)' Justice Davis discussed the policies underlying the 
5 I.R.P.C., Rule 1.2[10] 
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lriigation privilege. Therein she stated: 
[tJhe public policies associated with the 1itigaLion privilege include: (I) 
promoting the candid, objective and undistorted disclosure of evidence; 
(2) placing the burden of testing the evidence upon the litigants during 
trial; (3) avoiding the chilling effect resulting from the threat of 
subsequent litigation; (4) reinforcing the finality of judgments; (5) limiting 
collateral attacks upon judgments; (6)  promoting zealous advocacy; (7) 
discouraging abusive litistion practices; and (8) encouraging se.t-tlernent. 
Matsuura v. E.1" du Pont de Nenzours & Co., 102 Hawai'i 149, 73 P.3d 
687,693 (2003). 
Barefield, 215 W.Va. at 560,600 S.E.2d at 272 (Davis, J., concurring). In light of 
these policies, we see no reason to distinguish between communicatiorzs made 
during the litigation process and conduct occurring during the litigation process. 
As recognized by the Florida Supreme Court: 
absolute immunity must be afforded to any act occurring during the course 
of a judicial proceeding, regardless of whether the act involves a 
defamatory ~tatement or other tortious behavior such as the alleged 
misconduct at issue, so long as the act has some relation to the proceeding. 
The rationale behind the immunity afforded to defamatory statements is 
equally applicable to other misconduct occurring during the course of a 
judicial proceeding. Just as participants in litigation must be free to engage 
in unhindered communication, so too must those participants be free to use 
their best judgment in prosecuting or defending a lawsuit without fear of 
having to defend their actions in a subsequent civil action for misconduct. 
Levin, Middlebrooks, Mabie, Thomas, Mayes & Mitchell, P.A., v. United States 
Fire Insurance Company, 639 So.2d 606,608 (Fla. 1994). See also Jackson v. 
BellSouth Telecommunications, 372 F.3d 1250, 1274 (1 1 th Cir.2004) (quoting 
Levin ). 
In Collins, we recognized that absolute privileges, such as the litigation privilege, 
should only be permitted in limited circumstances. Collins, 21 1 W.Va. at 461, 566 
S.E.2d at 598. Thus, we do not believe that a litigation privilege should apply to 
bar liability of an attorney in all circumstances. In Mehafj, Rider, Windholz & 
Wilson v. Central Bank Denvez; N.A., 892 P.2d. 230, 235 (Colo. 1995), the 
Colorado Supreme court noted that "an attorney is not liable to a non-client absent 
a finding of fraud or malicious conduct by the attorney." See also Baglini v. 
Lauletta, 338 N.J.Super. 282, 768 A.2d 825, 833-34 (2001) ("The one tort 
excepted from the reach of the litigation privilege is malicious prosecution, or 
malicious use of process."). We believe such exceptions to an absolute litigation 
privilege arising from conduct occurring during the litigation process are 
reasonable accomodations whch preserve an attorney's duty of zealous 
advocacy while providing a deterrent to intentional conduct which is unrelated to 
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legitimate litigation tactics and which harms an opposing party. As recently noted 
by a California court: 
[a] fraud claim against a lawyer is no differertt: from a fraud claim against 
anyone else. If an aaomey commits actual fraud in hs  dealings with a 
third party, the fact he did so in the capacity of attorney for a client does 
not relieve him of liability. M i l e  an attorney's professional duty of care 
extends only to his own client and intended beneficiaries of his legal work, 
the limitations on liabilily for negligence do not apply to liability for 
fraud. 
Vega v. .Jones, Day, Reavis & P o p e ,  121 Cal.App.4th 282,291, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 
26, 3 1-2 (Cal.Ct.App.2004)(internal citations and quotations omitted). 
In order "[t]o maintain an action for malicious prosecution it is essential to prove: 
(1) That the prosecution was malicious; (2) that it was without reasonable or 
probable cause; and (3) that it terminated favorably to plaintiff." Syl. Pt. 1, Lyons 
v. Duvy-Pocahontas Goal Co., 75 W.Va. 739, 84 S.E. 744 (1 9 15). The term 
maliciotzs is defined as cc[s]ubstantially certain to cause injury" and "without just 
cause or excuse." Black's Law Dictionary 977 (8th Ed.2004). This definition 
implies an improper or evil intent or motive or the intent to do harm. Where an 
attomey files suit without reasonable or probable cause with the intent to harm a 
defendant, we do not believe the litigation privilege should insulate him or her 
from liability for malicious prosecution. 
As noted above, we can find no reasonable justification for distinguishing conduct 
fiom communications for the purposes of the litigation privilege. However, we 
also recognize the need for limited exceptions from application of the absolute 
litigation privilege for certain intentional actions. Accordingly, we now hold that 
the litigation privilege is generally applicable to bar a civil litigant's claim for civil 
damages against an opposing party's attorney if the alleged act of the attomey 
occurs in the course of the attorney's representation of an opposing party and is 
conduct related to the civil action. 
Clark v. Druckman, 624 S.E.2d at 870-87 1. 
In the instant matter, the conduct and actions of the Defendants that form the basis of 
Plaintiff's claims are all conduct and actions within the scope of the underlying litigation. Mibile 
Plaintiff correctly notes that there are potential conflicts of interest that exist between the clients 
of the Defendants, the Court is sufficiently persuaded, based on its review of the in camera 
documents, that the Defendants' clients have knowingly waived any conflicts and are fully 
informed that, as the litigation progresses, the common interests and defenses of the underlying 
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defendmts may diverge m d  the parties may find tlnemselves adversaries. While the underlying 
case is conlplex in that it involves numerous claims asserted against multiple defendants and 
involves inter-corporate trmsactions approved by directors that cross over from corporati 
corporation, the circumstances are not so unique that the Court is unable to look to the general 
analysis of courts with similar, albeit distinguishable, facts. 
A case with many similarities to the instant case is helpful to the analysis the Court must 
make. In Alpert v Crain Cuton &James PC. ,  178 S.W.3d 398 (Tex.App.-Houston [lSt Dist.] 
2005), Robert Alpert filed suit against the law firm of Crain, Caton & James afier the firm had 
represented hlark Riley, an attorney who found himself being sued by Alpert after their attorney- 
client relationship had soured. Alpert's suit against Crain Caton law firm asserted the firm had 
conspired with Riley to defraud Alpert, had aided and abetted Riley to defraud Alpert, and had 
torti~usly interfered with Riley's fiduciary duty to Alpert. The law firm moved to dismiss the 
lawsuit based on PLlpertYs failure to state a recognizable claim. The lower court granted the 
motion and Alp313 appealed. The trial court's dismissal of the lawsuit was affirmed by the Texas 
Court of Appeals. In reaching its decision, the Texas Court made the following statements: 
Perhaps as an offshoot of its privity jurisprudence, Texas case law has 
discouraged lawsuits against an opposing counsel if the lawsuit is based on the 
fact that counsel represented an opposing party in a judicial proceeding. Bradt Y. 
Sehek, 14 S.W.3d 756, 766 (Tex.App.-I-fouston [lst Dist.] 2001, pet. denied). An 
attorney has a duty to zealously represent his clients within the bounds of the law. 
Bradt v. West, 892 S. W.2d 56,7 1-72 (Tex.App.-Houston [I st Dist.] 1994, writ 
denied). In fulfilling this duty, an attorney has the right to interpose defenses and 
pursue legal rights that he deems necessary and proper, without being subject to 
liability or damages. Id. If an attorney could be held liable to an opposing party 
for statements made or actions taken in the course of representing his client, he 
would be forced constantly to balance his own potential exposure against his 
client's best interest. See id. Such a conflict hampers the resolution of disputes 
through the court system and the attainment of justice. Thus, to promote zealous 
representation, courts have held that an attorney is "qualifiedly immune" from 
civil liability, with respect to non-clients, for actions taken in connection with 
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representing a client in litigation. See, e.g., Butler v. LilZy, 533 S.W.2d 130, 13 1- 
34 uex.App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1976, writ dism'd). 
This qualified i m u n i t y  generally applies even if conduct is wrongful in the 
context of the underlying lawsuit, li'enfioe v. Jones & ,4ssocs., 947 S.W.2d 285, 
288 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1997, writ denied) ("'Under Texas law, attorneys 
c m o t  be held liable for w o n g h l  litigation conduct.'". For example, a third party 
bas no independent right of recovery against an attorney for filing motions in a 
lawsuit, even if frivolous or without merit, alhough such conduct is sanctionable 
or contemptible as enforced by the statutory or inherent powers of the court. West, 
892 S.W.2d at 72. Courts have refused to acknowledge an independent cause of 
action in such instances "because making motions is conduct an attorney engages 
in as part of the discharge of his duties in representing a party in a lawsuit." Id. 
(holding no cause of action existed for making motion for contempt because 
attorneys do not owe duty to be correct in legal arguments-"even if the ... motion 
for contempt had been meritless, their conduct in so moving, corning as it did in 
the discharge of their duties in representing a party in a lawsuit, would still not be 
actionable."). Thus, an attorney's conduct, even if frivolous or without merit, is 
not independently actionable if the conduct is part of the discharge of the lawyer's 
duties in representing his or her client. Id at 74; Chapman Children's Trust v. 
Porter & Hedges, L. L.P., 32 S. W.3d 429,44 1 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 
2000, pet. denied). The i m u n i t y  focuses on the type of conduct, not on whether 
the conduct was meritorious in the context of the underlying lawsuit. Renfroe, 947 
S.W.2d at 288. 
As the Texas Supreme Court observed in McCamish, a lawyer's protection from 
liability arising out of his represenlati011 of a client is not without limits. See 
McCamish, 99 1 S.W.2d at 793-94; see also Tales v. Tales, 1 13 S.W.3d 899, 912- 
13 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2003, no pet.). For example, a cause of action could exist 
against an attorney who knowingly commits a fraudulent act outside the scope of 
his legal representation of the client. See Likover v. Sunflower Terrace I%, Ltd., 
696 S.W.2d 468, 472 (Tex.App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1985, no writ). If a lawyer 
participates in independently fraudulent activities, his action is "foreign to the 
duties of an attorney." Id. (quoting Poole v. fibuston & 11 C. Ry. Co., 58 Tex. 134, 
137 (1882)). A lawyer thus cannot shield his own willful and premeditated 
fraudulent actions from liability simply on the ground that he is an agent of his 
client. See id. 
Alpert v. Crain, Caton & James, P.C., 178 S.W.3d at 405-406. 
In the instant case, Reed Taylor's claims against the Defendants are all based on conduct 
and actions engaged in by the Defendants within the scope of the underlying litigation. 
Nevertheless, under the theory asserted by Plaintiff, a defendant's attorney may become liable to 
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a plaintiff if the plaintiff disagrees with or is offended by the litigation tactics of defense counsel 
or disagrees with or is offended by the decision of an opposing party to waive conflicts of 
interest in order for common interests to be defended in the most efficient andjor e E e c ~ v e  
manner. It is this very morass that the litigation privilege seeks to prevent. 
Each of Plaintifrs claims against the Defendants contends that by defending the 
corporations in the underlying action, by accepting payment for their representation, by arguing 
positions to the Court in favor of their clients and against the claims of Reed Taylor, and that by 
failing to agree with Reed Taylor's positions in regards to his claims, the Defendants have aided 
and abetted and conspired with the corporations and individual directors to interfere with the 
contracbal rights of Reed Taylor. Yet, Plaintiff is unable to direct the Court to any conduct or 
action on the part of the Defendants that falls outside the scope of the Defendants' representation 
of their clients. 
The Court appreciates the Plaintiffs right to zealously prosecute his claims in the 
underlying action and respects his belief that his claims are sound, that he will prevail on those 
clainis and that the underlying defendants are simply delaying the inevitable. However, the 
Court also appreciates the defendants' right in the underlying action to disagree with Reed 
Taylor's position and to defend against his asserted claims. The Court is persuaded that the 
litigation privilege is a sound judicial concept that should be recognized in Idaho as it is 
consistent with the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct and the firmly held established standard 
in Idaho that an attorney is obligated to provide his clients with zealous representation. In the 
instant matter, the conduct and actions of the Defendants, as alleged by Plaintiff, all fall within 
the scope of the Defendants' representation of their clients and, therefore, fall within the 
protection of the litigation privilege. 
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The Court is further persuaded, based on its review of the various documents provided to 
the Court for in camera review, that the Defendmts took all steps necessary to insure compliance 
with the mles of professional anduct  in their representation of clients with potential codlicts of 
interest and in the use of a joint defense agreement. Therefore, there has been no conduct of 
aiding and abetting or conspiracy on the part of the Defendants in. their representation of the 
underlying corporate defefendmts. Neither has there been m y  conversion of assets by the 
Defendants. Prior to the Dekndants being retained in the underlying case, the Court entered a 
preliminary injunction ordering operational authority of AIA to remain status quo. Thus, the 
directors of the corporation, including John Taylor, had authority to retain the Defendants to 
represent the corporations. Furthermore, representations made by the Defendants to the Court in 
furtherance of their of their clients' defense do not constitute violations of Idaho's consumer 
protection laws when those representations are made within the scope of litigation. Finally, 
PlaintifPs claim for legal malpractice fails as a matter of law. The existence of an attorney-client 
relationship is a necessary element to a legal malpractice claim and Plaintiff, who specifically 
raises the fact that he has not been allowed to choose counsel for the underlying defendants, has 
no attorney-client relationship with the ~e f endan t s .~  
(B) PLAINTIFF'S NOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT 
"The decision whether to allow a party to amend its pleadings is left to the sound 
discretion of the trial court . . . ." Wells v. Uizited States Insurance Co., 1 1 9 Idaho 160, 166, 804 
P.2d 333 (Ct.App. 1991). It is not an abuse of discretion to deny a motion to amend where the 
This issue was addressed fully in the Opinion & Order on Defendants Motion to Dismiss in the companion case of 
Taylor v. McNichols, et al., Nez Perce County Case No. CV08-01763. See also Harrigfeld v. Irlancock, 140 Idaho 
134,90 P.3d 884 (2004) and again in Estate ofBecker v. Callahan, 140 Idaho 522,96 P.3d 623 (2004). 
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record contains no allegation that? if proven, would entitle a plaintiff to the relief claimed. Id. at 
167. 
The Court, afier hearing oral argments of counsel and after revie-wing Ealaintifrs 
proposed mended complaint, finds it would be a futile act to grant PIaintifPs motion to amend 
as the proposed mended complaint would not withstand a motion to dismiss. In his proposed 
amended complaint, Plaintiff asserts the same claims as set forth in his original Complaint and 
seeks to add derivative claims. Plaintiffs amended direct claims fail as a matter of law for the 
same reasons as addressed by the Court above, despite Plaintifrs bare allegation that the conduct 
and actions of the Defendants exceeded the scope of their representation. 
Plaint~ff's attempt to bring derivative claims on behalf of AIA Insurance and AIA 
Services fail as a matter of law. Idaho Code 5 30-1-741 clearly and unambiguously provides 
standing to bring derivative proceedings only to those who are shareholders at the time of the act 
or omission complained of and only to those shareholders who fairly and adequately represent 
the interests of the corporation. As noted by the ABA Official Comment at the end of I.G. 5 30- 
1-741, while some state's have eliminated the "contemporaneous" ownership rule, Idaho's 
legislature chose to retain the requirement, as is evidenced by the language in the statute. 
Plaintiff contends that, because other states have allowed creditors and stock pledges to bring 
derivative claims, standing should not be limited to shareholders. The Court is not persuaded. 
Idaho Code (j 30-1-741 is clear and unambiguous, making it clear Idaho's legislature has chosen 
to limit derivative claims to shareholders only. 
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O m E R  
PlaintifPs &lotion to /mend Complaint is hereby IJENXED. 
Defenda~ts' Motion to Dismiss is hereby GRANTED. 
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Dated this day of December 2008. 
I hereby certify that a true ropy of the foregoing OPINION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION TO DISMISS AND PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT was 
li~aiieri, postage prepaid, by the undersigned at Lewiston, Idabo, this day of Decetllber 2008, 
to: 
Micl~ael Bissell 
7 So Howard St., Ste. 41 6 
Spokane WA 99201 
J a ~ i ~ e s  LaRue 
PO Box 1539 
Boise ID 83701-1539 
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CAMPBELL, BISSELL (4i; KIRBY PLLC 
7 South Howad Street, Suite 4 16 
Spokane, WA 99201 
Tel: (509) 455-7100 
Fax: (509) 455-71 11 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed Taylor 
IN TWE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
REED J . TAYLOR, an individual, 
GARY D. BABBITT, an individual; D. JOHN 
ASWBY, an individual; PATRICK V. 
COLLPNS, an individual; RICHARD A. 
RILEY, an individual; HAWLEY TROXELL 
E W I S  & HAWLEY LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; JANE DOES I-X, 
unknown individuals; 
Case No.: CV08-01765 
AFFIDAVIT OF MICHAEL S. BISSELL 
IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTlFF REED J. 
TAYLOR'S MOTION TO DISALLOW 
DEFENDANTS' REQUEST FOR 
ATTOWEUS' FEES AND COSTS 
Defendants. I 
STATE OF WASHPNCTON 1 
) ss: 
COUNTY OF SPOKANE 1 
I, Michael S. Rissell, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says: 
1. I arn over the age of eighteen years, competent to testify in court, the 
attorney for the plaintiff in the above-entitled action, and make this Affidavit based upon 
my personal knowledge and belief based upon the infonnation available to me. 
2. Attached as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of Reed Taylor's Motion 
to Compel filed in Taylor v. AIA Services Colporntion, et al. By way of the attached 
TAYLOR'S MOTION TO DISALLOW DEFENDANTS' REUEST FOR 
ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS i -j r 
i) \I 
Motion, Reed Taylor sought copies of tolling agrements and represelltation docun~ents 
subtnined by certain defendants (who were y the Defendants in this action) 
to their experts to testifjr in opposition to Reed Taylor's Motion to Disqualifi counsel in 
Taylor v. AIA Sewices Corporation, et at. The documents requested in the Motion were 
the same tolling ageements and evidence apparently relied upon by the Court in 
dismissing Reed Taylor's Complaint against the Defendants in this action. 
3. Attached as Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of the Court's Order 
de~iyirtg Reed Taylor's request to obtain copies of the documents referenced above. By 
denying Reed Taylor's Motion to Compel (Exhibit A), the Co~lrt permitted the 
kfendants to use the documents referenced in the Motion to Compel as a shield fi-om 
being disqualified, and as a sword for dismissing Reed Taylor's claims in this action. 
4. Attached as Exhibit C is a hue and correct copy of the itemization of fees 
requested by the Defendants in this action. My office numbered each entry so as to 
provide a basis to cite to the applicable entry for objection purposes, 
5. 1 have not pursed any claims in this action for any harassment, fiivolous or 
unfounded purposes. I stand by the claims asserted by Reed Taylor, as they were 
asserted in good faith and supported by substantial law, as dernonstrated by the 
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knowing that the claims and facts asseired were not suppoired by the law or a good faith 
ent for the reversal, modification or expaslsion of existing law. 
TED: This 20'" day of January, 2009. 
SUBSCEIlBED AND SWORN to before me this 2oth day of January, 2009. 
A&BM~~~PWE~T;~%EL~S ~ ~ % ~ - S ~ P P O R T  OF PLAINTIFF REED J. 
TAYLOR'S MOTION TO UISALLOW DEFENDANTS' REUEST FOR 
ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS I .:; fl 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
1 HEWBY CERTIFY that on "che day of' Jmuary, 2009, 1 caused to be 
served a t-rue md coned copy of the foregoing document lo the .following: 
HAND DELIVERY J m e s  D. LaRue 
" U.SMAfL E l m  cgE; Bmke, PA 
OWRN1CHT MAIL P.O. Box 1539 
FAX TWNSMISSIOH Boise, UD 83704 
EMAIL (.pdf attachent) 
A&BWY%PMG%&EV $IW%W.SBPPORT OF PLAINTIFF REED J. 
TAYLOR'S MOTION TO DISALLOW DEFENDANTS'REUEST FOR 
ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS 
. 488 
RODERTCK C. BOND (Pro Hac Vice) 
M2D A. O N ,  ISB No. 233 L 
SMITH, CANNON & BOND PLLC 
508 Eighth Street 
Lewislon, Idaho 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-9428 
Fax: (208) 746-842 1 
MICFtAF,L S. BISSELL, ISB No. 5762 
CAMPBELL, BlSSELL & KIRBY PLLC 
7 South Roward Street, Suite 4 16 
Spokane, WA 99201 
'I'el: (509) 455-7100 
FM: (509) 45 5-7 1 1 1 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor 
. Ild TE-IE DISTRICT COURT 01: THE SECOND JUDICIAI, DISTRICT OF 7'IE 
STATE OF IDAHO, M AND FOR 'THE COUNTY 01; NEZ PERCE 
REED J. TAYLOR, a single person, 
Plaintiff, Case No.: CV-07-00208 
v. / REED TAYLOR'S MO1'ION TO 
AIA ST?RVICES CORPOEUTION, an TtIaho 
corporation; M A  INSURANCE, WC., an Idaho 
corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and CONNIE 
TAYLOR, individually and the community 
property comprised tiiereot BRYAN 
FFCEEMAN, a single person; JOLEE DUCLOS, 
a single person; CROP USA INSURANCE 
AGENCY, lNC., an Jdaho Corporation; and 
JAMES BECK and CORRIME BECK 
individuaily and the community property 
comprised thercoc 
COMPEL PRODUCTION OF 
DOCUMENTS PROVIDED TO 
EXPERT WTl'NESSES OF M A  
SERVICES, AIA INSURANCE AND 
JOIIN TAYLOR AND PRELIMWARY 
RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION '1'0 
MOTION FOR hV CAMERA WVTEW 
REED TAYLOR'S MOTION TO COMPEL 
PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS - I 
AFFIDAVIT OF MICHAEL S. BISSEL TIFF REED J. 
TAYLOR'S MOTION TO DISALLOW FOR 
ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS . \ ..I 8 .$) 
Plaintiff, Reed J. 'Taylor {""Reed Taylor"), submits t h i s  Motion to Compel rhe 
Production of C)ocumenls Provided to Expert Wibesses of AIA Serviceu, AHA Insurance, 
GropUSA, and John Taylor. 
l, BRIEF STA- 
In opposition to Reed 'Faylor" M&ion to Disqualifyjl, AIA Services, ALA 
Insurance and John Taylor submitled. the dtidavits of expert witnesses Thomas D. 
Morgan and John A. Strait. Cornlie Taylor; James Deck and Corrirte Beck filed a Joiiider 
horporating by referet~ce the expert witness affidavits. See Connie Taylor, Ja~nes Beck 
and Corrinc Reclc's Joinder. The Aaidavits of ?bornas Wrgan and John Strait refer to 
doctu11enis reviewed by each in renciel.ing their expert opinions. Some of the riocunlents 
revicwcd by each are claitncd to bc subject to privilege. A list of the privileged 
docrunents rr:viewed by Morgm is set forth at pages 4-5 of his affidavit. A list of the 
privileged documents rcv ie~~ed by Strait is set forth at pages 8-9 of his afidavit. 
Atracllcd as Exhibit I to the Supplemcntd Affidavit of Roderick Bond is a combined list 
of the some of the priviieged documents reviewetl by each ("'priviie~d doc;uments"j. 
Et is essential to note that Morgan and Strait relied upon the privilegd documents 
in re~dering their rcspcctive opinions. Spccificaly, on page 21 of his affidavit, Strait 
en~phasizev that his opinion is btised upon privileged documents and cnridiclly points out 
that Reed 'l'aylor's expert witness, Peter Jarvis, "simply doesn't have relevant 
[privilcgcd] irtformation from tv12ich to opine." See Straight Aff. This slateinent 
perfectly frames the fss~ie on this motion to compel: Whether disclosure to a testifying 
expert of privileged materials in connection with his testimony constitutes a waiver of the 
atlorttey-client and work product privilege as to the material disclosed such that the 
opposing party is entitled to discovery? As discussed below, the answer is yes. 
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Far this motion $0 compel, it is also to bc materially noted that alrc privileged 
doc~ments - before being disclosed to defendan&kxpel.ts - were the subject of Reed 
Taylor's Req~iests for Production of Docrunenis. Sge Affidavihf  Ruderick Bond; 
Supplcmcn~al Amdavit of' Rodcrick Bond. The Defen&dnts have rehsed to provide the 
documents claiming ~~rivilege, See AfGdavit of RocIerick Bond; Supplerneiltai A-fTjdavit 
of Roderick Bond. 
'1%~ next business day aAer being served wit11 the Affidavits of ?'hornas Mofgetr 
and folm Strait, the attorney for Reed 'Taylor again requested of the defendank that the 
doculr~ents provided to the expert witnesses. Set Affidavit of Roderick: Bond, EX. E. 'i'he 
attorneys for the dcfendanh were provicted with written notice and an opportunity to 
produce the documearls. Iri Thc Defendants contitl~te ta refuse production and so stated 
in an ernail dated October 14, 2008, from John Ashby to Roderick Rortd. See Affidavit 
of Roderick Bond, Ex. E. No other respoases were provided by any of the Defendants. 
Reed Taylor riow moves the court to enter an order compelling defendants to 
produce the docuntents identifiect in Exhibit I to the Supplemental Affidavit of Roderick 
C. Bond. 
A, Rsed Tlpgrlos Atte~~ptcd To Rasohe This Maate% Witlhov~t Corjlrt Actioa, 
However, Tbe Defcadnatis Hit~kjrr, Refused To Produce Discovergble 
Documents, 
T.R.C.P. 37(a)f2j governs tiiis  rotio ion lo compef, and the rule provides as 1ollo.t~~ 
in pertinent part: 
(2) Motion. .. . [Iff a party, in Iespotlse to a request for inspection submitted 
under Rule 34, fails to rcsportd that inspection will he permitted as requested or 
fails to permit inspection as rey~tested, the discovering party may move for an 
order corl~pcllir~g . .. inspection in accordance wit11 the request. T11c motion must 
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include a cerlification &fit the movant has in good kith conferred or atternpled lo 
coztfcr with the party not ~naking the disclosure in an effort to secure tlie 
disclosum without court action. 
I.K.C.P. 37(a)(2), 
Here, Reed Taylor, though his counsel, has complied with I.R.C,P. 37(a)(2). 
Recd 'faylor in good faith attempbed to resolve fithis ctisputc Mri%out court action, but due 
to the de.fendmts~e%sai to produce relevmt documents this molio~n is required, 
8. The Defend;tnts3 Dbclosura To A Testifying Expert Oft Privileged Documeatst 
Corzstifotes A Waiver Of The Atforney-Client- PriviIegc And Work Product 
Pri-vifegie, Wfsich Requires The Produckion Of All Sech Documents 'I'o Reed 
Tilylar, 
A party waives privilege when he or she discloses privileged documents to a 
testifyii~g expert witness. U.S. F i d e f i ~  d Czrar. Go. v. Brcl$petro Oil Servs. Co., 2002 
W t  15652 (S.D.N.Y.), 53 Fed.R.Serv.3d 60 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Jn re Pioneer fi-Bred 
Intern., Inc., 238 F.3d 1370 (8Ih Cir. 2001); In Mil*~,relmun v. PItillips, 176 F.R.D. 194 
@.Md. 1997); In Doe v. Lzacrne Counry, 2008 WI. 251 81 31 (M.l).Pa. 20012); CP Kdco 
US. IFJC. V. Pkr~rrntacizr Gorp., 213 F.R.D. 176 (D.5~1. 2003); ,State ex rel. Tmcy v. 
Dandzimnd, 30 S. W.3d 83 1 (Mo. 2000); Gulf v. Jumison, 44 P.34 233 (Colo. 2002). 
la1 US. Fidelity R Guar. Co. v. I3r.nspeti.o Oil Servs. Co., 2002 JVL 15652 
(S.D,N.U.), 53 Fed.R.Serv.3d 60 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), the cox~rl ordered all documents 
produccd to d ~ e  plaintiffs hoiding that discIosi~re of rnatcrials to a teutifyir-ig expert in 
cotmeetion with his testimony effects a waiver lo the same extent as any other disclosure. 
The cotlrl stated: 
Lt is well eshbljshcd that voluntary disclosi~re of a docu~nent to a party outside the 
privilege waives thc ~ttomey-cficrrt privilege regarding that document. (Multiple 
citations omitled). This is because such disclos~trc undercuts tlre very reason for 
the privilege, which is to protect the confidcrttiaiity of colnln~inications between 
clients and their attorneys. (Multiple citations omitted). 
REED 1'AYI,OR'S IvlO'SlON TO GOMPEI. 
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US.  FideiiD & Gaclr. Ca.* 2002 WI 15552 ili 5. T~IC court cited the Advisory 
Cummittec's Notes to the 1993 Amendments to Rule 26 of the Pede~.;r.at Rates of Civil 
Procedure and quoted: 
'[Ljitiga~~ts should no longcr be able to argue thnt materials filrnished to their 
expert!: to be .used in forming their opinions-whet11er or not uttimately relied on by 
the expett-are privileged or otlicrwise protected from disclosure.' 
in re Yioncer FJi-Bred Itlketn., Inc., 238 F.3d 1370 (8"' Cir. ZOOl), the Eighth 
Circu~t Court of Appeals held tlzat "kndamental Fdirness" reqrzires any disclosure Lo a 
testifying expert of privileged or protected material in conr~ectiort witfl his testimony 
;anstit~tt-es a waiver of thc tlttorncy-cfietlt and work prodirct privilege to the same extcnt 
as with any ather disclosure. 'I'ltc court also referred to tile 1993 Amcndmet~ts to R u b  26 
ufihe Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and stated: 
rTl11e 1993 amendments to Rule 26 ofrhe Federal Rules of Civil Procedure make 
clear that documents and information diseloscd to a testifying expert in 
collncction with his testimony are discoverable by the opposing party, whether or 
not the expert relies on the documents and informatior1 in preparing his repox-t. 
Rule 26(rt)(Z) requires that the testifying expert's report "co~itain a complete 
statement oF all opinions to be expressed and the basis and reasons ificrefor; the 
data or other idormation considered by the witr~css in Forming tttc opinions; ...." 
7'hc accompanying Advisory CommiEee Note expIicitly states thnt "[tjhe report is 
to disclose tlie data and other infomation considerect by the expe rt.... Given this 
obligtxtion or  disclosure, litigants should no longer be able to argue that materials 
f'ur~lished to their experts to be used in forming their opi-c~ions-whedie~ or not 
udtimately relied upon by t I ~ c  expert-are privileged 01 otherwise protected from 
disctosure when such persons iure testifying or being deposed." (Citation 
omitted). 'I& rcvisccl r g t c g ~ n ~ c c c ~ ~  t l ~ c ~ ~ t i r l t l  that &ttdamc~t&fJ~~it~~csq 
ctcg.tircs c&&ttse, o f  i d l  i12ftrnn-& it icstifi:irrr! cxpr t  i 1-1 cotinectio~ - 
w i l ! ? m g n v .  ititicd-&uniIblc to p E $ i u l :  what i n t c ~ s j u g d ~ !  - 
&cr vet1 by_peru~ iftins? cotrnsc1 gwvidc e o ~ . e - y x L ~ & a ~ i  testifying 
cxgert atld then ta den~tiiscotr@rv n f s u c l ~ m i a l  to the omgin-. - -- 
In re Pioneer ffi-Bredintern., h c . ,  238 F.3d at 13115 [emphasjs added). 
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In Nusseln~un v PhillQs, f 76 F.R.D. 194 (D,Md. 1997), the court held that ivhcn 
ajl attorney furnishes work product to an expert witness rctained for purpose d' provi 
upinion Icstimony, then the opposing party is entitlccl to discover such communication. 
'I'hc court slso disctssed the 1991 Amendments to Rule 26 OF the Federal lttiles of Civil 
Procedure and the status of case law: 
Bused largely on the Advismy Committee's Note to Rule 26(aj(2)(R), a number of 
courts and commentators have accordingly concluded U=t if an attorney provides 
work product to an expert who consiclers it iir fornling opinions whkh he or she 
will be tesiibng to at trial, this information is no longer privileged add nrust be 
disclosed. See, c.g., 3 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Mille~, & Richard I.. 
Marcus, Federal Pmcticc and 13rocedur@ § 2016.2, at 250 (1994) ("At Iectst with 
respect to experts who testify at trial, the disclosure requirement oEKuIe 2(r(a)(2), 
adopted in 7993, was intendcd to predetermine farther discussion and mandate 
disclosure despite ftlae work product] privilege."). . .("'13oth the [ I  993 
Amenclments to the 17ederal Rules) and tire Advisory Corilmittee Notes inciicatc 
that materials supplied to an cxpert are st~bjject to discovery."). 
Mzissotmcx~, 176 F.1i.D. 194 at 197-198. 1x1 Doe v. Ltrzeme Cotmty, 2008 WL 25 111 13 1 
[W.D.Pa. 200Rj, the corlri held that work-product priviicgc protection is waived whcri an 
attorney discloses privileged documents tu an expert witness that considers, relics upoil 
and citcs the docun~ents in writing an expel* repurt. 'fke priviieged documents are 
rccyuired to be produccd to the opposing party. 
In CP Kefco US. JRC. V .  Phutmacin Corp.,' 213 F.1X.D. 1'46 (D.DcI. 20031, the 
district court also held that a party is required to prociuce dncurnctlts protected by tbe 
attorney-client privilcge whcn it provides the doc~unents to an expert witness that offers. 
In the context of an assertion of privilege, the inviolability of lhat rule is of 
fimdnmental in-rportaace. It wotrld be martifestly unfair to allotv a party to ~ i s c  tfx 
privilege to.&icld information which i t  ltncl r l e l i b e r ~ . ~ ~ g ~ ~ j y s  
as Pharmacia iiicl In this insta~lcc when it i~sed thc afteaecilv nriviiercd documents 
to arm ifs expert for testimony. ( See Fed.E.Giv.P. 26(b)f4)(a) and Advisory 
Commitlee note.) 1.Ience.ffie tndsm that a orlvilegc cannot he uscd as bottr a 
$Geld and a sword. See United States v. Rylander, 460 17.3. 752, 758, 103 S.Ct. 
1548, 75 L.Ed.24 521 (1 983). The non-Ieaat cqtlivafettt. of that truism is  eaually 
to O i h ~  pain[: "You cstr'"txave it bur11 wav&xav&g C I I O S ~ I T  toc~$e: the infntn~iitirt~ 
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irtformalion from disciasure is, and rernains, waived. 
tP Melco US, Irac., 213 F.R.D. I76 at 179 (cfnpharjis arlded). 
In St~xte  cx rcf. Trucy Y. anduraurd, 30 S.W.Jd 831 (Mo. 2000), the court held 
that a party waives the attorney-client privilege as to clocumcnts pravidcd to an expert 
witness tvl~o testifies and the opposirtg party is entitled to the prodt~ction of ufl of the 
materials provided lo the expert. 
Rttle 56.01(b)[4) wissouri denomination of Rule 26(b)(4)] should hc read to 
require production of all of the materials provided to the mpert. 'To hold 
otherwise wotttd illlow the expert witness or t lx  patty retaining the expert witness 
to select which documen~q to produce after the expcrt has reviewed thc docurnen& 
in preparation for tire expert's testimony.. .it is appropriate, at depositton or trial, 
to cross-examine an expert witness as to illformaGon provided to the expert that 
may contradict or wealc~n the bases for his or her opinion regi~rdless of whether 
the cxpert relied upon or considered B c  in formntion. 
In Gnfl v. Jamison, 44 P.3ri 233 (Colo. 2002), the Colorado Supreme Court, en 
banc, held 11.1at privileged matcririls lose their privileged status when disclosed to, and 
consiciered by, it testifying expert. In a scholarly and comprel~cnsively consictercd 
opinion, [he court stated: 
A 1993 amendmet~t to Rule 26 of the Federal IPttles of Civil 12rocedure and a 
parallel 1995 amenctment to its Colorado countev.rt mandate firif disclosure of' 
"ihc materials considered by an expert witness, even if the materials include 
attorney work product The plain Iangxiage of the amended Rrtle, the 
accompai~ying advisory co~nmittee's note, policy conqidexations, and the weight 
of authority compel the conclusior~ tftat privileged inateriais lose their privileged 
status when disclosed to, and co~rsidered by, a testifying expert 
Gull, 44 P.3d at 234. 'l'hc Cotorndo Supreme Court a190 specificnlly addrcsscd and 
rejected the disclosing party's argument that an in cntncrra inspection of Lbe disclosed 
cfocuinents was an available alternative: 
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Strong prt'biic policy co~~siderations s~ippo& a consfr~tction o f  Rule 26fa)(2) 
w&-fcs of !kc rules c ~ ~ ~ & ~ ~ ~ c ~ w ~ ~ ~ c L I ~ c c J ~ ~ ~ & ~  
resources. --- 
A brigl~t-line rule preserves judicial ecolromy by obviating the need for a judge to 
consicler whether counsel's commui~ications to retained experts cofttain work 
product. 
Gall, 44 P.3d at 239 (cmphasis added). 
Lastly, becatlse of its succinct and instruclive nature, the guidance offered io 
attorneys in Law m d  Practicc of I~lsrlrancc Coverage Litigation tj 24:39 (2008) is 
mentioncd. AAer stating that there "are tl~ree importarit kaidelincs" for disclosing 
ducumedlrs to an expert witness, the first guideline is statcrt: 
First, counsel must consider wlteth~r the doct~meut to be provided is subjcct fa 
any privilege because providing tho doc~ment to thc expert will constitz~te a 
waiver of that privilege. Certainly, an exper"tshoufd not be provided with any of: 
CO~IIIEL'I'S nri~ilcggd~~ft.ttnutlit.at~~yit1~ till: c!ittrt,ar ~ ~ ( ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ Q ~ ~ J Q ~  
are taking the cxtrcrnelv unuwalst~g of waiving such privileges, - 
I.aw and Practice of Insurance Coverage Litigation 5 2439 (2008) (crnphasis added). 
ikcre, the John Taylor, AIA Services, AIA Tnsurance, and Crop USA all srrbmitted 
expert reports by and tlxough their attoixeys. Connie 'f'i~ylor, Jaines Beck ;tad Carrine 
Beck filed a J~ inder  opposing disquali5cation. Thcy have alf waived their attortiey-client 
privilege and dl docilments mast be produced thcit have been provided to or relied upon 
by the experts, including, all notes and related documetlts. 
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Far the reasons s&~ulakd above, the Court shouId gatat Reed Taytor's N o ~ o n  to 
Compel Productiol~ uf Daeunxerzts Pravided lo Experl Witnesses J b h  StraigIrt and 
' h m a  Morgm. The D d e b n t s  shotxld be ordered to produce all docamefi% provided 
to Thomas Morgm and Job S.trai&t and their nates, in parlicdar, all documents listed in 
For the same reasons set fb& above, the Motion for In C m r a  &view shouid be 
denied because the fbefencfanls have wnived any privilege, 
DATED. 'This 35'" d ~ y  of October, 2008. 
SMTTH, CAWON & BOND PLLC 
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & KIRBYa,I,C 
Ned A. Camon 
Micl~aei S .  Bissell 
Atlomeys for PIdnfiEReed J. Taylor 
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JAM.  9. 2 0 0 9  1 :36PM R I C T  COURT 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF JUDIC'flAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OP l'DAH[O, IN AM) OF NIEZ PERCE 
REED I. TAYLOR, a singIe person, 
Plaintiff, 
AIA SERVICES COWORATION, an Idaho 
corporation; AIA INSURANCE, INC., an 
Idaho corporation; 8, JOHN TAYLOR and 
CONNXE TAYLOR, individually and the 
community property comprised thereof, 
B W  FREEMAN, a single person; and 
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person; CROP 
USA INSURANCE AGENCY, MC., an 
Idaho corporation; and JAMES BECK and 
CORRINE BECK, individually and in the 




CASE NO. CV07-00208 
OPINION AND ORDER ON 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO 
COMPEL DOCUMENTS 
PllOVTDER TO DEFENDANTS' 
'EXPERTS RELATIVE TO 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO 
DISQUALIFY 
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs Motion to Compel filed October 15,2008. 
On October 20,2008, the Court heard Plaintiff's Motion to Compel along with Plaintiffs Motion 
to Disqualify and Defendants' Motions to Submit Documents in Cameru as the motions were all 
related. The Court took the moxions under advisement, Shortly thereafter, the C O U ~  granted 
AFFIDAVIT OF MICHAEL OF PLAINTIFF REED J. 
TAYLOR'S MOTION TO DI ' REUEST FOR 
ATTORNEYS' FEES AND C 
NO. 9 4 4 3  P. Z / ?  
in part on the i~ camera docmenfs, Ihc: Coufi later entered itx Opinion and Order on Flakties 
he Attorneys and Law Firms of Hawley Troxell Emis & EIawley LLP, 
Clements Brown & McNichols, P.A., and Quarles & Brady ILU. The Court now adcfxesses 
PfhtifPs motion to compel disclosuse of the docmeats provided to the Court iul camem, 
After careful review of the doc~meas ought by Plah~-Efl the Court Grids the documents 
are w r k  product subject to a~omeyIc1ient pfivilegt: and not discoverable. Therefore, Plain~ff s
Motion to Compel is hereby DENIED, 
Dated ihir 7 day of January 2009. 
rT"rl 
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CERTmU 
1 hereby cerliq &at a a e  copy of .the foregoing 0 D E R  was: 
/hand delivered via court basket, or dw4 - / 
- 
U '  
mailed, postage prepaid, by the undersiped at Lewision, Idaho, this %%aY of 
Jmxay, 2009, to: 
Ksoderick C. Bond 
Smith md ~ m 6 n  
505 Eighth St 
Lewiston, ID 83 50 1 
David R, Risley 
Randall, Blake & Cox 
PO Box 446 
Lewislon, ID 83501 
Mchael S. BisseII James Gatziotirj 
7 S Wowsd St Charles E?. Harper 
Spokane, Wi?l 99201 QuarIes and Brady LLP 
500 W Madison St., Ste 3700 
Mchael. E, McNichols Chicago IL, 6066 1-25 1 l. 
Clements, Brown SG McNichols 
POBox 1510 
Lewiston, ID 53501 
David A. Gittins 
PO Box 1191 
Clarkston, WA 99403 
Gary 5). Babbitt . 
D John Ashby 
Wawfey, Txoxell Emis & Hawley LLP 
PO Box 1617 
Charles Brown 
PO Box 1225 
Lewiston, TCI 83503. 
To Plaintiff's Motion to Disilualify 
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251 East Pront Street, Suite 3 0 0  
Post Office Box -9 
Boise, Idha 83701 
Telephone 208 343-5454 
Fax 208 384-5844 
ELAM & BURKE - 
ATTORNEYS A T  LAW 
IRS NO. 82-045 1327 
FOR PROFESSION= SERVICES RENDERED 
Through December 29, 2008 
RE: HTEH (I) Reed Taylor (C) CLIENT/MATTER 07082-00013 
Claim: B086124 
DATE HOURS 
\ * 8/20/08 JDL 5.00 Review emails from Bissell with attached complaint - 
forward copy to client and ALPS (.4). Telephone 
conferences with client re new lawsuit, 
McNichols complaint and appointed counsel, and 
related issues (1.1). Review numerous email. 
communications (.8). Review Complaint against 
HTEH (1.5) . Letter to consultant ( .1) . Call 
co-counsel re: McNichols Complaint (.1). Brief 
review of McNichols Complaint (.3). Work on 
issues to develop and understand ( . 7 ) .  
k. 8/20/08 JNP 1.10 Review and analyze email correspondence re filing 
of complaint against HTEH (.I). Analyze issues 
re complaint against HTEH and individual 
attorneys ( .3) . Review and analyze complaint 
filed against HTEH and individual attorneys (.7) .
3.  8/20/08 LC1 1.30 Receive and review complaint by Reed Taylor 
against Hawley Troxell and individual members of 
that f inn. 
q. 8/20/08 LC1 .20 Review case law and analyze its applicability to this 
action. 
5. 8/20/08 LC1 1.80 Receive and review complaints against Hawley 
Troxell and Mike McNichols; analyze defenses to 
complaint against Hawley Troxell. 
la. 8/21/08 JDL 4.70 ~egin outline for motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim by identification of legal 
theories in complaint, possible responses and 
research needed and identification of documents 
to support (2.3). Communications with 
client/carrier (1.1). Telephone conversation 
with attorney ( .1) . Develop analysis and 
strategy of sequencing underlying and attorney 
AFFIDAVIT OF SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF REED J. 











8 / 2 5 / 0 8  L C I  
Lawsuits, motions, stays, and other 
considerations ( . 9 ) .  Comunications with 
attorney Bissell re: acceptance of service(.3). 
2-10 Xesearch and analyze Idaho case law re elements of 
cause of action (1.4). Research and analyze Idaho 
case law re elments of claims ( .7) . 
1.00 Prepare maorandurn analyzing complaints, of Reed 
Tyler vs. Hawley Troxell and defenses to causes 
of action. 
' 5 0  Review consolibted financial statments of corporations. 
.70 Research case law re plaintiff's causes of action 
for alleged civil conspiracy and aiding and 
abetting client in comission of tortious acts. 
.50 Analyze defenses to complaint, Rule 12 (b) (6) 
motion, and possible motion for change of venue. 
.50 Commence preparation of Rule 12 ( h f  (6) motion ta 
dismiss and supporting brief. 
2.00 Research and continued preparation of brief in 
support of 12 (b) (6) motion to dismiss. 
.70 Call to client (.2f. Review email communications ( . 3 ) .  
Discuss structure of motion to be filed in response 
to complaint and consideration of Rule 11 sanctions 
in motion ( . 2 ) .  
5.60 Review and analyze Idaho Code provisions and 
Tdaho case law re the Idaho Gonsumer Protection 
Act, elements of individual claims and defenses 
(3.1). Draft memorandum summarizing research and 
analysis re claims for conversion, violations of 
the Idaho Gonsumer Protection Act, and defenses 
( 2 . 5 ) .  
1.50 Work on brief in support of motion to dismiss. 
.50 Research case law and impact on plaintiff's cause 
of action for alleged aiding and abetting. 
7.50 Research privity rule in Idaho in legal 
malpxactice action; continue preparation of 
motion to dismiss. 
7.00 Continue briefing issue of whether privity is 
required in legal malpractice action. 
1.00 Research issue of alleged aiding and abetting 
liability. 
5.60 Review numerous emails between clients, 
McNichols, Bissell and counsel ( . 9 ) .  Review file 
documents and complaint t.6). work on memorandum 
in support of motion to dismiss (2.5) . Calls to 
attorney re: issues common to recently filed 
complaints. ( . a ) .  Call client re: various issues ( . 4 ) .  
Review email from Bissell re: acceptance of 
service of complaint and discovery (.2). 
Consider method of accepting service of discovery 
- discuss with client ( . 2 )  . 
3.90 Research and analyze case law, treatises and law 
review articles re conversion and claims for 
conversion against attorneys by non clients 
(2.6). Draft section of memorandum in support of 
motion to dismiss re plaintiff's claims for 
conversion and alleged violations of the Idaho 
Consumer Protection Act (1.3 ) . 
3.50 Research issues of liability of attorneys under 
Page 2 
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theories of civil conspiracy and aiding and 
abetting. 
4.60 Research and brief issues of conversion, alleged 
breach of consumer protection act, civil 
conspiracy, aiding and abetting, litigation 
imunity, and Section 876 of the ~estatemenflSecond) 
of Torts. 
3.10 Develop analysis for purposes of motion to dismiss 
and conference with clients (1.2). Commication 
with attorney ( . 3 ) .  Telephone call to carries's 
representative (-6). Call Brad Geary - Lewiston 
Tribune - on behalf of HTEII (.I). Commication with 
client re: various issues (.I). Review 
of email from client ( .8) . 
5.50 Continue to research and analyze case law, 
treatises and Law review articles re conversion 
and claims for conversion andlor violation of 
consumer protection acts against attorneys by non 
clients. 
.20 Receive and review correspondence from clients. 
.50 Analysis of specific allegations of complaint and 
defenses to same. 
2.40 Research and brief issue of litigation privilege 
or immunity; briel: application of Taylor v .  Maile 
decision. 
2.30 Work on brief re plaintiff's cause of action for 
aiding and abetting and civil conspiracy. 
4.20 Review documents prior to contact with 
client f . 3 ) .  Telephone conference with client: 
re: upcoming motions and other xssues (.7). 
Communication with attorney Bissell with 
acceptance of service ( . 2 ) .  Review additional 
email communications ( . 9 ) .  Communications with 
client re issues (.2). ~eview email comunications 
from client (.9). ~eview and forward Bissell 
email to client ( .l) . Develop issue list for 
meeting with clients (.4). Review CV of 
poteritial consultant ( . 2 ) .  Telephone conference 
with attorney re: common considerationsfissues 
f . 3 ) .  
4.60 Continue to research and analyze case law, 
treatises and law review articles re conversion 
and claims for conversion and/or violation of 
consumer protection acts against attorneys by non 
clients (3.0). Further develop legal arguments 
re plaintiff's claims for conversion and 
violations of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act 
(1.6). 
'50 Review relevant documents pertaining to complaint. 
.20 Assist with preparation of section of brief in 
support of motion to dismiss which deals with 
alleged conversion of personal property. 
.30 Receive and review client's comments regarding 
factual allegations of complaint. 
1.30 Provide input into memorandum to be filed against 
complaint (.3). Complete list of meeting topics 
for discussion ( . 3 ) .  Communication with client 
re: items for discussion (.3). Review prior 
Page 3 
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trial court decision in preparation for meeting 
with client ( . 4 )  . 
9'60 Further develop factual and legal. arguments in 
support o f  dismissal of plaintiff's claims for 
conversion and the Idaho Conskzmer Protection Act 
3 Research and analyze case law from Idaho 
and surrounding jurisdictions re elments of 
conversion and conversion of money (2.4). 
Further develop mmormdum in support of motion 
to dismiss to include additional legal and 
factual arguments addsessing plaintiff's 
conversion and Idaho Consumer Protection Act 
claims (3.9). Review local rules for the second 
judicial district to verify whether there is a 
page limitation for briefs in support of motions 
( . 2 1 .  
10.50 Continue preparation of brief in support of Rule 
10 (b) (6) motion to dismiss. 
6.40 Numerous telephone calls and anail eomunications 
to/from client and carrier re: recent filings and 
retaining consultant (11.3). Review draft memorandum 
in support of motion to dismiss - recommendations for 
change/additions (1.5). Telephone calls to 
prospective consultants (.3). Initial review of 
motions filed in underlying matter (2.9). Provide 
draft memorandum in support of motion to dismiss 
to clients (.I). Review and forward copy of 
written discovery from plaintiff to client 
representative and carrier. { . 3 ) .  
1.80 Further develop memorandum in support of motion 
to dismiss re plaintiff's claims for conversion 
and alleged violations of the Idaho Consumer 
Protection Act (1.5). Telephone conferences with 
Nez Perce County Clerk's Office re page 
limitations for filings ( . 2 ) .  
1.50 Revise, edit and proof first &aft of brief. 
- 4 0  Make changes to brief. 
.30 Receive and review plaintiff's initial discovery 
requests. 
.10 Receive and review plaintiff's first set of 
interrogatories and request for production 
propounded to defendant Hawley Troxell Ennis L 
Hawley, LLP. 
1.50 Analysis of documents relevant to complaint. 
1.30 Research issue under Idaho re: application of 
Uniform Commercial Code. 
.70 Research issue re: remedies. 
.80 Research issue re: alleged breach of fiduciary duty. 
.30 Review general allegations of complaint against 
Hawley Troxell and prepare schedule of factual 
allegations to discuss with defendant attorneys. 
1.00 Research whether corporation's attorneys are 
subject to claim of conversion for receipt of 
attorney's fees from collateral subject to 
security interest of creditor of corporation. 
.70 Review complaint and prepare memorandum of issues 
to discuss with Hawley Troxell attorneys. 
.30 Analyze potential implication of article 9 of the 
Page 4 
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UCC re plaintiff's conversion claim (.2). 
Telephone conference with Judge Brudie's law 
clerk re local rules for page limitations (.I). 
.40  Analyze claim for conversion in lawsuit against 
Wawley Troxell attorneys. 
3.00 Meeting with clients to dis se of 
lawsuit. 
1-30 Revise brief to incorporate client's cements- 
.20 Analyze and formulate arwents in support of 
dismissing aiding and abetting cause of action. 
1.20 Research issue of whether creditor of corporation 
has direct cause of action for breach of 
fiduciary duty against directors and attorneys 
for alleged breach of fiduciary duty. 
.10 Correspondence to clients re: issues. 
.30 Review draft motion, memorandum and affidavit in support 
of protective order against discovery from RTEK pending 
ruling on 12 (b) (6) motion - forward copy to client ( .3 ) . 
4 .20  Review and analyze plaintiff's first Set of 
discovery requests in preparation for drafting 
motion for protective order to stay discovery 
( 3 )  Research and analyze Idaho case law and 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure re bases for 
staying discovery pending the outcome of a 
dispositive motion (1.4). Formulate arments in 
support of staying discovery pending the outcome 
of defendants' motion to dismiss ( . 4 ) .  Draft 
motion for protective order ( .l) . Draft 
memorandum in support of motion for protective 
order 11.5). Draft affidavit in support of 
motion for protective order t . 5 ) .  
.50 Work on revision of brief in support of Rule 
12 (b) (6) motion to dismiss. 
2.00 Research issue of whether creditor of corporation 
has direct cause of action against corporate 
officers, directors, and others. 
2.00 Revise brief in support of motion to dismiss to 
incorporate suggestions of Hawley Troxell 
attorneys, 
8.80 Complete brief in support of motion to dismiss 
and circulate for comment. 
3.90 Work on memorandum in support of motion to 
dismiss (2.4). Telephone conference with client re: 
modifications to memorandum in support of 12(b) (6) motion 
and motions scheduled for hearing ( ' 2 ) .  mail to 
client with copy of memorandum in support of 
12 (b) ( 6 )  motion to dismiss 1.2) . Review client s 
suggestions re: 12 (b) (6) memo ( .4) . Call 
from counsel for Mr. McNichols ( . 5 ) .  Final motion for protective 
order re: discovery sought in ETEH lawsuit ( . 2 ) .  
.60  Research and analyze Idaho case 
law and Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure re timing 
of reply briefs and affidavits after a 12(b) (6) 
motion is converted to a summary judgment motion 
(.GI. 
1.00 Receive and review comments on brief and revise 
same to accommodate comments. 
3 . 5 0  Receive and review emails from Hawley Troxell 
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attorneys re 1 2 ( b )  (6) brief and incorporate 
comments into brief. 
2,50 Final memorandum in supporc of motion to dismiss, 
motion for protective order, create proposed 
order grating motion for protective order - 
correspondence to Clerk/Court with motions and 
supporting documents (1.7). Review various email 
cornmications from client ( . 4 ) .  Identify issues 
for telephone conference with attorney Bissell 
1 )  Telephone conference with attorney 
Bissell re: handling of pending motions ( . 3 ) .  
' 2 0  Letter to Bissell re: timing of hearing on pending 
motion to dismiss and agreement re: pending discovery ( . 2 ) .  
3.80 Work on stipulation and order re: protective 
order staying discovery f.3). Gall clients re: 
cornmications with attorney Bissell 
and answer in malpractice case ( .2) . Review and 
respond to email from attorney Bissell re: change 
of hearing on motion to dismiss ( .1) . Begin 
draft of answer (2.9). Call from attorney 
( 2  Forward copy of amended notice of hearing 
and proposed stipulationlorder re: discovery to 
attorney Bissell ( .1) . 
2.90 Gommwication with client re: attached draft 
answer (.I). Analysis and development of 
additional affinnative defenses for answer ( . 3 ) .  
Telephone communication with client re: 
inquiry from Quarles and Brady re: expert (.2). 
Work on letter re: claims against BTEH (2.3). 
.50 Suggest revisions and additions to answer to 
complaint. 
.20 Review civil conspiracy research. 
1.90 Work on answer to complaint (1.2). Call client 
re: telephone conference to address issues for 
answer ( .3) . Create newest edition of answer 
t . 4 ) .  
.I0 Review Hawley Troxell suggestions re answer. 
2.80 Review memos (.7). Final and forward draft 
answer to client (.3). Telephone conference with 
attorney re: common issues on motion to 
disqualify, motion to dismiss, and other related 
issues ( . 5 )  . Review comunications from cf ients 
re: answer, integrate recommended 
changes/additions and create another edition of 
answer for client review and comment. ( . % I  . 
Cornmication with client re: issues common with 
McNichols and updated version of answer ( . a ) .  
Telephone call from client ( . I )  . 
.50 Review proposed answer to complaint and suggest 
revisions to same. 
- 5 0  Receive and review additional comments and 
proposed changes to answer from clients ( . 2 ) .  
Prepare changes to answer ( .3) . 
.20 Review and analyze new Idaho Supreme Court case 
(J-U-B v. Lopez) regarding requirements for legal 
malp~actice claim under Idaho law. 
2.20 Review and outline proposed response to plaintiff 
Reed Taylor's brief in opposition to Rule 
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12 (b) (6) motion to dismiss. 
1.30 Prepare memoranda regarding arguments advanced 
by plaintiff in opposition to.motion to dismiss 
and proposed response to siune. 
2.10 Review response to 12 (b) (6) - outline issues in 
response to 12(b)(S) motion to facilitate reply 
brief (2.1). 
.70 Zlnalyze plaintiff's brief in opposition to motion 
to dismiss and how to respond to same. 
2.00 Research and prepare reply brief in support of 
motion to dismiss. 
2.50 Con~inued preparation of reply brief. 
9.50 Continued preparation of reply brief. 
1.10 Work on reply brief. 
6.60 Continued preparation of reply brief. 
2.90 Work on reply brief (1.9). Review memorandm in 
opposition to motion to disqualify to insure 
consistency with 12(b)(6) motion and for 
background information that may be helpful in 
arguing 12 [b) (6) motion ( .7) . Call from attorney 
re: substance of 12(b) (6) motion, opposition and 
reply; thoughts re, standing/status to argue motion 
to disqualify on behalf of clients; and related issues (.3) 
3.90 Receive comments regarding reply brief and revise 
same. 
.50 Draft additional revisions to reply brief. 
5.00 Work on hearing notes for motion to dismiss ( 3 . 9 ) . -  
Call from attorney re: reply issues ( . 2 ) .  
Email communication with client (.3). Call to/from 
attorney ( . 3 )  . Calls to/from carrier ( .3) . 
3.80 Receive and review comments re brief from Hawley 
Troxell and revise brief to incorporate comments. 
4.10 Work on hearing notes for motion to dismiss (3.8). 
Communication with attorney re: reply to 
response to motion to dismiss ( . 2 )  . Final and 
file/serve reply brief ( .l) . 
1.70 Telephone conference with client regarding 
comments concerning 12 (b) (61 reply brief (0.2) ;
revise brief to accommodate such comments (0.5) ;
receive additional comments from client (0.3) ;
check quotation from treatise on corporate 
dividends and redemptions (0.2); revise brief per 
client's comments and suggestions (0.4); 
correspondence to Hawley Troxell attorneys re new 
revisions (0.1) 
5.50 Communications with client (.2). Work on 
hearing issues (5.2). Call from attorney 
re: reply and issues for hearing (.I). 
.10 Assist in preparation of oral argument on motion 
to dismiss. 
2.80 Work on hearing outline re: motion to dismiss (2.8). 
5.90 Work on hearing issues for 12(b) (6) motion (1.71. 
Email from and response to Eissell's office re: 
availability for hearing on motion to mend 
complaint ( .I) Travel to Lewiston (3.3) . Review 
new filings from attorney Bond ( .4) . Meeting with 
client ( . 4 )  . 
7.20 Prepare for hearing (1.91 Meeting with client 
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10/17/08 LGZ 
105. 10/20/08 J D L  
1o-k' 10/21/08 JDL 
to%. lo/zz/os JDL 
10/23/08 JDL 
k t o .  10/27/08 LC1 
10/28/08 L C 1  
10/29/08 JDL 
113 ' l.0/29/08 LCI 
' 7 )  Court appearance for hearing (1.2). ~eview 
proposed amended complaint in malpractice case ( . 8 ) .  
Travel to Boise (2.6) , 
2.50 Review emil from attorney ( .I) . m i l  to 
client and ALPS with copy of proposed amended 
complaint: and obsemations from initial review 
( 3  bail to attorney with copy of proposed 
amended complaint (,I). ~egin detailed review of 
proposed mended complaint (1.5). Analysis of 
timing, procedural and substantive reasons to 
oppose the motion to amend complaint and seek 
derivative relief l.5). 
1.10 Receive and review plaintiff Reed Taylor's motion 
to amend complaint and memorandum of law, 
together with proposed amended complaint. 
.5O Analysis of proposed amended complaint and 
defenses to motion to amend. 
1.40 Comunications with client and carrier(.2). 
Analysis of issues under derivative 
claim statute, and other defenses applicable to 
derivative claims stated in proposed amended 
complaint (1.2) .
1.00 Analyze plaintiff's arguments in support of 
motion to amend complaint; formulate arguments in 
opposition to motion to amend complaint re 
standing, violation of stay in underlying action, 
and noncompliance with Idaho Code provisions re 
derivative actions (.5). Research and analyze 
Idaho case law re elements of judicial estoppel 
3 Draft memorandum outlining elements for 
application of doctrine'of judicial estoppel 
(.2t. 
. 90  Review communication from client (.I). Review 
memo re: judicial estoppel and/or judicial 
admissions as defenses to amended complaint ( . 3 ) .  
Telephone conference with client ( . 5 ) .  
1.10 Telephone conference with attorney for Mr. McNichols 
re: issues with proposed amended complaint (.3). 
Review derivative action statutes f . 8 ) .  
1.30 Analysis of issues which should be raised in 
opposition to motion to amend complaint and 
consideration of timing of same (.8). 
Communication with client representative re: 
opposing motion to amend (.2). Review newly 
filed motion and supporting documents in 
underlying case f.3). 
.90 Review and analyze plaintiff Reed Taylor's motion 
and memorandum of law to amend complaint. 
1.60 Research regarding conditions precedent for 
filing shareholder derivative action. 
1.30 Outline issues for opposition to motion to amend 
complaint. 
.50 Analysis of facts and contentions in opposition 
to plaintiff's motion for leave to amend 
complaint. 
1.20 Research issue of requirement that plaintiff in 
shareholder derivative action must plead and 
prove irreparable injury to corporation, as 
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opposed to purely personal dmages allegedly 
sustained by plaintiff shareholder or creditor of 
11 /03 /08  LC1 
11 /04 /08  JDL 
11 /04 /08  L C 1  
11 /05 /08  JDL 
11 /25 /08  JDL 
11 /26 /08  JDL 
12 /02 /08  JDL 
12 /03 /08  JDL 
12 /04 /08  JDL 
corporation. 
5.70 Research and prepare brief in opposition to 
plaintiff's motion to amend complaint 
.80 Work on opposition to motion to file mended complaint 
(.4). Review draft opposition to motion to file 
amended complaint in the McNichols matter t . 4 ) .  
6.60 Research and prepare brief in opposition to 
motion to mend complaint. 
2 . 4 0  Work on draft brief opposing motion to mend 
complaint - forward draft to client for comments 
and recommendations. 
3.40 Prepare section of brief dealing with shareholder 
derivative action. 
-50 Review draft of brief and revise same. 
3 . 0 0  Work on memorandum in opposition to motion to 
amend. ( . 9 ) .  Communication with client re: 
possible changes to memorandum ( . 2 1 .  Review 
modifications recommended by client ( . 5 ) .  Call 
client re: memo (.I). Return call to 
attorney ( - 2 )  . Final, file and serve 
opposition memorandm (1.1). 
. 30  Research case law re standing o f  minority 
shareholders to bring a direct or derivative 
claim against corporate counse1 for malpractice, 
fraud, and breach of fiduciary duty. 
. 70  Work on hearing notes for motion to amend 
complaint. 
.30 Consider focus of hearing on motion to mend 
complaint. 
1 . 5 0  Review reply to opposition to motion to amend and 
attached cases. 
6 . 1 0  Work on oral argument responses to arguments and 
authorities raised in reply brief ( 5 . 8 )  . Review 
emails from client representatives addressing 
issues raised in reply ( , 3 )  . 
.70  Receive and review plaintiff's reply to 
defendants' memorandm in opposition to motion to 
amend complaint. 
1 . 4 0  Review cases and authorities cited by plaintiff 
in support of motion to amend. 
.90 Research Idaho statutes; rules of court and cases 
re shareholder derivative actions. 
1 . 2 0  Assist in preparation for hearing on motion to 
amend complaint. 
1 . 8 0  Research and prepare memorandum re issue of 
whether plaintiff Reed Taylor is fairly qualified 
to represent interests of shareholders in 
derivative action. 
1 . 9 0  Final preparation for hearing on motion to amend 
complaint ( 1 . 0 )  Meeting with client pre-hearing - 
discussion of arguments available 
( . 9 )  Participate in hearing on motion f . 8 ) .  
PROFESSXOMAL FEES 43,912.50 
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MICHAEL S. BISSELL, 1SB No. 5762 
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & KIRBY PLLC 
A.l-tsmeys for Appellant Reed Taylor 
7 South Howard Street, Suite 4 16 
Spokane, WA 99201 
Tel: (509) 455-7100 
Fax: (509) 455-71 11 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TEE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual, who is 
bringing this action on behalf of himself and 
on bebalt of the creditors andor shareholders 
of AIA Services Corporation and AIA 
Insurance, Inc.; 
Appellant, 
GARY D. BABBITT, an individual; D. JOI34 
ASI-IBY, an individual; PATRICK V. 
COLLINS, an individual; RICHARD A. 
RILEY, an individual; HAWLEY TROXELL 
ENNIS & MAWLEY LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; JANE DOES I-X, 
unknown individuals; 
Case No.: CV-08-01765 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Respondents. 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENTS, GARY D. BABBITT, D JOHN 
ASHBY, PATRICK V. COLLINS, RICHARD A. RILEY, AND 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP. AND THE PARTIES' 
ATTORNEY JAMES D. LARUE, ELAM & BURKE, P.A., P.O. BOX 
1539, BOISE, ID 83704; AND 
TO: THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1 
NOTICE IS HEWBY GIVEN THAT: 
1 The above n m e d  Appellant Reed J. Taylor appeals against the above- 
named Respondents Itt the Idaho Supreme Court from the final Order grwing 
Defendantswotion to Dismiss and denying Plaintfrs  Motion to Amend Cornplaint 
entered in the above entitled action on the 23rd day of December. 2008, the Honorable 
Jeff M. Brudie presiding. 
2, Appellant has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the 
JudgmcntslOrders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable Orders under and 
pursuant to Rules 4 and 1 l(a)(l), I.A.R. 
2 . A preliminary statement of issues on appeal, which the Appellant intends 
to assert in this appeal are as follows (several of which are issues of first impression); 
provided, the following list of issues is not exhaustive and Respondents should expect 
others: 
a. Did plaintiff state causes of action against attorneys for fraud, 
breaches of fiduciary duties, conversion, excessive compensation, 
and/or tortious interference and/or causes of actions pertaining to 
aiding and abetting and/or conspiracy to assist others in the 
commission of any of any of the foregoing causes of action. 
b. Does the Litigation Privilege exist in Idaho and, if so, does it bar 
claims against attorneys for fraud, constructive fi-aud, breaches of 
fiduciary duties, conversion, excessive compensation, and tortious 
interference and/or causes of action pertaining to aiding and 
abetting and/or conspiracy to assist others in the commission of 
any of the foregoing causes of action? 
c. Does a plaintiff state a cause of action against an attorney for 
conversion and other causes of action by alleging that the attorney 
accepted payment for attorney's fees and costs from funds the 
attorney knew or should have known were funds in which the 
plaintiff held a valid and perfected security interest? 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2 
d. Does a stock pledgee, who is also a secured creditor of the 
revenues and all of the stock of the corporation, have standing to 
pursue direct causes of actions against parties ibr cliiims owned by 
the corporation? Does the same plaintiff have stallding to pursue 
derivative causes of action on behalf of the cofporation? 
e. Does a creditor of an insolvent corporation, who is also a secured 
creditor of the revenues of the corporation, have standing to assert 
direct causes of action against padies for claims owned by the 
corporation? Does the same plaintiff have standing to pursue 
derivative causes of actions on behalf of the corporation? 
f. Are allegations that an aaarney has exceeded hislber scope of 
represenbtion sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss for failure to 
state a claim based upon the Litigation Privilege? 
g. Can an attorney represent corporate clients with diverging interests 
when the representation was approved by persons with 
directorfofficer conflicts of interest? 
h. Does Idaho's Consumer Protect Act bar a person from asserting 
claims against an attorney, when the plaintiff does not have privity 
of contract with the attorney, for violations of Idaho's Consumer 
Protection Act? 
i. In considering a motion to dismiss under I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), is it 
permissible for the district court to take judicial notice of an 
entirely different case in toto andlor to consider documents which 
are not in the record for that case? 
j. Can a stock pledgee of all of the stock and revenues of a pledged 
corporation assert direct and/or derivative causes of actions for 
malpractice against an attorney? 
k. Can a secured creditor, who is also the most significant creditor of 
an insolvent corporation, assert direct and/or derivative claims for 
malpractice against an attorney? 
1. Can the district court judge, who is the same judge for two related 
actions, consider privileged documents in granting a motion to 
dismiss under IRCP 12(b)(6) without requiring production of the 
documents to the other party? 
m. If a party provides privileged documents to an expert and the 
expert provides testimony through an affidavit relying on the 
privileged documents for the experts testimony, has the attorney- 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3 
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client privilege been waived and must the documents be produced 
to the opposing party upon a motion to compel? 
n. If Idaho adopts the Litigation Privilege deknse f i r  an attorney, can 
the defense be asserted to dismiss an action pursuant to I.R.G.P. 
12(b)(Ci) for actions taken by the aaorney which the attorney 
asserts were under the scope of representation, when such scope of 
representation was purportedly agreed to by representatives from 
the corporation client, when the attorney knows or should have 
known that: ( I )  the representatives of the corporation have 
conflicts of interest; (2) the board of directors of the corporation 
client have conflicts of interest; (3) the corporation has not held an 
annual shareholder meeting in years; (4) the purported scope of 
representation was not in the best interests of at least two 
corporation clients with diverging interests; and (5) the scope of 
representation was not in the best interests of each of the attorney's 
three different clients. 
o. Does an attorney owe a non-client any fiduciary duties, special 
duties, andor third-party beneficiary oblagations when the attorney 
knows or should have known (including, without limitation): (1) 
that all of the shares and revenues of the corporation client the 
attorney is purportedly representing are pledged as collateral to the 
non-client and another client is in default of the obligations which 
trigger remedies pertaining to such security interests; (2) the non- 
client has voted the shares appointing himself as the sole officer 
and director of the corporation client, the corporation client is 
being wrongfully managed by persons breaching fiduciary duties 
and not safeguarding assets; (3) the assets and funds are 
insufficient to pay; (4) that millions of dollars in assets and funds 
may have been wrongfully transferred from the corporation client 
by the very individuals directing the litigation (5) the parent 
corporation of the pledged corporation is also being represented by 
the attorney and the same non-client is owed millions of dollars by 
the parent corporation client who is highly insolvent? 
p. Does a plaintiff have a constitutional right (whether under the 
United States Constitution or the State of Idaho's Constitution) to 
obtain documents, prosecute causes of action and/or pursue causes 
of action to protect andor recover assets which are subject to a 
security interest and/or pursue causes of actions action attorneys 
relating to any one or more the foregoing? 
4. There has not been an Order sealing all or any portion of this record. 
5 .  A reporter's transcript is not requested. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 4 
4. Appellant requests the following docunents be included in the clerk's 
record, in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R.: 
a. This Notice of Appeal; 
b. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss; 
c. PlaintifPs Response in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss; 
d. Dekndants' Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss; 
e. Plaintiffs Motion to Amend and Supplement Complaint (including 
the attached proposed First Amended Complaint); 
f. Defendants' Response in Opposition to PlaintifPs Motion to 
Amend Complaint; and 
g. Opinion and Order on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and 
Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint. 
7. I certify that: 
a. A copy of this notice of appeal has not been served on a reporter 
because a transcript has not been requested. 
b. The clerk of the district court has not been paid any fee for 
preparing a transcript because a transcript has not been requested. 
c. The estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been 
paid. 
d. The appellate filing fee has been paid. 
e. Service has been made upon all parties required to be served 
pursuant to Rule 20. 
DATED this 3oth day of January, 2009. 
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & KIRBY PLLC 
By: 
Attorneys for Appellate Reed Taylor 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEWBY CERTIFY that on the 30" day of January, 2009,I caused to be served 
a true and correct copy of Appellant's Notice of Appeal to the following: 
WAND DELIVERY James D. LaRue 
U.S. MAIL E l m  & Burke, PA 
OVERNIGHT MAIL P.O. Box 1539 
FAX TUNSMISSION Boise, ID 83704 
EMAIL (.pdf attachment) 
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James I>. LaRue ISB #I780 
JeEey  A. Thornson ISB #3380 
ELAM & BUHCEi, P.A. 
25 1 E, Front Street, Suite 300 
P.O. Box 1539 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 343-5454 
Facsimile: (208) 3 84-5 844 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual; I 
Plaintiff/Appellant, I Case No. CV 08-01765 
GARY D. BABBITT, an individual; D. JOHN 
ASEIBY, an individual; PATRICK V. 
COL,LINS, an individual; RICHARD A. 
RILEY, an individual; HAWLEY TROXELL 
ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; JANE DOES I-X, 
unknown individuals; 
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL 
TRANSCRIPT AND ADDITIONAL 
CLERK'S RECORD 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED APPELLANT AND THE PARTY'S ATTORNEY, THE 
COURT REPORTER AND CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT; 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN, that Respondent in the above entitled proceeding hereby 
requests, pursuant to Rule 19, I.A.R., the inclusion of the following materials in the clerk's 
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL TRANSCRIPT AND ADDITIONAL CLERK'S RECORD - 1 
5 l i j  
record and rqort-er7s transcr^ipt in addition to that required to be includecl by the T.A.R. and 
identified in the notice of appeal: 
1, Reporter" Transcript: 
A. Transcript of hearing on Motion to Dismiss held on October 16,2008; and 
B. Transcript of bearing on Motion to Amend held on December 4,2008. 
2. Clerk's Record: 
A. Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, filed September 10,2008; and 
B. Opinion and Order on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Plaintiffs Motion to 
Amend Complaint, filed December 23, 2008, in the case of Reed J. Taylor v. 
Michael E. MeNichols, et al., Nez Perce County Case No. GV-08-0 1763. 
' 3 .  I certify that a copy of this request for additional reporter's transcript has been served on 
each court reporter of whom a transcript is requested as named below at the addresses set out 
below and that the estimated number of additional pages being requested is 100. 
Linda Carlton 
Court Reporter to Judge Brudie 
425 Warner 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
4. I further certify that a copy of this request for additional record has been served upon the 
Clerk of the District Court and upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 20, I.A.R. 
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL TRANSCRlPT AND ADDITIONAL CLERK'S RECORD - 2 
DATED this 1 2- day of February, 2009. 
ELAM & BURKE?, P.A. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the /z day of February, 2009, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following in the 
manner indicated below: 
Michael S. Bissell /U.S. Mail 
CMBELL BISSELL & KIRBY, PLLC Hand Delivery 
7 South Howard Street, Suite 41 6 Federal Express 
Spokane, WA 99201 Facsimile Transmission 
(509) 455-71 1 1 
Linda Carlton /U.S. Mail 
Court Reporter to Judge Brudie Hand Delivery 
425 Wamer Federal Express 
Lewiston, ID 83501 Facsimile Transmission 
(208) 746-1474 
/ 
Clerk of the District Court 
Nez Perce County Courthouse 
P.O. Box 896 
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J m e s  D. L a u e  ISB ##I 780 
Loren 6 .  Ipsen ISB ##I 767 
ELAM 8r BU 
25 1 E. Front Street, Suite 300 
P.0, Box 1539 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 343-5454 
Facsimile: (208) 3 84-5844 
E: & B File No. 7082-0013 
FILED 
P A F T i  u. WEEKS 
C*kgsJAvx 
-.. DEPUTY -. 
Aaomeys for Defendants 
PN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, PN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
=ED J. TAYLOR, an individual; I 
Plaintiff, I Case No. CV 08-01765 
v. 
GARY D. BABBITT, an individual; D. JOHN 
ASHBY, an individual; PATRICK V. 
COLLINS, an individual; RICHARD A. 
RILEY, an individual; HAWLEY TROXELL 
E W I S  & HAWLEY LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; JANE DOES I-X, 
unknown individuals; 
Defendants. I 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
Defendants, by and through their counsel of record, Elam & Burke, P.A., hereby submit the 
following memorandum in support of their motion to dismiss the plaintiffs complaint pursuant to 
Rule 120>)(6) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS - 1 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This case presents the unusual issue of whether one party may sue another's attorneys for 
decisions made during the course of litigation or for alleged malpractice. The plaintiff in this case, 
Reed Taylor, is not and was not represented in connection with any of the events alleged in the 
complaint by the defendants, the law firm of Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley and indi~dual 
attorneys employed by that firm (the firm and its individual attorneys will be referred to herein as 
"HTEH"). Lacking privity of contract, Reed Taylor cannot assert a direct claim for malpractice 
against HTEH. Rather, he premises his complaint on positions advanced by HTEH on behalf of its 
clients in the case of Taylor v. M A  Services Corporation, et al., Case No. CV-07-00208, in the 
District Court of the State of Idaho, Nez Perce County (hereinafter referred to as the "Underlying 
Litigation"). Additionally, he attempts to assert claims for malpractice against HTEH for advice 
given or legal services rendered, not to him, but to clients of HTEH who are parties in the 
Underlying Litigation. 
Reed Taylor is suing AIA Services, Inc. ("AIA Services"), in the Underlying Litigation upon 
a contract to redeem his stock. He has also named as defendants AIA Insurance, Inc. ("AIA 
Insurance"), a wholly-owned subsidiary of AIA Services, CropUSA Insurance Agency, Inc. 
("CropUSA"), and various officers and directors of the three corporations. HTEH represents AIA 
Services and AIA Insurance and has appeared as local counsel for CropUSA in the Underlying 
Litigation. The individual defendants are represented by counsel of their choice. In vague and 
conclusory tams, the complaint in the present action attempts to assert claims against HTEH for 
malpractice or wrongful actions arising out of the defense of their clients in the Underlying 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS - 2 
G:\7082\0013\Pleadings\Motion to Dismiss - Memo\Motion to Dismiss - Memo ver_l I .wpd 
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL TRANSCRIPT 
AND ADDITIONAL CLERK'S RECORD 5 2 0 
Litigation or related mattm. Reed Taylor has also filed scaparate but substantially similar lawsuits 
against counsel who have appewd in behalf of other defendants in the Underlying Litigation. 
ot escape notice that by filing suits against opposing counsel, Reed Taylor implicates 
ethical issues regwding whether they can continue to represent their clients in the Underlying 
Litigation. If the present lawsuit and the companion lawsuits against defense counsel are not 
dismissed, defense counsel may be required to withdraw Erom representing their respective clients 
in the Underlying Litigation after nearly a year and a half of proceedings. In effect, Reed Taylor 
seeks to strip the opposing parties of their chosen counsel. See Alumet v. Bear Lake Crazing Co., 
112 Idaho 441,732 P. 2d 679 (Ct.App. 1987), noting that filing suit against opposing counsel may 
have the effect sf requiring them to withdraw because privileged matters between litigants and their 
counsel may have to be revealed in order for counsel to defend thmselves, thus possibly 
jeoprdizing the litigants' positions. 
Shortly after filing this action, Reed Taylor moved to disqualify defense counsel, in the 
Underlying ~ i t i~a t ion . '  Strategies to disqualify opposing counsel are disfavored by the courts. 
Tisby v. BufJlo General Hospital, 157 F.R.D. 157,163 (W.D.N.Y. 1994) ('Motions to disqualify 
opposing counsel must be viewed in the context of favoring a party's right to be represented by 
counsel of its own choice, as opposed to disqualification as a strategic weapon."); Spence v. Flynt, 
816 P.2d 771 (Wyo. 1991) ("Disqualification motions are often simply common tools of litigation 
process used for strictly strategic purposes.") (citations and internal quotations and ellipses omitted) 
' See Reed Taylor's Motion to Disqualify the Attorneys and Law Firms of Hawley Troxell Ennis & 
Hawley LLP; Clements, Brown & McNichols, P.A.; and Quarles and Brady LLP, dated Septembei4.2008. 
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For the reasons discussed in this m m o r m d m ,  it will be seen that the complaint against HTEW is 
merely pretexhal and fails to stale a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
11. S T m D A m  OF ADWDIGATION 
W e r e  a complaint contains no allegations which, if proven, would entitle the plaintiff to the 
relief claimed, it is subject to dismissal pwsuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 120>)(6). Fells 
v. UizitedStatesLge Im. Go., 119 Idaho 160,804 P.2d 333 (Ct. App. 1991). A Rule 120>)(6) motion 
to dismiss for failure to state a claim, without affidavits or deposition testimony introduced into the 
record either in support or in opposition, is addressed soley to the sufficiency of the complaint. 
Orthman v. Idaho Power Go., 126 Idaho 960,962, 895 P.2d 561,563 (1995). All inferences Erom 
the facts pleaded in the complaint must be drawn in favor of the party opposing the motion; and the 
issue presented is "whether the plaintiff is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims." Id. 
However, the court need not accept as true legal conclusions or unwarranted factual inferences. 
Cornez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 636 n. 3, 100 S.Ct. 1920, 192 1 n. 3., 64 L.Ed.2d 572 (1980). 
When ruling upon a Rule 120>)(6) motion, the question is whether the nomoving party has alleged 
sufficient facts to support his claim which, if true, would entitle him to relief. Rincover v, State of 
Idaho, Dept. of Finance, Securities Bureau, 128 Idaho 653,917 P.2d 1293 (1996). For example, 
standing is a preliminary question to be determined by the court as a matter of law; if the plaintiff 
lacks standing to bring the claim, his complaint should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). 
Young v. Ciy ofk'etehum, 137 Idaho 102, 104,44 P.3d 1 157, 1 159 (2002). 
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111. FIRST GAUSE(S) OF AmION - AmINC AND METTING TORTIOUS ACTS 
CIVIL CONSP 
A. The Compl&t Is Factualfy Dc?ncltent 
As a g a d  rule, attorneys who r q m e n t  clients in litiption m o t  be held liable to their 
clients' d v m w  based an the attorney' conduct of the IitSgation. W l e  there me excepciona to 
the g m d  rule, the plaintiff has failed to plead any facts which would fall within any of such 
exceptions. Therefore, the p lh t i f f  s h t  cause of action shodd be dismissed for failure to state a 
claim upon which relief can be panled. 
A party may not rely on pleadings which assert only legal conclusions, but must allege facts 
w k h ,  if true, state a claim for relief Resolution T m t  Cotp., v. Famer, 823 F.Supp. 302,309 
(E.D.Pa. 1993). While well-pled facts alleged in the complaint are viewed in the light most. 
favorable to the plaintiff, conclusory allegations are not accepted as true without specific factual 
allegations to support thesn. Production Resources Group, L.L.C. v. NCT, 863 A.2d 772, 781 
(Del.Ch. 2004); Tri-Star Pictures, Inc., titigaton, 634 A.2d 3 19,3 26 (Del. 1993) (articulating the 
Rule 12 (b)(6) standard). If a factual basis for the relief is not alleged, then the pleading is subject 
to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). In the case at bar, plaintiff merely states a number of conclusory 
allegations but fails to plead any facts which would justify an award of damages against HTEH. 
El. The Complaint Fails to State a Cause of Action for Aiding and Abetting. 
The first cause of action of the complaint is mnwtually muddled because it attempts to plead 
a cause of action for (1) civil conspiracy, or (2) aiding and abetting without distinguishing between 
the two theories. In actuality, they are sepmte and distinct causes &tion with different elements, 
and each will be discussed below. 
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enmwagment or assistance of one pmon is a substmhal factor in causing the resulting tort, then 
the one guing it is himself a tortfernor and is responsible for the consquenccr of the other's art. 
Id. at 678,701 P.2d at 298. 
No Idaho case has been found dealing with the issue whether a I a y e r  can be found liable 
for aiding md abetting the comission of an allegedly tortious act by giving advice to his or her 
client, whe&er in connection with litigation or otherwise. Other jusisdictions that have grappled 
with the issue have prdominantly (that is, with limited exceptions not applicable here) held that the 
attorney-client relationship precludes aider-abettor liability. 
Section 876(b) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1 979) states: 
For h a m  resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another, one is 
subject to liability if he 
* * * 
(b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial 
assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct himselfl.] 
To state a cause of action, the plaintiff must also sufficiently allege that his injury was "a 
direct or reasonably foreseeable result" of the conduct complained of. Bloor v. Carro, Spanbock; 
Londin, Rodman d Fass, 754 F.2d 57,63 (2d Cir. 1985). Damages caused by the alleged tort must 
be alleged and proved. Britestarr Homes, Inc. v. Piper Rudnick LLP, 453 F.Supp. 521, 528 
Plaintiff Reed Taylor's attempt to plead a cause of action for aiding and abetting fails at the 
outset because he fails to plead facts which, if true, would constitute a tortious act or to allege 
damages proximately caused by a tortious act ofAIA Services, AIA Insurance or CropUSA. Merely 
mislabeling alleged contractual breaches does not convert them into torts. See Decker v. Massey- 
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Ferwon,  Ltd., 681 F.2d 11 1, 119 (2d Cir. 1981) (allegations of aider-abkttor liability were 
dismissed on the ground of being "so broad and conclusory as to be meiunindess."). 
Even if it is assmed for the sake of m t  that the complaint sufficiently alleges the 
ission of one or more tortious acts on the part of ALA Services, AM Inswmce or CropUSA, 
it is still deficient because it fails to allege which of the HTEH attorneys allegedly aided and abetted 
any particular act, what howledge any of them had of any particular act, what assistance was 
purportedly lent by any of them, or how the plaintiff's alleged damages were caused by them. 
Furthermore, to the extent the underlying purportedly wrongkl acts are based on allegations of fraud, 
the plaintiff has f"ailed to plead with particularity the elements of fraud as required by Idaho Rule of 
Civil Procedure 9@) .2 
A case where the plaintiffs asserted claims strikingly similar to those in the present case is 
Mann v. GTCR Golder Rauner, L.L.C., 351 B.R. 685 (D.hiz.  2006), where suit was brought by 
shareholders of a corporation against the law firm of Kirkland & Ellis ("K & E") for allegedly aiding 
and abetting its clients, the parties in control of a corporation, to breach their fiduciary duties. The 
shareholders also alleged that K. & E committed professional malpractice and tortiously interfered 
with the plaintiffs' contractual relations and prospective economic advantage. K & E moved for and 
was granted summary judgment with respect to the aiding and abetting claim on the ground K& E 
* Rule 9@) requires that all averments of fraud must be stated with particularity. The nine elements of 
fraud are: (1)  a statement of fact; (2) its falsity; (3) its materiality; (4) the speaker's knowledge of its falsity; (5) the 
speaker's intent to induce reliance; (6) the hearer's ignorance of the falsity of the statement; (7) reliance by the 
hearer; (8) the hearer's right to rely; and (9) consequent and proximate injury. Country Cove Development, Inc. v. 
May, 143 Idaho 595,600, 150 P.3d 288,293 (2006); Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corp., 141 Idaho 233,239, 108 P.3d 
380,386 (2005); Lettunich v. Key BankNA., 141 Idaho 362,368, 109 P.3d 1 104, 1 1  10 (2005). 
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did no more than provide legal advie  to its own The court found that K. & E's act of 
@ glving advice to i ts  clients, even if such advice were faulty, did not conrt i~te  aiding and abetting the 
allegd breach of fiduciw duty.4 
A plethora of cases have held that a lawyer acting on behalf of his or her client and within 
the scope of the attorney-climt relationship is not liable for assisting the client in conduct that 
breaches the client's fiduciary duty. See, e.g., Durham v. Guest, 142 N.M. 8 17, 1 7 1 P.3d 756 
(2007), holding that an attorney who represented an insurer in a claim arbitration could not be held 
liable for aiding and abetting the insurer's allegedly wrongfir1 denial of the claim; Morin v. Trupin, 
7 1 1 F.Supg. 97 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), holding that attorneys who represented their client in negotiations 
regmding the collection of allegedly Eraudulent promissory notes were not liable to an adverse party 
for aiding and abetting their client in seeking to enforce the notes; Camp v. Dema, 948 F.2d 455 (8' 
Cir. 1991), holding that a corporate attorney could not be held liable for securities fraud solely on 
the basis of advice given to his client; and Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485 (1991)' holding that 
attorneys had no duty to disclose misrepresentations of their client in connection with the sale of 
securities where the attorneys themselves did not make or assist in the making of misrepresentations. 
See also, the U. S. Supreme Court's recent decision in Stoneridge Investment Partners v. ScientiJc 
Atlanta, Inc., 128 S.Ct. 761, 169 L.Ed.2d 627 (2008), declining to hold alleged aiders and abettors 
The court also dismissed the malpractice claim because K 62 E had no attorney-client relationship with 
the plaintiffs and the totious interference claims because "the mere act of giving legal advice to a client cannot 
constitute tortious interference." Id. at 70 1 .  
4 K & E advised bringing in a so-called crisis manager. This turned out to be a disastrous decision, as the 
crisis manager dissipated the corporation's assets and led to its demise. Id. at 691-692. 
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liable for securities violations under $10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 
1%-5.' 
A third p m ' s  claim against a lawyer puts the l a v a  at odds with his or her client in a 
m m e c  which wmpromises the attorney-client relationship. Protecting that relationship protects 
more than just an individual or entity in any particular case or transaction; it is fundamental to the 
i n t e ~ t y  of the judicial process itself. As pointed out in Durham v. Cues?, 142 N.M. 8 17,823,17 1 
P.3d 756,76 1 (2007), to permit claims against attomeys by adversary parties in civil litigation would 
have a chilling effect on representation because: 
[Alnytime a plaintiff alleged that a defendant had breached a fiduciary duty to the 
plaintitf, an additional claim against the defendant's counsel for aiding and abetting 
would withstand a Rule [12@)(6)] motion, even though the defendant's counsel had 
simply been representing the client's position in an adversarial proceeding. Before 
agreeing to represent a client, an attorney faced with this dilemma would have to 
evaluate the merits of his client's position and the attendant risks, then would have 
to monitor the case during the representation in order to evaluate the risk of liability. 
This would have a detrimental effect on the representation. . . . 
Few rules, of course, are absolute. An attorney, wen acting the course of litigation, can be 
liable for egregious conduct that amounts to an abuse of process or malicious prosecution. Kahala 
Royal Corporation v. Goodsill Anderson @inn & Stifel, supra, at 270, 15 1 P.3d at 751. However, 
no factual allegations are contained in the complaint which support these exceptions. The plaintiffs 
claims against HTEH for purportedly aiding and abetting its clients' actions relate only to advice 
Recently, the Stoneridge holding has been extended to attorneys. See In re DVZ Znc. Securities 
Litigation, 249 F.R.D. 1 96,2 1 6-2 18 (E.D.Pa. 1008). holding that attorneys of a corporation owe no independent 
duty of disclosure to investors and cannot be held liable for failure to divulge or prevent a scheme on the part of their 
client to violate $ lo@) of the Securities and Exchange Act. 
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r m d m d  and positions taken in the Gourse of zealous rqresaatal-ion and, as such, must be dismissed 
h r  failure to state a =use of action. 
C.  Reed Taylor Was No Standhg as a Creditor of AM Services to Brhg a Direct Cause 
of Action Against the Directors of the Corporat-ion for a Breach of Ffdueiary Duty or 
Against HTEH for AULegedly Aiding and Abetting any such Breach, 
Liability for aiding and abetting does not exist in a vacum; in order for to liability to attach, 
the &leg& aider and abettor must be found to have materially assisted in perpekating the wrongful 
act of another. If the predicate act is not actionable, there can be no cause of action for aiding and 
abetting. Reed Taylor alleges that because he is a creditor of AIA Services, which is insolvent, the 
directors of that company owe a fiduciary duty to him. He avers that HTEH aided and abetted the 
directors in diverting funds of the corporation to other purposes, thereby precluding the corporation 
from making payments to him. Assuming arguendo these allegations are true, they do not state a 
claim against opposing counsel upon which relief can be granted. 
It is offen stated that directors stand in a fiduciary relation to the corporation, hence, to the 
stockholders. Hanny v. Sunnyside Ditch Co., 82 Idaho 271,276,353 P.2d 406,409 (1960); Coeur 
d 'Alenes Lead Co. K Kingsbury, 59 Idaho 627,630,85 P.2d 691,692 (1938). It is said that should 
the corporation become insolvent, this fiduciary duty runs also to the creditors of the corporation. 
Tbrch Liquidating Tkust ex rel. Bridge Associates, LLC v. Stock-still, 2008 WL 696233 (E.D.La. 
2008). The reason for this is that directors have the task of attempting to maximize the economic 
value of the company. "By definition, the fact of insolvency places the creditors in the shoes 
normally occupied by the shareholders - that of residual risk-bearers." Production Resources 
Group, L.L. C, v. NC2: 863 A.2d 772,79 1 (Del.Ch. 2004). 
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However, this does not mean that either shseholders or creditors have a direct cause of 
action against the dirsrtor.. See Weatherhead v. Grgen, 123 Idaho 697,705, 85 1 P2d  993, 1001 
(Ct.Agg. 1993 ); iMcGivem v. A M S A  Lumber Co., 77 Wis.2d 241,156,252 N.W.2d 37,378 (1 977). 
An infornative case illustrating the cwent  evolution of the law is North American Catholic 
Educational Programming Foundation, Inc. v. Cheewaila, 930 A.2d 92 (Del.Supr, 2007). There, 
the Delaware Suprme Court held that creditors of an insolvent6 corporation or a corporation 
operating in the zone of insolvency7 could not bring a direct breach of f i duc iq  duty action against 
such corporation's directors. 
In Gheavalla, creditors of an insolvent, or at least financially challenged, corporation sought 
to bring direct, not derivative, claims of breach of fiduciary duties against the directors for allegedly 
causing the corporation to enter into improvident transactions, rather than preserving the assets of 
the corporation for the benefit of its creditors. The trial court entered judgment under Rule 120>)(6) 
dismissing the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The 
Delaware Suprme Court affirmed the dismissal, noting: 
It is well-settled that directors owe fiduciary duties to the corporation. W e n  a 
corporation is solvent, those duties may be enforced by its shareholders, who have 
standing to bring derivative actions on behalf of the corporation because they are the 
ultimate beneficiaries of the corporation's growth and increased value. W e n  a 
corporation is insolvent, however, its creditors take the pIace of the shareholders as 
the residual beneficiaries of any increase in value. 
The Gheavalla court noted that insolvency of a corporation ". . . may be demonstrated by either showing 
( I )  a deficiency of assets below liabilities with no reasonable prospect that the business can be successhlly continued 
in the face thereof, or (2) an inability to meet maturing obligations as they fall due in the ordinary course of 
business." Id. at. 98, n. 17. (footnotes and internal quotations deleted) 
This term does not appear to have been precisely defined by the courts but has been used to indicate that 
the corporation is in the "vicinity" of insolvency. Javell Recovery, L. P. v. Cordon, f 96 B.R. 348,355 (N.D.Tex. 
1996). 
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Consequently, the weditom of an inrotvent copration have stmding to maintain 
derivative claims against the dirmors for breaches of fiduciary duties. The 
copration" insolvency makes the a d i t o m  the principal constituency injured by 
any fiduciary breacha that diminish the firm's value. Therefore, equitable 
considations give creditors standing to pursue derivative claims against the 
dirmtors of an insolvent covrarion. Individud creditors of an insolvent corporation 
have the same incentive to pursue valid derivative claims on its behalf that 
shareholders have when the c o p r a ~ o n  is solvent. (internal quotations omitted; 
mphazsis in original) 
Id. at 101-102. 
The fact that a corporation has become insolvent does not turn derivative claims into direct 
creditor claims. Id. at 102. "To recognize a new right for creditors to bring direct fiduciary claims 
against. . . directors would create a conflict between those directors' duties to maximize the value 
of the insolvent corporation for the benefit of all those having an interest in it. . . ." Id. at 104, n. 46, 
quoting Production Resources Group, L. L. C. v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A.2d at 797. Thus, Reed 
Taylor's attempt to assert a direct claims in the present case is ill-founded, particularly because he 
seeks to bring a direct suit not against the directors, but against defendants who are one step fwther 
removed, lawyers who allegedly advised the  director^.^ If he has no standing to sue the directors 
directly, he certainly has no standing to sue the corporations' counsel directly. 
D. The Complaint Fails to State a Cause of Action for Civil Conspiracy. 
The distinction, which plaintiff Reed Taylor ignores in his complaint, between civil 
conspiracy and aiding and abetting is that an action for civil conspiracy cannot arise unless the 
parties to the alleged civil conspiracy each independently owe a duty to the aggrieved party. 
His complaint states at 1 10 that it is not a derivative action; rather, he is seeking to bring claims directly 
against HTEH. 
The plaintiff consistently fails to distinguish in his complaint between counsel for the corporations and 
counsel for the individual directors. 
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A civil conspiracy, however atrocious, does not per se give rise to a cause of 
action unless a civil wong has been comitted resulting in dmage. The elemmb 
of an a c ~ o n  for civil conspiracy are the formation and operation of the cornpiracy 
and dmage  resulting to plaintiff %om an act or acts done in m e r m c e  of the 
co rnon  design. . . . In such an action the major si@fimce of the cornpiracy lies 
in the fact that it r m d m  each participant in the wron&l act jointly respnsible as 
a joint tortfeasor for all damages ensuing fi-om the won& irrespective of whether or 
not he was a direct actor and regwdless of the degee of his activity. 
A cause of action for civil wnspiracy may not arise, however, if the alleged 
conspirator, thou& a participant in the agement  undertying the injury, was not 
pmonally bound by the duty violated by the wrongdoing and was acting only as the 
agent or employee of the party who did have the duty. (citations and internal 
quotations deleted) 
Doctor's Co. v. Stcperior Court, 49 Cal.3d 39,44,260 Cal.Rptr. 183, 185-186,775 P.2d 508,510- 
Thus, in the Doctor's decision it was held that an attorney retained to assist in the defense 
of an insured against a third-party claim was not liable to the claimant for damages allegedly 
resulting firom a conspiracy to violate provisions of the state insurance code which made it an unfair 
practice for an insurer to delay prompt and fair settlement of a claim where liability has become 
reasonably clear. The court reasoned that "[algents and employees of a corporation cannot conspire 
with their corporate principal or employer where they act in their official capacities on behalf of the 
corporation and not as individuals for their individual advantage." (Citations and internal quotations 
omitted) Id. at 44, 260 Cal.Rptr. at 186,775 P.2d at 5 1 1. 
In Skarbrevik v. Cohen, England & WhitJeld, 231 Cal.App. 3d 692, 282 Cal.Rptr. 627 
(199 l), it was alleged that an attorney for a closely held corporation was liable for civil conspiracy 
to conceal information &om a minority shareholder. The California Court of Appeal, however, held 
that, absent either an individual duty to the plaintiff or a personal financial interest, the attorney 
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could not be held liable on a theory of civil conspiracy bas& on his actions as attomey for the 
copration. Id., at 71 1,282 Cal.Rptr, at 640. Receipt by an attomey of reasonable compensation 
ces perfsmtxi does not constitute such financial interest as will support a cause of 
action for conspiracy to deeaud, Id., at 710,282 Cal.Rptr. at 639; see also Camp v. Dema, 948 F.2d 
455,463 (8* Cir. 1991). 
Similarly, in Fischer v, Estate ofFfax, 81 6 A.2d 1 (D.C. 2003), it was held that an attorney 
does not "conspire" with his own client merely by giving advice. The court stated, "To hold 
otherwise would be akin to saying that 'a defendant could conspire with his right arm, which held, 
aimed, and fired the fatal weapon.' " Id. at 5, n. 4. The complaint in the present case fails to state 
a cause of action against HTEH for civil conspiracy. "[Tlhere can be no 'conspiracy' with a client 
if an attorney merely acts within the scope of his employment as an advisor to, or an advocate on 
behalf of, the client." Id. at 5. 
E. The Complaint Fails to State a Cause of Action for Interference with Contract 
Plaintiff's first cause of action does not specifically allege intentional interference with 
contract. However, the general allegations of the complaint contain averments that could be 
construed as attempting to plead interference with contract. See, e.g., Complaint 7 14, alleging 
"intentional violation and interference with Reed J. Taylor's contractual rights" by, among other 
things, obtaining a TRO and preliminary injunction in the Underlying Litigation. 
Since the analysis of interference with contractual relations is similar to that of civil 
conspiracy, HTEH will respond here to the allegations that they improperly interfered with one or 
more contracts between their clients and Reed Taylor. 
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The e l m a t s  of the tort of intentional interfamce with contract are: 
(a) the existence of a contract, (2) knowledge of the contract on the part of the 
defmdmt:{3) intentional interference cawing a breach of the contract, and (d) injury 
to the plaintiffresdting ftQm the breach. 
Barlow v. International Harvester Co., 95 Idaho 881,893,522 P.2d 1102, 11 14 (1974). 
A party cannot tortiously interfere with its own eontract. Ostmnder v. Farm Bureau Mut. 
Ins. Co. ofldaho, Ine., 123 Idaho 650,654,851 P.2d 946,950 (1993). The actions of an agent acting 
within the scope and course of his authority are imputed to the principal. In Ostrander, a former 
mployee of Farm Bureau alleged that her supervisor, Hart, had interfered with her employment 
contract by making an inaccurate evaluation of her perforrnance which led to termination of her 
mployment. The court held: 
As an agent of Farm Bureau, Hart had the authority to evaluate Ostrander and 
terminate her contract. Since Hart's actions with respect to Ostrander were within 
the scope of his authority as an agent of Farm Bureau, there was no third party to the 
contract. Accordingly, Ostrander has not stated a claim for tortious interference with 
contract. 
Id. at 950, 851 P.2d at 654. 
In BECO Const. Co., Inc. v. J-U-B Engineers, Inc., 145 Idaho 7 19, 1 84 P. 3d 844 (2008), a 
contractor claimed that an engineering firm tortiously interfered with its contract with the City of 
Pocatello by failing to approve its application for final payment until perceived defects in 
csnstruction were remedied. The court held the engineers were acting within the scope of their 
authority as project engineers for the city. Fulfillment of their duty to monitor the progress of 
construction and advise the city progress payments did not constitute interference with contract: 
Although J-U-B was not a party to the Construction Contract in the traditional sense, 
it acted as the City's agent by the very terms of the contract between BECO and the 
City. Ths case falls within the purview of Ostrander where an intentional 
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intdermce claim was foufld not to lie against an agmt of a party who was acting 
within the scope of his authority. 
Id., 184 P.3d at 850. 
Other m e s  in accord with Ostrander and J-U-B are Leon v. Boise State Universip, 125 
Idaho 365,870 P.2d 1324 (1994) (the chair of a ~ v e r s i t y  dep ent could not be held liable for 
i n t d h n g  with a professor's employment contract); Gunter v. Murphy 's Lounge, U C ,  14 1 Idaho 
16,105 P.3d 676 (2005) (the managing member of a limited liability company was not liable for the 
company's decision to terminate a contract); Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corp. 141 Idaho 233, 108 
P.3d 380 (2005) (former employee's managers were acting within the scope and course of their 
employment and thus could not constitute third parties for purposes of a claim for intentional 
mterfaence with contract); Thomas v. Medical Center Physicians, P.A., 138 Idaho 200'61 P.3d 557 
(2002) (professional corporation could not be held liable for interference with its own contract); 
Cantwell v. City of Boise, 2008 W L  2757046 (Idaho 2008) (employee failed to establish claim for 
tortiow interference with prospective economic advantage when employee's supervisors 
recommended termination of his employment contract). 
The relationship between an attorney and his or her client is that of principal and agent. An 
attorney cannot be held liable for interference with contract by giving advice to the client within the 
scope of the attorney's representation of the client. Therefore, Reed Taylor's complaint fails to 
plead a cause of action for intentional interference with contract. 
IV. SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION - CONVERSION 
Plaintiff's second cause of action is for alleged conversion of an indeterminate sum of 
money. Conversion has been defined as "a distinct act of dominion wrongfully asserted over 
@ 
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mother's pmonal property in denial [ofl or inwnsistent with (the] rights therein. " Torir v. Allred, 
100 Idaho 905,919,6116 P.2d. 334,139 (1980); see aim Pear lq  irom/rr d 9ornge Co. v. Smith, 
132 Idaho 732,743,979 P.2d 605 (1999) reh 'g denied (citation omitted) "Conversion in the legal 
sense applies only to personal property." Rowe v. Burrup, 95 Idaho 747,750,5 18 P.2d 1386 (1974). 
Plaintiffcmot state a valid claim for conversion against HTEH, however, for three reasons: 
(1) plaintiff does not own or have a possessor/ interest in the money claimed; (2) HTEH has not 
wrongfully asserted dominion over the money claimed; and (3) the money claimed by plaintiff is not 
identifiable as a specific chattel. Plaintiffs conversion claim therefore fails as a matter of law and 
should be dismissed. 
A. Pliaintifll Does Not O m  the Sum of Money Claimed. 
Tn order to state a valid claim for conversion, a plaintiffmust demonstrate that he or she has 
6 
title to the property claimed, or a right of possession. Portland Seed Co. v. Clark, 35 Idaho 44,46- 
47,204 P. 146,146-47 (1 922); Bowman v. Adam, 45 Idaho 2 17,227,261 P. 679,682 (1 927) reh g 
denied (citation omitted). "Generally, a plaintiff must establish legal ownership or right to 
possession in the particular thing the specifically identifiable moneys, that the defendant is alleged 
to have converted." Macomber v. Travelers Propert and Casualty Corp., 804 A.2d 1 80,199 (Conn. 
2002) (internal quotations and citations omitted). No action for conversion of money may be 
brought if the plaintiff did not have ownership, possession or control of the subject money. Flute, 
Inc. v. Rubel, 682 F.Supp. 184 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). 
The allegations of plaintiffs complaint do not clearly identify what specific sum of money 
plaintiffpurportedly owns or is entitled to possess or control. It appears plaintiffis a creditor of AIA 
Services (Complaint, W 51-55) whose right to payment of the debt has not been completely 
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established and is cmmtly at issue in the Underlying Litigation. (See Complaint, fl 15-16.) At 
@ best, p i ~ n t i 8 h a s  a claim to a sum of money. Until pl&ntiffs claim is adjudicated and his allegcll 
rights are asmatively established, plaintiff has no right to any liquidated sum. Plaintiff therefore 
c m o t  eskblish a necessary elment of his cause of action for conversion. 
B, Defendants Have Not Wrongfully Asserted D a d i o n  Over the Property. 
A claim for conversion fails if the plaintiff cannot establish that the defendant wronmly  
exerted dominion over the subject personal pro 
P.2d 1334,1339 (1980). 'Wo convmion action can exist against a defendant who did not exercise 
any form of dominion or control over the property that was allegedly converted." US. Claim, hc. 
v. Fl~menhaJt, 519 F.Supp.2d 532,536 (E.D. Pa. 2007). 
In this case, HTEH is not alleged to have taken any property directly from plaintiff. Instead, 
plaintiffs complaint alleges HTEH was compensated for attorney fees and costs incurred in 
defending its clients in the Underlying Litigation filed by plaintiff. (Complaint, 7 54.) Idaho law 
clearly permits corporations to hire attorneys to represent the corporations' interests and to 
compensate those attorneys for their services. See LC. 5 30-1 -302(1) (establishing general corporate 
power to defend in its name); I.C. $ 30-1-302(7) (establishing general corporate power to make 
contracts and to incur liabilities); I.C. 5 30-1-302(15) (establishing general corporate power to make 
payments that further the business and affairs of the corporation); I..C. 5 30-1-850 et seq. 
(establishing general corporate power to indemnify directors and advance litigation expenses); see 
also Wayne v. Murphey-Favre & Co., 56 Idaho 788,791,59 P.2d 721,722 (1936). AIA Services, 
AIA Insurance and CropUSA are legally authorized to hire HTEH and to pay the attorney fees and 
costs incurred relating to the defense of the claims asserted against the corporations in the 
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Underlying Litigation. merefore, my exedion of dominion or con&ol over the attorney fees and 
soits paid to HTEH, whrthn by AIA S h s r r .  AIA Insurance, or CropUSA cannot be wrongful such 
that a claim for conversion arises in favor of plaintiff. 
G.  Plaintiffs Claimed Sum of Money Is Not Identifiable as a Specific Chattel. 
Pliiintifs conversion claim against NTEW alleges only the conversion of an indeterminate 
amount of money. “Normally conversion for misappropriation of money does not lie unless it can 
be describedor identified as a spec$c chattel," Warm Springs Properties, Inc. v. Andora Yilla, Inc., 
96 Idaho 270, 272, 526 P.2d 1106 (1974) (emphasis added). "More particularly, if the alleged 
converted money is incapable of being described or identified in the same manner as a specific 
chattel, it is not the proper subject of a conversion action." High View Fund, L.P. v. Hall, 27 
F.Supp.2d 420,428 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (citation and internal quotations omitted). 
An action for conversion of money is insufficient as a matter of law unless it is 
alleged that the money converted was in specific tangible h d s  of which claimant 
was the owner and entitled to immediate possession. An action for conversion does 
not lie to enforce a mere obligation to pay money. 
Ehrlich v. Nowe, 848 F.Supp. 482,492 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (citations omitted); see also Landskroner 
v. Lanhkroner, 797 N.E.2d 1002 (Ohio App. 8 Dist., 2003). "In other words, an action alleging 
conversion ofmoney lies only where there is an obligation to deliver the specific pieces of the money 
in question or money that has been specifically sequestered, rather than a mere obligation to deliver 
a certain sum." SouthTrust Bank v. Donley, 925 So.2d 934,940 (Ala. 2005) (citations and internal 
quotations omitted) Even if Reed Taylor were a shareholder of AIA Services or AIA Insurance, he 
would have no personal right to possess or exert dominion over the assets of either corporation. 
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V. T H I m  CAUSE OF ACTION - IDAHO CONSUMER PR0TECTLC)N ACT 
Plaintiffs third cause of action is for an alleged violation of the Idaho Consmer Protection 
Act @meinafter the "Act"). Plaintitiff, however, has not asserted - and indeed assert - a valid 
claim under the Act against HTEH be~ause plaintiff had no contract with HTEH fiom which an 
alleged claim could pssibly arise. Accordingly, plainlips third cause of action must be dismissed 
as a matter of law. 
The Act, Idaho Code §Ej 48-601 through 48-61 9, prohibits unfair methods of competition and 
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of trade or commerce within the State of Idaho. 
The purpose of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act is "to protect both consmers and 
businesses against unfair methods of competition and unfair and deceptive practices 
in the conduct of trade or commerce, and to provide efficient and economical 
procedures to secure such protection. It is the intention of the legislature that this 
chapter be remedial and so construed." I.C. Ej 48-601. Idaho Code Ej 48-603, which 
contains a knowledge requirement, provides an enumeration of unfair methods of 
competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or 
commerce that the legislature declared to be unlawfil. I.C. 9 48-603C also declares 
any unconscionable method, act or practice in the trade or commerce to be a violation 
of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act whether it occurs before, during, or after the 
conduct of the trade or commerce. 
E'hite v. Mock, 140 Idaho 882,890, 104 P.3d 356, 364 (2004). 
Idaho Code $9 48-603 and 48-603A set forth certain practices which are prohibited under 
the Act. Idaho Code Ej 48-608(1) allows individuals to pursue a cause of action for an alleged 
violation of the Act and provides, in relevant part, as follows: 
Any person who purchases or leases goods or services s d  thereby suflers an 
ascertainable loss of money or property, real or personal, as a result ofthe use or 
employment by anotherperson ofa method, act orpractice declared unlawfirl by this 
chapter, may treat any agreement incident thereto as voidable or, in the alternative, 
may bring an action to recover damages or one thousand dollars ($1,000), which ever 
is greater.. .. 
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I.C. S, 48-608(1) (mphasis added). 
Idaho case law limits claims under the Act to circmsmces involving a clear and distinct 
con&ach;lal relationship b e W m  the piarties. See Na&n v. Glass, 102 Idaho 785,640 P.2d 1 186 
(Gt.App. 1982). In E l a s h ,  the pasties entered into negotiations for the sale of real property. The 
proposed sale never occmed and the buyers, who were renting the subject property at the time, 
ultimately pmued damage claims against the sellers. The buyers later filed a motion to amend their 
pleading to assert a claim against the sellers under the Act, claiming the sellers engaged in deceptive 
acts or practices, The trial court denied the buyers' motion to amend, finding that no valid claim 
could be asserted under the Act because no contract existed between the parties. On appeal, the 
Idaho Cowt of Appeals of Idaho upheld the trial court's denial of the sellers' motion to mend, and 
specifically held that a claim under the Act must be based upon a contract: 
I.C. 9 48-608(1) of the ICPA provides that "[alny person who purchases or leases 
goods or services and thereby suffers any ascertainable loss of money or property, 
real or personal, as a result of the use or employment by another person of a method, 
act or practice declared unlawll by ...[ the] act," may file an action for damages. We 
do not construe this language to require that a purchase or lease be "completed" in 
order for an action to be brought. However, we have reviewed the regulations 
promulgated by the Idaho Attorney General pursuant to I.C. S, 48-604(2), the 
decisions of the Idaho Supreme Court interpreting the ICPA to date, and cases 
reported under 15 U.S.C. S, 45(a)(l), which are deemed guides to construction of the 
ICPA under I.C. S, 48-604(1). We find no authority for applying the ICPA to a 
merely contemplated transaction, where there was no contract. We hold, as we 
believe the trial court intended, that a claim under the ICPA must be based upon a 
contract. 
Haskin, 102 Idaho at 788 (emphasis added). 
Similar to the facts at issue in Haskin, there is no contract in the present case between 
plaintiff and HTEH upon which plaintiffs claim under the Act can be based. The facts of this case 
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I er rmoved h m  those Etf issue in HasKin in this w e  pl&~.fThas not allegd 1 
I 1 n was even 'bntmplatd*'  between the parties. 
8 
: F h m ,  the Court of A held that a l l o k g  a pl&tiff to sue his 
or her adv 's attorney under a commer pmtection act theory infringa on the attorney-client 
relationship. Jeckle v. Grotty, 85 P.3d 931 wmh.App.Div, 3,2004). In m p H  oE&at finding, the 
court relied on Connecticut case law, holding as follows: 
Providing a private cause of action under [the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices 
Act] to a supposedly aggrieved party for the actions ofhis or her opponent's attorney 
would stand the attorney-client relatiom&p on its h a d  and would compromise an 
aaomq's duty of undivided loyalty to his or h a  client and thwart the exercise of the 
attorney's independent professional judgment on his or her client's behalf. Su$ield 
Dev. Assoc. Ltd. P'fhip v. Nat 'I Loan Investors, L.P., 260 Conn. 766,783-84, 802 
A.2d 44. 
Id., 85 P.3d at 384-85 (other citations omitted). 
Not only is there a complete absence of any contract or consumer relationship between Reed 
Taylor and HTEH which would form the basis for a claim, see LC. $48-608(1); H'kin, 102 Idaho 
at 788, but Reed Taylor should not be permitted to sue his adversaries' attorneys under the Act. 
VI. FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION - LEGAL MALPRACTICE 
A. There Is NO Attorney-Client Relationship between PIrafnW and Defendants. 
The plaintiffs fourth cause of action is for legal malpractice. 
To establish a claim for attorney malpracticelpro fessional negligence, the 
plaintiff must show: (1) the creation of an attorney-client relationship; (2) the 
existence of a duty on the part of the lawyer; (3) the breach of the duty of the 
standard of care by the lawyer; and (4) that the failure to perform the duty was a 
proximate cause of the damages s u f f d  by the client. 
Becker v. Callahan, 140 Idaho 522,526,96 P.3d 623,627 (2004), citingMcColm-Traska v. Baker, 139 
Idaho 948,951, 88 P.3d 767, 770 (2004); Jovdan v. Beekr, 135 Idaho 586, 590, 21 P.3d 908, 912 
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I (2001); Marias v. Marano, 120 Idaho 11, 13,813 P.2d 350,352 (1991); Johnron v. Jones, 103 Idaho 1 
1 
4 702,652 P.2d 650 (1982). a 
The first impediment to plilintiffs maIpracdice claim is the failure to allege the existence of an 
attorney-client relationship - the so-called privity rule. The complaint does not allege that HTEH 
represented the plainriff in connection with any events alleged therein." Ordinarily, one not in grivity 
of contract with an attamey cannot bring suit for legal malpractice against the attorney. Stated 
othmise,  the care md skill an attorney owes his or her client ordinarily do not extend to third parties. 
National Sav. Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195,205-206,25 L.Ed. 621 (1 879); Buscher v. Boning, 1 14 
Hawai'i 202,159 P.2d 8 14 (2007); Rhode v. Adams, 288 Mont. 278,957 P.2d 1 124 (1 998); Lilyhorn 
v. Dier, 214 Neb. 728,335 N.W.2d 554,555 (1983). 
The reasons for the privity rule are manifold: "The scope of an attorney's contractual duty to 
a client is defined by the purposes for which the attorney is retained." Johnson v. Jones, 103 Idaho 702, 
703,652 P.2d 650,652 (1 982). Absent the privity rule, "clients would lose control over the attorney- 
client relationship, and attorneys would be subject to almost unlimited liability." Barcelo v. Elliott, 923 
S.W. 2d 575,580 (Tex. 1996). Allowing a broad cause of action in favor of third parties would create 
a conflict of interest between an attorney's client and such third parties, thereby limiting the attorney's 
ability to zealously represent his or her client. Id. at 578. "Attorneys owe fundmental duties to their 
clients. Among themost important of these duties are the duties of zealous representation and loyalty." 
10 In approximately 1987 Mr. Riley was employed by the fm of Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & 
McKlveen, Chtd., a law fm that represented Reed Taylor in connection with his divorce from Donna Taylor. 
Incident to the divorce, Series A preferred stock in AIA Services was issued to k. Taylor. The complaint does not 
allege any act or omission of  Mr. Riley in connection with the divorce or the issuance of the Series A preferred stock 
as the basis for damages allegedly sustained by Reed Taylor. Even if such allegation were to be made, the applicable 
two-year statute of limitation, Idaho Code $ 5 - 2  19, has long since run. 
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Heinze v. Bauer , 145 Idaho 232, 178 P.3d 597, 603 (2008). Those duties would be irrevocably 
u'mpomised if attorneys were required to t a n p a  their representation by tding into aaovnt the 
economic interests of third parties. Finally, the attorney-client relationship, although based on contract, 
involves a hi&Iy personal and confidential relationship ". . .. more analogous to a mnbact of a personal 
nature than to an o r d i n q  comercia1 contract." Jachon v. Rqgers & fills, 210 Cal.App.3d 336, 
342,258 Cal'Rptr. 454 (1 989). Imposing duties to non-clients would give rise to increased malpractice 
suits and cause attorneys to practice in a manner calculated to protect themselves personally rather than 
advance the interests of their clients. 
The Idaho Supreme Court in Harrisfeld v. fincock, 140 Idaho 134, 90 P.3d 884 (2004), 
confronted the issue of whether a legal malpractice action must arise out of an attorney-client 
relationship. In that case disappointed heirs sought to bring a legal malpractice action against the 
attorney who drafted a decedent's will and three codicils. Each of the two later codicils revoked prior 
codicils. The heirs contended the codicils were intended by the testatrix to be cumulative. The court 
acknowledged: "As a general rule, an attorney will be held liable for negligence only to his or her client 
and not to someone with whom the attorney does not have an attorney-client relationship." Id. at 137, 
90 P.3d at 887. However, the court held this is not an invariable rule and that in deciding whether to 
recognize a new duty or extend a duty beyond the scope previously imposed the court would adopt what 
it called a "balance-of-the-harms" test. 
The Harrigfeld test involves weighing the following policy considerations: 
[Tlhe foreseeability of the harm to the plaintiff; the degree of certainty that the 
plaintiff suffered injury; the closeness of the connection between the defendant's 
conduct and the injury suffered; the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct; 
the policy of preventing future harm; the extent of the burden to the defendant and 
consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting 
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liability for breach; and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk 
involved. 
Id. at 138,90 P.3d at 888. 
Considering those factors, the court held that an attorney preparing testamentary instrurnenb 
owes a duty to the beneficiaries named in the instruments to effectuate the testator's intent. This is the 
only instance to date in which the requirment of privity in a legal malpractice action has been 
abrogated under Idaho law. The Harrigfeld court cautiond: 
A direct attorney-client relationship is required to exist between the plaintifland the 
attorney-defendant in a legal malpractice action except in this very narrow 
circumstance. 
Id. at 139, 90 P.3d 884. 
The reason for such cautionary limitation was aptly expressed by theHarrigfeld court, quoting 
While privity of contract has been abolished in many areas of tort law, the concern 
is still that liability for negligence not extend to an unlimited and unknown number 
of potential plaintiffs. In the area of legal malpractice the attorney's obligations to 
his client must remain paramount. In such cases the best approach is that the 
plaintiffs must allege and prove facts demonstrating that they are in the nature of 
third-party intended beneficiaries of the relationship between the client and the 
attorney in order to recover in tort. By this we mean that to establish a duty owed by 
the defendant attorney to the nonclient the nonclient must allege and prove that the 
intent of the client to benefit the nonclient third party was the primary or direct 
purpose of the transaction or relationship. 
Id. at 137, 90 P.3d at 887 
The Idaho Supreme Court, in a case decided afier Harrigfeld, declined to create an additional 
exception to the privity requirement. In Taylor v. Maile, 142 Idaho 253, 127 P.3d 156 (2005), the 
Taylors, as remainder beneficiaries of a trust, attempted to sue the trustee's attorney for legal 
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A pmon wishing to invoke the court's j-&sdiction mwt have standing, Yan Virlknk-enburgh 
v. Citizens for irernr Limits, 135 Idaho 12 1, 124, 15 P.3d 1 129, 1 132 (2009). As noted in Miles v. 
I h h o  Power Go., 116 Idho  635, 639, 778 P.2d 753, 761 (1989), the doctrine of standing is a 
subcategory of justiciability. 'Standing focuses on the p w  seeking relief and not on the issues the 
party wishes to have adjudicatd." Young v, City ofKetchum, 137 Idaho 102,106,44 P.3d 1 157,1159 
(2002). See also Boundaty Baclcpackers v. Boundary County, 128 Idaho 371,913 P.2d 1 141 (1996). 
The court in Young, supra, elucidated the applicable principle as follows: 
To satisfy the case or controversy requirment of standing, a litigant must "allege or 
demonstrate an injury in fact and a substantial likelihood the relief requested will 
prevent or redress the claimed injury." (Citations omitted) This requires a showing 
of a "distinct palpable injury" and "fairly traceable causal connection between the 
claimed injury and the challenged conduct." (Citations omitted) 
Id. at 106,44 P.3d at 1159. 
The requirement of standing was Eurther explicated in the case of Bowles Y. Pro Indiviso, Inc., 
132 Idaho 371, 973 P. 2d 142 (1 999) as follows: 
In order to fulfill the standing requirement, the plaintiffmust "'allege such a 
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy' as to warrant his invocation of the 
court's jurisdiction." Bentel, 104 Idaho at 135-36,656 P.2s at 1388-89 (quoting Life 
of the Land, 623 P.2d at 438) (emphasis in original). The party seeking to invoke the 
court's jurisdiction must allege such a personal stake in the outcome of the 
controversy as to assure the concrete adversariness which sharpens the presentation 
upon which the court so depends. See Miles, 116 Idaho at 641, 778 P.2d at 763 
(quoting Duk Power Co. v. Carolina Env. Study Group, 438 U. S. 59, 72, 98 S.Ct. 
2620,2630,57 L.Ed. 2d 595 (1978). This "personal stake" requirement dmands 
that the plaintiff allege a distinct palpable injury to himself 
Id. at 377,973 P.2d at 146. 
Reed Taylor has failed to demonstrate a personal stake in any theoretically posited controversy 
among AIA Services, AIA Insurance, CropUSA and their defense counsel. Accordingly, he lacks 
standing to assert any direct claim for professional negligence against the defendants in this case. 
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VII, THE CLAIMS OF LEGAL WLPMCTICE, AIDLNG AND mETTINC, 
AND CIVIL CONSPIMGY ARE BARJRED BY LITIGATION P M L E C ; E  
It would be particularly pernicious and dffhuctive of the attorney-client relationship if 
aeomeys in a litigated matter were held to have a duty of care or loyalty to the adverse party - in 
eff"wt, that they become co-counsel for the oppnent. The defendants cannot possibly act as zealous 
advocates of AM Senrices, AIA Insmmce and CropUSA if they are also deemed to owe duties of care 
and loyalty to Reed Taylor. "An attorney owes no duty to a third party in an adversarial relationship." 
Bowman v. Two, 104 Wash.2d 181, 188, 704 P.2d 140 (1085). '"xistence of a duty to an adversary 
party beyond the courtesy and respect owed all participants in the legal process. . . would interfere with 
the undivided loyalty an attorney owes a client and would diminish an attorney's ability to achieve the 
most advantageous position for a client."'Id. at 189. Accord, Tlre Chapman Children's T m t  v. 
Porter &Hedges, L.L.P., 32 S.W.3d 419 (Tex.App. 2000); Rhode v. Adam, 288 Mont. 278,957 P.2d 
1 124 (1 998): Gnrcia v. Rodey, Dickason. Sloan, Akin & Robb, P.A., 106 N.M. 757, 750 P.2d 1 18 
(1988); Friedman v. Dozorc, 41 2 Mich. 1 ,3  12 N.W.2d 585 (1 981). 
Section 890 of the Restatement (Second) ofTorts (1979) provides: "One who would otherwise 
would be liable for a tort is not liable if he acts in pursuance of and within the limits of a privilege of 
his own or of a privilege of another that was properly delegated to him." The statements and conduct 
of an attorney who participates in the judicial process are protected by the litigation privilege, or as 
it is sometimes is called, litigation immunity. The privilege is not absolute; for instance, it does not 
permit a lawyer to steal documents, IBP, Inc., v. Klurnpe, 101 S.W.2d, 461 (Tex.App. 2001), to 
physically assault another party, Miller v. Stonehenge/FASA - Texas , 993 F.Supp. 46 1 (N.D. Tex. 
1998), or to c o r n i t  acts which constitute abuse of process or malicious prosecution. Otherwise, the 
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privileg is broad. "VTphe litigation privilege proteets Iawyem not only against defmation actions but 
against a host of other tort-related claim..* Loigman v. Middietown, I85 N.J. 566,889 A.2d 126,436 
It was held in Loiean that an attorney who excluded a spectator and self-styled cornunity 
watchdog h r n  a heaiing on the allegedly specious ground that the person was a potential witness was 
held to be immune from a 42 U.S.C. $1983 suit brought by the d i s m t l e d  watchdog. The court 
observed that '"t]he c o r n o n  policy h e a d  that runs thou& judicial, prosecutorial and witness 
immunity is the need to ensure that part-icipants in the judicial process act without fear of the threat 
of ruinous civil litigation when performing their respective hctions." Id., at 581,889 A.2d at 436. 
The privilege applies even where the theories advanced by counsel are new. or innovative: 
Typically, the litigation privilege has been invoked by attorneys to safeguard 
them &om defmation suits arising from comments made in the course of judicial 
proceedings. However, to address creative pleading, courts have extended the 
litigation privilege to cover unconventional and sometimes novel causes of action 
against attorneys acting within the judicial process. As one scholar put it, as new tort 
theories have merged, courts have not hesitated to expand the privilege to cover 
theories, actions, and circumstances never contemplated by those who formulated the 
rule in medieval England. (Citations and internal quotations deleted) 
Id. at 583,889 A.2d at 435-436. 
If attorneys must work in constant fear of civil liability, then the rights of all clients will suffer. 
Thus, it has been recognized that counsel owes no duty to a party opponent in litigation: 
Historically, our court system has always been adversarial in nature. The role 
of the attorney therein is to represent and advocate a client's cause of action as 
vigorously as the rules of law and professional ethics will permit. For that reason 
an attorney's exclusive and paramount duty must be to the client alone and this duty 
cannot run to the client's adversary. Not only would the adversary's interests 
interfere with the client's interests, but the attorney's ongoing and justifiable concern 
with being sued would detrimentally interfere with the attorney client relationship. 
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Thw, an altorney in dischar@ng professional duties on behalf of his client cannot be 
held liable for ne&igence toward an advme party. As a matter of public policy in 
order to mllinlain and a f o r e  the fidelity and duty of the attorney toward the client, 
t jeopardize the inteMty of the advmarial system by imposing a 
professional duty on n attorney toward an advarse party. (Citations omitted) a 
Garcia v. Rody, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, 106 N.M. 757,761,750 P.2d 118, 122 (1988). 
Nor does violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility give rise to a private cause of 
action, either in favor of the laver 's  own clients or third parties. "The rules are designed to provide 
guidmce to lawyers and to provide a strucwe for regulating conduct through disciplinary agencies. 
They are not designed to be a basis for civil liability." Id. at 762,750 P.2d 123. 
Nmerous r q r t e d  cases support the proposition that the privilege attaches where attorneys 
represent clients in litigation or other contested or advmarial matters. See, e.g., Al'pert v. Crain, Caton 
& James, P.C., 178 S.W. 2d 398 (Tex.App. 2005); C X  Transportation, Inc. v Gilkinson, 2007 WI, 
858423 (N.D.W.Va. 2007); Weaver v. Superior Court, 95 Cal.App. 3d 166,156 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1979); 
Clark v. Dmckman, 281 W.Va. 41 7,624 S.E. 2d 864 (2005); Friedman v. Dozorc, 41 2 Mich. 1,3 12 
The case of Kahata Royal Corp. v. Goodrr'll Anderson Quinn & Stifel, 1 13 Hawai'i 25 1, 15 1 
P.3d 732 (2007), contains an extensive review of the authorities and the policy reasons for baning a 
litigant's claim for civil damages against an opposing attorney for statements made or actions taken 
in the course of the attorney's representation of an opposing party related to the civil litigation. The 
policy reasons include: 
(1) promoting the candid, objective, and undistorted disclosure of evidence; (2) 
placing the burden of testing evidence upon the litigants during trial; (3) avoiding the 
chilling effect resulting &om the threat of subsequent litigation; (4) reinforcing the 
finality of judgments; (5) limiting collateral attacks upon judgments; (6) promoting 
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zealous advocacy; (7) discouraging abusive litigation practices; and (8) mcowadng 
settlment. 
Id. at 268, 15 1 P.3d at 750. 
The allegations in the present case relate to thmries advanced, positions taken, e o m e n t s  
made and defenses raised by HTEH in litigation or related adversarial m a t l a  relating to disputed 
control of closely held corporations. Those cowrations are entitled to zealous rqresentation by 
atlomeys of their own choosing, who should not be required to labor under constant threats of 
vindictive and raliatory litigation by the adverse party. The litigation privilege applies not only to 
plaintiffs cause of action for professional malpractice, but to those of aiding and abetting and civil 
conspiracy, which should be dismissed in their entirety on the ground that the actions of HTEH as 
litigation counsel for AIA Services, AIA Insurance and CropUSA are privileged. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The complaint fails to state a cognizable claim. The plaintifirs cause of action for aiding and 
abetting does not state a claim upon which relief can be granted because he fails to allege any facts 
that, if true, would establish that HTEH owed any duty to him or that he has any standing to sue HTEH 
directly. His claims of civil conspiracy and intentional interhence with contract also fail because, 
as a matter of law, an agent, such as an attorney, is incapable of conspiring with his principal or 
i n t d i n g  with the principal's contract. His claim under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act fails as 
a matter of law because he does not allege he has purchased any goods or services from HTEH. His 
claim for conversion is legally deficient because he fails to allege any specific chattel of which he was 
wrongfully dispossessed by HTEH. He fails to allege any facts which would show that he is in privity 
with HTEH or has any standing to sue that firm or its attorneys for malpractice. Finally, plaintiffs 
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complajnt is deficient because the actions of WTEH in mmection with the Underlying Litigation are 
protntcd by ihc litigation pfiuilege. 
DATED this 4 day of 2008. 
By: 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 9 day o f L  h a  .2008, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the above and foregoing instrument to bk served upon the following in the manner 
indicated below: 
Michael S. Bissell U.S. Mail 
CAMPBELL BISSELL & KIRBY, PLLC Hand Delivery 
7 South Howard Street, Ste. 416 7 - Federal Express 
Spokane, WA 99201 Facsimile Transmission (509) 455-71 1 1 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS - 33 
G:\7082\0013\Pleadings\Motion to Dismiss - Memo\Motion to Dismiss - Memo ver-1 1 .wpd 
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL TRANSCRIPT 
AND ADDITIONAL CLERK'S RECORD j 5 f 
* *- -s" L-i - 
DEC 23. 2008 3: 13PM D I S T R I C T  COURT NO. 9026 P- 1/19 
1)ISWC"Ir C O ~ T  OF THE %COW m I W  DXSma 
STAm OF IDABO, l[N AND FOR OF NEZ PERCE 
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual, 
M C W L  E. MGMCHOLS, an h&ddwl; 
C L E m 8 ,  BROWN & McMmOLS, 
P.A., an Idaho professional corpors'ltvn; 
JAlE DOES I-V, WOW h G ~ d d ~ ;  
Defendants. 
1 
) CASE NO. CVO8-01763 
1 
) OPrnION ANL, ORDER ON 
) D E F E N D W '  MOTTON 
) TO DISMSS AND PLmmFF'S 






This  matt0r is before the Court on DefendmtsWotion to Dismiss and Plaintiffs Motion 
to h a n d  Colldpfaint. A heari~g on tha Motion to was held on October 16,2008 and a 
he+ on thc Motion to Amend Complaint was h01d on December 4,2008. PIaintiEFReed 
Taylor was represented by attorney Michael S. Bisall. rlefendrrnts Michael E. McNiehols end 
the law firm of Clments, Brown & McVichols were represented by attorney John J. Janis. The 
Go~rt ,  having read the motion and briefs of the parties, b ~ g  considered the record in Ulc 
matter, hming heard oral arguments of counsel and bering fully advised in the matter, hereby 
tenders its decision. 
rrrylov v. McNtchDLr I 
Opinion & Order on Motion KO Disrniw 
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Percs Comv Case No. CV07-00208. The ismw in. the mdwlag casd RE complex a d  its 
pmeedutal bistctry len@y, though the mtta has yert to go to triiiL Reed Taylw" comp&t in 
the d e r l m  case, amen$ed five times, asserts eleven claims including one for d d d t  of a $6 
million ~~I t r i ssory  noEB issud to Reed Taylor by the q o r a t s  defisndants as part of a bupout 
or re&ement package. In ordar to mderstahd the ol being asseed in the instant matter, 
certain events in the mderlying o w  must be reviewed. 
On January 29,2007, Reed Taylor filed auit against AIA Sewises Coxporation, AIA 
e, h., John Taylor, C o d e  Taylor, Bqm Freeman md JoLee hclos. A U  Insurance, 
Inc. is a buhess  entiv under the mbmlla of ALA Services Comporatioa At the time of the 
E l  of thp, Iawdt, John Taylor was the aana&g director of the corporations and a board 
member along with Bryan Freeman and JoLee hclos.  Coanie Taylor, tEre former wife of John 
Taylor, held a m m ~ v  property kitemst in the corporations. Following the filing of the 
lawsuit, attorney Michael McNichols was retained to repraent AYA S ~ C R S ,  AIA Insurance and 
John Taylor; attorney David Oi~~m was retained to represent Bryan Freeman and JoLec Duclos; 
attorney Jan H d y  was r&&ed to fepwesent C o d e  Taylor. 
On February 27,2007, upon motion by the Defendants, the Court granted a temporary 
res* order against Reed Taylor &BT he artemp&d to exercise mmgcment authority over 
the copraze Defendants. A hearing date was them set on the Defendants' accompmag motion 
for a preliminary injunction. On March 8,2007, as a result of actions taken by Reed Taylor 
before and immediately foIlowing the filing of his lawsuit, tbe Court entered a p m l i a r y  
injunction pmkbiting Reed Taylor from acting or attempting to act as manager and/or a board 
Taylor V M&f~hob 
Opinion& Order onMorton IO 13imIss 
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memba of AIA 
On ME& 28,2007, agomey NcNchols filed a modon to witfidraw as co-1 for AIA 
S c ~ m s  and AIA e- b e d  Taylor did not objcot and, at a hemlag on April 12,2007, the 
Court @mad &0 motion to *&aw. Oa May 7,2007, a notice of appaxance on behalf of 
S & G ~  and AL4 h m c e  %?a$ tiled by aameys Oary Babbitt. and John A&ky of the law 
firm mwl~y,  ~ x e l l  Ennis St Hawley, LLP. The firxu w n ~ u w  to reprment the cofpo~afXons. 
The last rngtter in the underlying case that is of rele~mw to the htmt awe is a &g by 
the Goutt on motion for partial s m q  judment filed by Reed Taylor- A f k  sigaifimt 
briekg md ord ammb on the motion, the Cow found the corporate D~fendarlts were id 
default on a $6 d i o a  pmissory note issued to Reed Taylor by the corporations. Howmer, the 
Court mde no detednation relative to other t m s  in tfie ateasivo buy-out *mmW beWen 
AIA W m c e  Corporation and Reed Tc~ylor, such as the effect on voting shares and receivables 
upon default of tho promissory note. Those issues were not before &a Coat in the context of the 
motion for p& judgment and, therefore, have yet to be d e t e d e d .  
After twenty-one months of motions and h d g s  in the uaderlying ease, after trial dates 
had been set and reset, and with a number of motions still panding before the Court, Reed Taylor 
filed the above-entitled action agW attorney MC%Ch613 and the law firm of Clements, Brown 
& McNichols, who currently remain as counsel for J o h  Taylor in the wderlag ease. In his 
action, Bed August 8,2008, Reed Taylor asserts the following claims against attorney 
M~NichoZs and his law fbm: (I) aiding Emd abetting or afsistin$ others in the c o d s s i o n  of 
tortiom am in the underlying case; (2) conversion and mis~ppmpr3.ation of MA oorporate 
' Wch 8,2608 Opfnfon and Order on Defkndm' Motion for prelim in^ fqjmction page 6 
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assea; (3) dol&~m of Idaho" am-r Pmkcldbn Act, I.C, 5 48-@I & sq-; and, (4) 
p r a f d ~ d  m@gmw w.d/or bmch of Bduciary dub.es. 011 Sepwber 29,2008, Dehdant 
McNiohols, k u & h  wmek filed a m o ~ o n  to dmk purmant to 1KC.P. 120,3(6) along with 
brifig Reed Tayfor filed briew fn oppodtidn and on Octdber 15,2008, the Coutt h d  ord 
armmts of c o ~ a l ,  
One day prior to the COW'S h e h g  on D&ndm&' Motion to W s s ,  Pl&m filed a 
motion to m a d  his wmpkc attach& his pmposed mended pleding, By order ofthe 
Go- haaring on tha Motion to Amend was held on Dtcenrbe~ 4,2008 and the Court will 
addtess the maw herein 
.ST-rn ON MOTION TO DISMIR 
In d i h g  on a motion to &miss purmt  to 1.RC.P. 12(ti)(6), a coat is to review all 
facts and infmnces in favor of the non-movhg party atld ask whether a daim for relief has been 
stated, Kohr v. Rohr, 128 Idaho 137,141,911 P2d 133,137 (1996). Inthe instant matter, the 
arguments made by &a parties incorp~raed evants and actiotls that have occmed in the 
m&rlging w e  of Taylor v. AU, et 4. Therefore, ki making its analysis in the instant mattex 
and p m 8 n t  to I.R..E. 201, the Cow will take judicial notice of the waderlying case fn toto 
pNALYrn 
m_ D m m M s l  MOZm TO DIEMISS 
The hut% raised in the instant matter appear at fitst blmh to bc complex and at times 
convol\aed However, despite lengthy briefs and pleadings, the issucf are not as daunting as thcy 
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first appesr.' A6 stated by R& Taylor in his opposition Wsf the pvmm of his Complaint ir 
that a&oancy MeMchols and tha law fkm of CbmW, Brow $ MoNiohols aided and abet.ted 
John T d o r  md othm in co g torts ag& Reed Taylor and acted to daprive rteed Taylor 
of mvnq md prop- to which ho is atitled? 
Each of fithe claims asserted by Plaintiff relies upon his contation that a Defendant law 
firfa md aamey wete xetahed to mpresent the AIA caqorations by J o b  Taylor and/or others, 
that John Taylor and/or others had no 8uthan:ty to fetafn Iegd qresmtation for the corparations, 
and fiat Defendants knew they were r e a e d  wi&owt proper corporate authocty, This fsctual 
asselrtion by PZainWIs critical to his elalms and oanses each of Plain=$ cfatms to fail as a 
In tbe undmIwg case, the events of the litigation can be divided into three & s h t  time 
frames based on pxocedd svents in the case. The first h e  f i m e  ms fkom the fiIing of Reed 
Taylor's fawsuit iigainst tha AIA corporations, Jabin Taylor and other8 until the Court's Order 
e n t e ~ g  a prelimhay injunction in the case. The siecond time f ime begbs with the mtry of the 
p r e l g ~  injm&on until, the Comt's Opinion and Orda finding AM in default on the $6 
million promissor~r note (but defening any tinding on other terms of the buy-out agreement until 
trial), The third time h m e  begins with the COW'S fin* of default an the pro~ssory note and 
continua to the present 
In the instant owe, aftomey McNichols was retained to represent .MA Services, AIA 
I n m c e  and John Taylor after Reed Taylor filed suit against the corporations and its board 
members in Nw; Psrce County Cast No. WO7-00208. At the time of  filing of the lawsuit, 
John Taylor was the managing director of the cofpohons and had bcan for many verns Reed 
Pmtiffs Complaint is twc:nty-tbme pages fn hgth. ~efc-' briefin suppat of@e motion to &amiss is 
thfrty-ebt pegas in lsngtk PfefnWs bidin opposflion is m- even pages in length 
PlaintifPs Response to Dafkndants' Motion to Dismisb at p a p  19. 
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T@ot mnmds fb amment at issue; in Ult mdml*g cme inchdm t e r n  that n a k  him fhe 
sole skeholder ofthe cclfpoxacions upon defdt of ihe @odssoq aote, md, bwwe he 
b@G@v@d theP ~ S O W  note was in def8ulf he was the only person with a u a o ~ p  to r6t& 
wmel fol the wqoxatiom to defend ag* tZle acGon he br0ugh.t. Howeva, at the time 
B d to mrmeat tfie ~ w m % o n s  and J o h  Tqlor, the question of wheaer 
the pa&sory note rn in defd t  h d  not b 
C o d  Until such a dnt 
wmel for the c q g d o m  n*sted with Zfic: cofpottifc board of directom, which incIuded John 
Taylor. Thesefore, at .the time attorney McNichols tyas retained to represent the cozpomtians, 
rn&o~Q to enter into a contracr for legal strrices rested with the corporzfte board of directors, 
Reed Taylor, on the other hand, had no authority dwkg this time period to make decisions for 
the cerponrfrions. It would be a s m g e  situation bdcd for a aivil pl&tifF to be mpowred to 
seIect counsel for t;hs defmdant or, by logical extansion, decide the &fendant should have no 
eourasel at all. 
Mer he vras mtained to represent John TsyIor and the corporatiom, attorney M~Ni~hols 
filed a aotion seeking a p r e r m q  injmctioa Reed Taylor. The motion was filed after 
Reed Taylor a m p b d  to have locks changed at the corporate oBces in an effort to take over 
m q e m e n t  of the corporations. The liti~tion action of attomy McNiA~ls was cleas1y 
wananted whem litre~ood of peat ham to thf: corporation existed &om Reed Taylor's conduct 
ahd no & t e a t i o n  on the question of defiiult andlor the effects of any default had been made 
by the Comt As xetained counsel for thc corporations and John Taylor, attorney MeNichols was 
obIig8a to pursue dl eRom necessary to prevent ham to the wrporations and defend his 
clients against the nmerow claims of Reed Taylor. 
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MwCtt 8,2007, after M o m  for inwcdos were filed by both parties in the 
mtlerlying mit, &a h @ y  M e k g  wm 
hjmdm o r d a g  mmgment of the co~Wonit:  o staW qua, i.e. for m a g e m a t  of 
the c o p d o n  to remain vestsd in Qe mprasions' board of dkcctors. In addition, the 
hh&on p~oh%ited Reed Taylor from 
d l e r  of the COW FoHoPving .the Cow's mtxy of the injmction, a b q  
McNichoXs moved to *thdraw as counsel for the corporatiom The Court m t e d  bre motion 
and new ootlflsel was scibs~utjnfly rctaincd to repregeslt tfic corpomti~ns. 
Ia tbt hstmt matt&, PIainWs assertion is that aftomey XvIc=~hob was retained 
to tt3prwm.t the ALA wwr&o118 by pesons who had no authotity to retain corporate co\msel 
a i d  that attorney McMchok knew Iile was retained without proper authorizatioa This fwt fails 
as a matter of law as the Court entered an Order eatly in the &=lying acdm that estabbhed by 
judicial orda that tbe operatiom md m g e m m t  of the AUI. csxporations was to remain 
unchged until furthtz order of the C o d  The Court's Oxder mains in effect to date. Under 
Idaho Code 5 30-1-302, corpandom have the same power as individuals to mdce con&acts and 
incur IiabiXities as necessary to carry out its bwhss t&%rs and John Taytor, as CltiO of the 
qoratiws anii pumasit to the Cow's Ordw, had .the aa%oIity to retain counsel for the 
~ ~ o n t t i a n s .  
PlainWs a W  also f&l under dre doctrine of litigation privilege. The Court found no 
Idahb case law addressing the doctrioe. Nevdetess, numerous other jwisdictions haw 
addrrnscd fhe doctrine at length, pmviding the Court Nit$ direction as to the applicabifjty of thc 
pzivilegc. 
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REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL TRANSCRIPT 
AND ADDITIONAL CLERK'S RECORD 
5 5 8 
~~s in West Virginis, h v c  dhwd thpi Utigation pxivilcge ooa a 
occasiom. Ia CZWRV. Dnrcfkmm, 624 5826 864,218 W.Va 427 (W Vn2005), tfre pl&tiff. a 
physician and f m e r  defendmt in a medical mkmt ice  suit, asserted claims in neggencc 
counsel for the plaintiff in the malpfactice lawsuit. The Clmk Court, loo- fixst at the 
Wts of an aMomy, found an inffedblc e m e n t  that attorneys diligmtly, faithfufly and 
dely p d o m  every a d  necessary to prow$, corn- and advance the interests of thelr 
clim&. Clwk v Drrrchan, 624 S.E.2d at 868. The Court then noted that its mswch revealed 
no case law thf would support Clark's assertion that an aaomey owes a duty to aa opposing 
psxty, such fhat breach of the duty woutd subject an attorney to liability. Id. at 869. The Court 
stated, "This COW can find no j m c a t i o n  for imposing a duty of care in favor of an opposing 
party upon camel. hposition of such a duty can only ~ o r k  to the detriment of cowel's own 
client md would adversely hpaot counsel's duty of zedous advocacy for his or her own client 
and would mmta an impossible and unjus~d conflict of interest.'? Id. 
Court's that have had the o p p o M q  to address the litigation Mvilege recognize the 
adversarid system would be turned on its b d  if parties to a lawsuit were allowed to bring 
claims fox torts andlor Isgd dprwtice against opposing counsel for conduct done within the 
scbptpe of litigation. While attorneys must not kno-y counsel or assist a client in c o d ~ n g  
a crime or fraud4, Idaho's Rulm of Pmkssional Conduct. require an attorney to pursue m&ts on 
behdf of a elisn~t despite opposition, obstmtim or personal inconvenience to the attorney and 
require, an attorney to take whatever 1awfid and ethical m e m  are nquircd to vindicate a 
climtts cause or endeavor. IX.P.C., Rule 1.3 [l] 
The docthe of litigation privilege a- htended to create a safety zone for attorneys 
so that they may zealously advocate for their client without Bar of retribution. The Supxcmt 
* I.W.C., Rule 13[10] 
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Cam of A p w s  of West V m i a  aptly &crib& the scope and purpose of the litigation 
Xn her c m c d g  apinioa in Barcrfeld v. DPIC Conrpmier, fnc., 2 1 5 W .Va. 544, 
600 S,E.Zd 256 @OW), J w t h  Davis dismserd titre policies undexlfiw the 
litigaGon pduilcge. Thmin she st& 
[tlhe pubfir: policies as9~iiate-d with the Wgdm privilege include: (1) 
p m h g  thrs candid, objective and rted disclo- of widma; 
(2) placing bra butda of ~ ~ j g  tbe up6n the litigarrts during 
W, (3) avoidhg thc cki ct resulting fbm the threat of 
s u b s ~ m t  litigation; (4) m g  the finality of judpents; (5) limiting 
c o l h M  attacks upon j d ~ e d s ;  (6) pmmom zealous advocacy; (7) 
d i s c o m ~ g  abusive fitigation pr~cItices; and (8) tncouraging settlemtiat. 
M a t m a  v. BI du Pont de Nmours dt Co., 102 Hawai 'i 149,73 P.3d 
687,693 (2003). 
B~efleld, 215 W.Va. at 560,600 SB.2d at272 @a*, I., concWg). In light of 
these policits, we see no reason to between cmmunicariom made 
during the litigation process and cordvct owurring during the litigation process, 
As ncognked by the F'loxids Supme Court: 
absolute immunity must be affotded to any acf occurring ddng the course 
of a judicial proceeding, repdless of whather the act involves a 
defamatory statement or other tortious 'behavior such as the alleged 
misconduct at ism, so long as the act bas some relation to the ptow&ng. 
T ~ B  rationale behind the immunity afforded to defamatory statements is 
ccp&y applicable to other nulscondmt occurrjng during the c o w e  of a 
juafeial proceeding. Just as participants in litigaon must be free to engage 
in amhindered c o m ~ c & o ~  80 t w  must those participants be free to use 
their best judgment in prosecuhg or defending a lawsuit withoat fear of 
bhp, to defend their actions in a subsequant civil action for misconduct. 
Levin, Mfdmeb~ookr, Mabie, Thomat, Mqes  & MltLhell, PA., v. U~tited States 
Fh.e b a n c e  Company, 639 S0.2d 606,608 (ma 1994). See also Jackson v. 
BellSouth Talecommnfcatium, 372 F.3d 1250,1274 (1 Ith Cir.2004) (qwtbg 
Levin ). 
In Collins, we recogoized that absolute privileges, m h  as  the litigafion privilege, 
should only be: pmnittd in limited c i r c w c c s .  ColZim, 2 1 I W-Va at 461,566 
S.E.2d at 598. Thus, we do not believe that a litigation privilege should am,Iy to 
bar IiebiIiV of an attorney in all c4rc-w. In M e h e ,  Rider, Windholz & 
WZIsorl 'v. Gentrat Bank Denver, N.A., 892 P.2& 230,235 (Colo. 19951, the 
Colorado Supreme court noted that "an attorney is not liable to a non-client absent 
a finding of'fiaud or malicious conduct by the attorney." See also Baglini v. 
h l e f t u ,  338 N,J.Super. 282,768 A.2d 825, 833-34 (2001) ('The one tort 
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excepted from the m h  of tbe litiw~on privilege is aclficiow prosea~on, ot 
&&OW use of prwm.". WP' M e v e  S U C ~  emep.tiom to RII absolute fitim~on 
the &#on process are 
&m@s duty of zealous 
conduct which is unrelated to 
oppo* parly. As recently n o w  
mafrauddaagainst 
ftisd&pvvitha 
third party, the fbct he did so in tha ~ w w  of attorney fbr a client does 
not relieve hiaa of Uabilw. W e  an attorney's pmfmsiod duty of care 
extends only to his own client and hmded bencfici&cs of bis legal work: 
the W M o m  on liabill'ty for negligme do not apply to liabiliq for 
fraud. 
Vega v. Jim& Dapt, Reavfs 8 Pogue, 121 Cal&p.4th 282,291, I7 Cal,F@ix,3d 
Z6,3 1-2 (Cal.CtApp.2004)(mtmal citarfons md quotations omiM). 
In order "([to rndtain an d o n  for malicious proseculion it is essential to prove: 
(1) That the pros~jution was rnallciow; (2) &at it was without masodable or 
probable cause; and (3) that it k h t e d  favoxably to plaintifE." Syl. Pt. I, Lyom 
v D-Pocahotrl:~~ Coal Co., 75 W.Va 739.84 S.E, 744 (1 915). The tern 
malioious is dofined as '"$]lub~tially wxtain to cause iqjwf' and "without just 
cause or exmse? Blaclc's Law Diaionary 977 (8fh Ed2004). This definition 
implies azl improper or gvil intent or axolive or the intent to do barn. Whmc an 
attorney files suit without reasonable or probcible aause with the intent to harm a 
d&enh$ we do not believe the litigation privilege should insulate him or fier 
fim liability for dfoious p~secudon, 
As noted above, we can thd no reasonable j a m t i o n  for didnfnp;uisbing conduct 
from c o m ~ a m  fc$ the parposes of the H~gation priaege. Rowewer, tve 
otlso recogniz-z the need fbr W t e d  ~ x q t i o n s  from application of the absolute 
litigation p ~ l e g e  for wrtain intentional actions. Aecor&gly, we now hold that 
thc litigation privilege is p d l y  appkable to bar a civil litigant's ofaim for civil 
damages a m t  an opposing party's &mey if the alleged act of the attorney 
occurs in the come of the attorney's we~entation of an opposing party and is 
oonduct related to thc civil action, 
Clark v. DmIbnun, 624 S.E.2d at 870-871. 
In the instant mattes, P b m b  argurx;t his fs a unique situation bemuse he has filed 
suit against the A3.A corporations and its board membcrs, that the contractual tern at the core of 
his undalying suit makc him the sole shareholder of the AXA corporations and, themfore, there is 
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a C O ~ &  bmeen the MA oorpora~om and bre hard mmbsrs &it makes it bmropriae, 
even %addent, fbr the board, or more pattioulaly far mm&g b o d  m~mbe;r J o b  Taylor, to 
fa thff corporations, to direct m m e 1  for thecorporations in my way, OT for them 
to be my cooperation between mmsd for the oorpoMom end c o w 4  fdf John Taylor. Boaom 
line, Rwd Taylor mam& he is the only person witb a&onlty to d e t d n e  who shodd serve as 
wmsal for tht, corpodom he is suing. The Courl; like thcJ PlainM, has been unable to find a 
case where a plhtighas filed suit ageinst a corpomtion and its board members and, while &at 
litigation remains f l ing,  has filed suit age%t.st he attorneys r e p s e n ~ g  the various 
in the underlying suit. Nevertbelm, the Court does not fmd the! instant matter to be 
as dcfue a.9 P l W p h b  it. 
A casa with many similarities to tbe inmt owe is helpAil to thc analysis the Court must 
makc. bAlpe& v Crain, Caton B James, P. C., 178 S.W.3d 398 flex.App.=Hourton [I" Dist] 
2005), Robert Alp& filed suit against the law firm representing Wrk Riley, the d c f m h t  in a 
separak d o n  filed by Mt. Alpat Maik Riley was an attorney who had assisted klr. Alpert in 
his b a a s  aud leg$ &&. M8r the reMonsfip betPz8en Alpcrt and Riley sowed, Mpert 
filcd sai t  against Riley and Riley asserted cctuntr:relaims. Riley was rcpresated by the Crain 
Caton law firm during the litigation. Alpat then fded suit against Crain Caton law finYl asserting 
the firm had conspired with Rilq to defiaud Alp%& had aided and abetted rrilty to deftaud 
Alp&& had tortiously interkred with Riley's fiduciary duty to Alp& by concealing Riley's 
maipxwticcs end braache6 of fiduciary duly, by filing frivolous la-ts against Alperl and b y  
disparaging Alpert's repM~tion in the business coxum~ty. The law firm moved to dismiss the 
lawsuit based on nlpert's Edilura to state a r e c o g h b l  claim. The Zowcr court granted the 
TQIW v. McNIubolf 
Opinion & Order on Motion to Dismiss 
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motion and Alpsrt appealed The tdd cow's didssd of tbe lawsuit wss a m r e d  by the Toras 
Cow of Appeals. In raac&g its dedsioq the Texas Cow made the following sta~smb: 
PcrMs as gn osboot of its $ ~ q  j*pm&nce, Texas case Iaw has 
dmouragd l tw~&~ an opposing caunsel if the lawsuit if based on the 
S&e& 14 S.W.3d 756,766 
aaomey a dm to zeals 
Ifrudt Y. FB&, 892 S,W.LZd 56,71-72 vex.App.-HoMon [lst bist ] 1994, wit 
deded). In W-g tbis duty, an has %e rigfit to interpose defenses a d  
pursue legal si&(s he d e m  necessary and propI  *.&out being subject to 
damaa. Id If an mmey could be hdd hb le  to an opposing party 
cat8 made or actiow taken in the course of rg,xmmw fnis cliet& he 
m d d  be fo& cor&antly to balm? his o m  p t m W  expome against his 
clients best -&. See id Such a co&& h p e r s  rhe resolution of disputes 
through tbe court system d the a-at ofjustice. T$us, to promote zedow 
q m a t i o b  murts have Wd that an aEomey is '"MCKUy -me' ftom 
civil liabflity, with reqmrt to rran-~licnts, for actions takzn in comecdon wifh 
r q r e s m h  a client in li*ation. See, e.g., Bvtler v. LZlly, 533 S.W.2d 130,13 1- 
34 Vex.Ap.-Rousron [lst Disk] 1976, wit dism'd]. 
This @ifid b ~ q  gemrally appBes wen if conduct is w o n m  in the 
context of the m d m g  lawsujt. R e ~ o e  v. Jones & Rrsocs., 947 S.W 2d 285, 
288 Penr4pp.-Fort Worth 1997, writ dcaicd) ('Wndm Texas law, attorneys 
catmot be held liable for wro@ 5tigation wnduct."). For sxmple, a third party 
has no independent fi@t of recovery against an attorney for iiling motions in a 
lawuif evm if ftivolom ox without merit, &thou& such conduct is sanctionable 
or con~mptibta as 0nfomd by the m t o q  or inbereat powers of the court. Weft, 
892 S.W.2d at 72. Courts have re&sed to acbowledge an hdepmdent cause of 
d o n  in swh htmces "because m&g motions is wnd& an attorney engages 
in rts part of the discharge of his duties in wmenting a party in a lawsuit." Id 
(holding no cause of actioa existed for m&ing motion for contempt because 
ammeys do not om du?y to be carrect in legal ar~en&-"even if the ... motion 
for coattmpt hsd bea  meritless, thek oonduct in so mo- coming as it did in 
the discharge of their duties in repramltlng a part~r in a lamuit, w d d  still not be 
actionable.")). 7'hw, an attorney's conduct, even if frivolous or without metit, i$ 
not independently actionable if the conduct is pact o f t .  discharge of the lawyer's 
duties in repmating his or her cli-t Id at 74; Chapman C;lhildm% TW v. 
Porter & Hedges, LI;.P., 32 S.W-3d 429,441 m.App.-Houston tl4t.h Dit] 
2000, pet. denied). The b ~ v  focws on the type of mhct, not on whether 
thc conduct was meritorious in tht, write* of the underlying lawsuit. Renzoe, 947 
S.W2d at 288. 
ks the Texas Supxme Court observed in McCmlsh, a lawyefs protection fiom 
liability arising out of his rcprcsentation of a client is not without limits, See 
Taylor v. McNchok 
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Udamtsh, 991 S.W.2d at 793-94: see aIso Tole$ v Tole4 113 S.W.3d 899,912- 
13 Vc;x@p.-Ddas 2003, no @). For eurmpke, a cause of mtion could exist 
aomey d o  bo*gly m-ts a ftaudulcrat act o-ide the seopff of 
e&aon of the clieak Sea LfRaver v. gmfloww Terrace B, Lfd, 
8,472 v U p p . - H o ~ n  [lst DM] 1985, no writ). If a lawyer 
@cip& in a q e n d a a y  &ddmt activitia, his d o n  is ''foreign to the 
&ties of an 8ttomey." Id (qwting Paale v. 
137 (I 8821). A lawyer thus cannot gMeld hi 
buddent  actions earn liaWQ shply on tho grad that he is an agent of his 
client. See M 
In fhe instant case2 Read Taylor's c1 the Defendants are based solely on 
eonduct engaged in by attorney McNichols as pat  of his obligation to mdously mpresmt his 
clients in the litigation procass brought about by Reed Taylor's lawsuit against attamey 
McNichols's clients. PlainWs fiat cause of action asserts the Dtfi:ndaats, with fiall knowledge 
of Reed Taylor's rights under the buy-out apemerzt, aided and abetted others in the tortious 
int~~~fetmcc of Reed Taylor's mntraotual rights. Plaintiff asserts that in seeking and o b W g  a 
p t e l m  injtmtion qdmt him in the undeil- me, attomcy McNichols aided and abetted 
in thr: hterEmnoe of P W s  mtractual rights that are at issue in the underlying case. 
The conduct alleged by Pl&Wwas not unlawful, was dope in tho course of the 
litigation proccs and in the course of rqmenting his clients' rights mtil a debmbtion on the 
legal ism= could be made though the judicial process. The conduct o f  the Defendants done in 
tho come of seeking a judicial detf:rmimtioa. on the numerous claims brought against the 
Dcfendaats' clients in the underlying case frills within the litigation privilege even though Reed 
Taylor may eventually prevail in the underlying d o n .  Whcn a party makes a claim that a 
prodsory xrote is in default and that certain tenns of an agreement art triggered by the default, 
an attorney is obligated to zealously defend his client against the claims. It is not enough that a 
plaintiff believes he will prevail on his claims. The ALA corporations and the board of dirc3ctors 
Tbylor v. McNichok 
Oplnion & Orbn on Motion to Dunriss 
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have a l a m  J$#I~, hdeed the obfim~on, to wroMately defend gp 
h a d  regadkg any d d w e s  to tfie . In ddition, any aaomey 
za~on and its dire- has aa Mdble  obligation to zealously q r w a t  his clime in b t  
defense and is obligated to take a m e r  Btsps me necossw *this thc litigation to protect his 
clients rights until a dete on of the issues is d o  by a cow. 
The seaonti cause of action asserted by P l b i E i s  for one of canvdon, In'& 
u n d c r l h  case, the question of *e&a the term of the bby-out &@went  entitle Reed Taylor 
to the co&ssiom and related receivabla of AlA Wed as security fox t6c promissory note 
is an opan one. In the h t  c w z  Plaintiff contands that by ac-g paymat fm iegd 
sewim, attorney &Nichols and his firm have con- those assets of AYli fn which Reed 
Taylor bas a security interest, knowing Reed T~ylor has a security interest in the assets, aad thus 
have & M l y  mveded to Defend- assets &longing to Reed ~ a ~ ~ o r . : '  As the COM hzls 
already stated, there is in place m Order that matlagwent of the colpadons is to remain with 
the hard of directors until a damination of Reed's ctaitns is  made or anti1 M c r  order of the 
Court, Secondly, the cowmtiona and the board of directors haw a right to defend against thrt 
claims of Reed T~ylox and to retain counsel to provide the necessary defense. The Defendants' 
aations in defending their clients agaimt the claims 5all squarely within the litigation privilege. 
Reliance on 131.8 Cow's Order placing a&aity to mmage the corporatfons with the board of 
directors, which includes mmc&g to pay for legal services, is justified and does not make the 
Defendants liable for conversion. 
.' Plaintiff a r p  that as a secured aditor,  he has a right to m&e &&ions negHniiag the operations of the 
corporation. PlafntWhas provided ths Court with no aurhoriry for his pos!tion. As a sedured oreditor, Plamtiffhns a 
right to seek a j u d w t  atlowfag hfm to take control of the security, a clalm. he has asserted in rhe underlying action 
and one that has yet to be dstumined. 
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL TRANSCRIPT 
AND ADDITIONAL CLERK'S RECORD 
555 
DEC. 23 .2008  3 :  17PM DlSTRICT COURT MO. 9426 , 5 , 
e of d o n  as- DefenhB violated the IWo Gonsma 
ProteGtion A&, h p d c u l s  X.C.8 48-608(2), by enga@g in acts, conduct, and represendom 
andlor deqtive c unf& mdlor d e M m  acts andlor 
pmodces. This allegation xlot onfy falls within the p o t d o n s  of fhe litipti,on privilege, as the 
ace M c h  PIainWdege!es Defendants engaged in w m  mprestntatio~~ presented to the Court 
within the scope of & f e w @ '  mresenation of the corpomte clients, but the claim fails for 
la& of ~ ~ q ,  which is elearly mq&d mder the 1 m p g e  of I.C. § 48-608(1).' 
PldnWs fourth cause of action asgas profe~sional negligence andlor breach of 
Dehnciants' fiduciary duties to Read Taylor ad the AIA co~porations. This claim fit& fbr two 
reasom; (1) litigation privilege aad (2) lack of an &ttomey-clfant relatiomEp between Plaintiff 
arrd the Defehbts. In H a ~ d ~ l d  v. Humck, 140 Idaho 134,90 P.3d 884 (2004) and again in 
&late of Becker u Canahan, 140 Id&o 522,96 P3d 623 (2004), Idaho's Stlp2eme Court 
directly sed the qw&n of whether an attorney-oliant reltrtionship is necessary before a 
claim for dp rac t iw  may be sserted against an attorney. The Court hid that, with the narrow 
exception of the g of Wrnw do~menb, thae must be an attorney-client 
mlationship for a mdpotim claim to be viable. In the instant matter, not oaly has Plaintiff not 
asserted tSle cxistttlce of en attorney-ctient relationship with the Defadants, a key component of 
his C o m p l d  i s  that he has not been coaeuIted or aUowed to choose counsel for the 
F W y ,  them am two positions wrted by Plaintiff that thc Court finds should be 
&wed. Ths f ~ s t  is the assertion that aftomey NdMichols should have withdrawn &om 
representing not only the corporations, but from representing Jab Taylor. Plaitltiffargues 
@LC. 9 48-608 reads in n ~ c m t  pan, "Any parson who ptnchaees or lease goods or sa-vim . . ." Reed Taylor, by 
his own admiion, didnot purchme the mrvices of attomoy McWtchols or bifi law firm. 
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momey McNicbob owed a duty of loyalty to t h ~  corpma~ons as cliab a d  that ptmdd 
C O & ~  of h ~ m  b-een the corpodons and J o h  Taylor dm=& McMi~hoh not rqfisent 
him The relatio11ships b Zhe def%ndm& inthe u n d t r l h  case have mmy overiayo, some 
of *oh potmWy create ~nflicti; of &rests the defmdmta and some of a c h  
potenliaay ereate c of ~ a g s b  a e n  &t dcfahb. One comonaliv batween 
the in the mdaiying caw: is that they are all defdmb. H%ere are w ~ c @  of 
intereat b t  hava been created by attorney McNj~hols initidy aoting as cowe l  for the 
co~poratiom and John Taylor, it is ibr the w m o n  clients to raise or to waive, not the opposing 
party- Rule 1.7 of the Idaho Rules of Professional Caadwt adhsses conEtict8 of interest 
betpreen cLi~ft.ts. Come- 23 makes clear that then arc & c m c e s  in wbich it is not 
imprapex for m affomey to represent codefadants wen though m&cts of intereat may 
potandally exist, In the inmint case, attom~y McNchoXs r w e n t e d  dl three clients for only a 
brief patiod at the very b e m g  of ths litigation, doing so at a very critical period in the case. 
His h e & & %  actions were clearly within that which is acceptable under rhe rules of 
pmfgssiod conduct established for attomcys mramting codefmdm& in a Iitigatioa 
The second position asserted by Plaintiff is Ms m m a i  the codefendants have acted 
monplly in entering into a joint defense agrecxncnt Xn the underlying case, many of Reed 
Taylor's claims challmge btcrcsts fbe m~orations and t&e individul board msmbm have 
in common and tha6 tberefore, require a common defense. It is ody  reasonable that a degree of 
cooperation mmt exist between cowel for thc corporations and counsel for the inrtividual board 
members, as the carpomtion is incapable of c o m e c a k g  vVith its counsel except through those 
individuals who run the corporations. Con- to the assertion by Plaintiff*, enbring into a joint 
defense agreement does not probibit rhc codefendants from asserting claims against each otber if 
?''lor u McNfchofs 
Opinion & Order on Motlon to DLsrniss 
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such c I h s  atre ~mm%d. h&cr, it p rovib  thr! partim certain protections in regard to their 
w m d c a t i o a s  with each o&a on thase arcas ofcbmon d e f e ~ ~ e  and c o m o n  htesst, The 
joint pridege, or tl &fas t .  nrfe, is an e m i o n  of tbe artomey-client pfivilege 
hause it ptects m m ~ c a t i o n s  bWm the pBstics wha  they am part of an on-gokg and 
joint effort to mt up a cornon defanse sWte@ h iamcction with a c t d  or p r o q d v e  
E~gadm. Intax Rscreazlon Coy. v. Team Worl&ide Corp ,471 f;.Supp.Zd 1 I (lI).L).C.200T), 
The rule qplias not only to comhcat ions  but atso to docmeats ~otected by &e work 
yoduct doc-e. Id 
In conclmion, for the reasors sWed above, the Court: finds the c l h s  assexted by 
P1hm fail to state c l b  for which relief my be $rmW As a matter of law, PlaintifPs 
claims must be climhsed. 
@'r P L m m ' S  MOnON TO J W E ~  C O m U T  
"The deofsion whethm to dIow a perty to amend its pleadings is left to the sound 
d i s m ~ o n  of the t&d c o w  . . . ." Wet18 v* United Stcite.s Imtrrance Co., 1 19 Idaho 160,166,804 
P2d 333 (Ct.App.1991). It is not an abwc of discretion to deny a motion to amcnd .Nhttri the 
record mntains no allegationh$ if proven, mdd entitle a plainti@ to the tclief claimed. Id. at 
167. 
The Court, after hearing oral s p e n Q  of counsel and after reviewing Plaintiffs 
proposed metided complaint, finds it would bc a %tile aot to grant Plaintifl's motion to amend 
8s the proposad amended complaint wouId not withstand a motion to dismiss. h his proposed 
mmded compl&n& P l h W  asserts the same claims as set for& in his original Complakit and 
seeks to add derivative claima. PlajnWs amended direct claims fail as a matter of law for the 
Taylor v. Mifdiak 
Opfnion & Onfa rm M o t h  to Dfsmkrs 
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sme reasam as ad&esed by tfie Court above, despite PlainWs bare rtlltgation that the c m h e t  
aid d o l l s  of& Befendm e x a d d  d~ scope of their r4prtsen&~o~. 
PlainWs aaempt to bring dgxiva6ve claims on behalf of AIA Inswmce and AZA 
Sedc89 fail es a me0r of  law, Idaha Code 8 30-1-741 clearly and uttmbjguowly pwihs 
sW&g to W g  derivattve pceedings only to b s e  who art sbdoMers at dLc time of the act 
or omis~on  compl&ed of  and only to those shareboldnn; who fkiy  and adeptely rupresw 
the htmsts  of b corpofation. As noted by tht M A  Official Cornmat at the end of I.C. 4 30- 
1-741, while some state's have e-d the "mnbmpmous" o m e ~ M p  d e ,  Idaho's 
l e e b e  chose to retah the q ~ m e n t ,  as is evidenced by tfie language in the staWt6. 
PMntiffcontm& that, because other Btates have dlowed creditors and stock pledges to bring 
derivad~e claims, standing should not bc limitad to sheholdas. The Court is not p-ded 
Td&o Code fj 30-1 -741 is clear and unanbiiguous, making it clear Idaho's legislature has chosen 
to Mt detivative claims to ~ e h o l d m  only. 
!2EiwB 
P I h W s  Motion to Amend Campfaint is hereby DENIED. 
Defendants' Motion to W s s  ishereby 0-P. 
Dated this %3 day of December 2008. 
/"7 
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL TRANSCRIPT 
AND ADDITIONAL CLERK'S RECORD 
In the Supreme Court o &of Idaho li 
rn I '11 
I 
REED J . TAYLOR, an indiv~dual, 
Plaintiff-Appellmt, 
Supreme Court Docket No. 361 30- 
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1 Supreme Court Docket No. 3613 1- /I/ 
I 
GARY D. BABBITT, an individual; D.JOHN ) 
2009 
Nez Perce County Docket No. 
ASEXBY, an individual; PATmCK V. 
COLLINS, an individual RICI3AFXI A. RILEY, ) 
2008-1765 
an indvidual; HAWLEY, TROXELL, ENNIS & ) 
HAWLEY, LLP, an Idaho limited liability ) 




It appearing that these appeals should be consolidated for all purposes for reasons //I 
of judicial economy; therefore, good cause appearing, 
IT E R E B Y  IS ORDERED that appeal No. 36130 and 36131 shall be 
CONSOLIDATED FOR ALL PURPOSES under No. 36130, but all documents filed shall bear 
CLERK'S RECORD, which shall include the documents requested in the Notices of Appeal, /I/ 
both docket numbers. 
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that the District Court Clerk shall prepare a 
together with a copy of this Order. ill /I/ 
1 
ORDER CONSOLIDATING APPEALS 
FOR ALL PURPOSES ,b 

MICHAEL S. BISSELL, ISB No. 5762 
CAMPBELL, BTSSELL & KIRBY PLLC 
7 Sot1t.h Howard S k e t ,  Suite 41 6 
Spokme, WA 99201 
Tel: (509) 455-7 100 
Fax: (509) 455-71 11 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor 
IN 'FHE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
REED 3. TAV LOR, an individual; r 
C' AXY 1). BABBITT, an individual; D. JOHN 
ASMBY, an individual; PATRICK V. 
COLLINS, an individual; RICHARD A. 
RII.,EY, an individual; I-IAWLEY TROXELL 
ENNIS &, HAWLEY, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability padnership; JANE DOES I-X, 
u h o w n  individuals; 
Case No.: CV08-01765 
APPELLANT'S mQUEST FOR 
ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS FOR 
CLEW'S RECORD 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENTS AND THEIR ATTORNEY 
AND TO: THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN, that Appellant in the above entitled proceeding 
hereby requests, pursuant to Rule 28(c), LA.R., the inclusion of the following materials in 
the clerk's record in addition to that required to be included by the I.A.R. and identified 
APPELLANT'S REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL 
DOCUMENTS FOR CLERK'S RECORD - 1 
? J  -?a2 
it1 the Notice of Appeal and subsequent Request for Additional Transcript and Additional 
Clerk's Record filed by Respondents. 
1. Clerk's Record: 
a. AfJidavit qf Michael S. Bissell in Szpport nfYlainfiSf',r Reed L. 
Taylor's h h t i o ~  to Dical'low Defendants' Request for Rt2"orneys' 
Fees a~zd Cosfs (filed January 20,2009). 
2. I certify that a copy of this request for additional record has been served 
upon the Clerk of the District Court and upon all parties required to be served pursuant to 
Rule 20, I.A.R. 
A DATED this /? day of February, 2009. 
CAMPBELL, BISSELL &,KIRBY PLLC 
By: 
Attorneys for Plainti fUAppellant 
Data\l3 15\1322\lequest iecord 021909 doc 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEKEBY CERTIFY that on the ,/f 'day of February, 2009, 1 caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the fbregoing d o m e &  to the following: 
~ e C c t . ~  Pi- Tk  
HAND DELIVERY James D. LaRue 
U.S. MAIL Elam & Burke, PA 
OVERNIGHT MAIL P.O. Box 1539 
FAX TRANSMISSION Boise, ID 83704 
EMAIL ('pdf at tachent)  
MICHAEL S. BISSELL 
APPELLANT'S REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL 
DOCUMENTS FOR CLERK'S RECORD - 3 
,A A 
IN 'THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SI-iCOri'D JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual, 
Plaintzff-Appellant, SUPREME COURT NO. 36130 
1 
vs. 
T4TCHAEL E. MC NICHOLS, an 
~ndividual; CLEMENTS, BROWN & 
MC NICHOLS, P.A., an Idaho 
professional corporation; JANE DOES) 




REED J. TAYLOR, 
) 
Pliiritif f -Appellant, 
vs. ) CLERKr S CERTIFICATE 
i 
GARY D, BABBITT, an individual; D. ) 
JOHN ASHBY', an individual; PATRICK ) 
V. COLLINS, an individual RICHARD ) 
4 .  RILEY, an individual; HAWLEY, ) 
TROXELL, ENNIS & HAWLEY, LLP, an ) 
Idaho limlted liability i 
Partnership; JANE DOES I-X, unknown) 
Individuals, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
I, DeAnna P. Grim, Deputy Clerk of the ~istrict Court of 
the Second Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for 
the County of Nez Perce, do hereby certify that the foregoing 
Clerk's Record in the above-entitled cause was compiled and bound 
by me and contains true and correct copies of all pleadings, - 
CLERKr S CERTIFICATE 
<- t4 
"4 / 4 
3. A SECOND JONT MOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD with attachment was filed 
by counsel for Respondents on July 27,2009. 
I 
4. A RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO RESPONDENTS' SECOND JOINT MOTION 
TO AUGMENT RECORD AND OBJECTIONS TO TAKING JUDICIAL NOTICE, 
AND, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SECOND MOTION TO 
STAYiSUSPENDiENLARGE TIME AND STAY ENFORCEMENT OF 
JUDGMENT with attachments was filed by counsel for Appellant on August 12, 
2009. 
The Court is fully advised; therefore, good cause appearing, 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that RESPONDENTS' JOINT MOTION TO AUGMENT 
RECORD REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE be, and hereby is, DENIED; however, this 
Court shall take JUDICIAL NOTICE of the document listed below, a copy of which is attached 
to the Joint Motion to Augment the Record and placed with the EXHIBITS for the convenience 
of the Court: 
1. June 17, 2009 Opinion and Order on Plaintiff's Motion for Rule 56(f) Continuance; 
Plaintifl's and Defendants' Motions to Strike Expert Affidavits; Defendants' Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment; Intervenor's Motion for Reconsideration. 
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that Appellant Reed J. Taylor's MOTION TO 
STAYISUSPENDIENLARGE TIME AND STAY ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENT be, and 
hereby is, DENIED. 
DAlXD this day of August 2009. 
By Order of t$e Supreme Court 
cc: Counsel of Record 
ORDER - Docket Nos. 361 30-2009 (361 3 1-2009) 
I 
t l l  
In the Supreme Court of  the State of Idaho 
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual, 
Plaintiff- Appellant, 
) AUGMENT THE MCORD 
) Supreme Court Docket No. 36130- 
MICHAEL E. MC NICHOLS, an individual; ) 2009136 13 1-2009 
CLEMENTS, B R O W  & MC NICHOLS, ) Nez Perce County Docket No. 2008- 
P.A., an Idaho professional corporation; JANE ) 1763/2008- 1765 
DOES 1-V, unknown individuals, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
REED J. TAYLOR, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
GARY D. BABBITT, an individual, D. JOHN ) 
ASHBY, an individual; PATRICK V. COLLINS, ) 
an individual; RTCHARD A. RILEY, an 
individual; HAWLEY, TROXELL, E W I S  & ) 
HAWEU,  LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership; JANE DOES 1 -X, unknown 
Defendants-Respondents. 
A MOTION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD AND STATEMENT IN SUPPORT 
THEREOF was filed by counsel for Respondent Hawley, Troxell, Ennis & Hawley, LLP on 
September 4,2009. Therefore, good cause appearing, 
IT HERFiBY IS ORDERED that Respondent Hawley, Troxell, Ennis & Hawley LLPYs 
MOTION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD be, and hereby is, GRANTED and the augmentation 
record shall include the documents listed below, copies of which accompanied this Motion, as 
ill C 
1. Satisfiction of Judpent ,  file-stamped August 26,2009; and 
2. Check firom the personal account of Appellant Reed J. Taylor, dated August 22,2009 
in the amount of $20,527.28 paid to Hawley, Troxell, Ennis & Hawley Respondents 
for "'Judgment". 
DATED this of September 2009. 
For the Supreme Court 
Stephen W. Kenyon, elerk 
cc: Counsel of Record 
documents, and papers designated to be included under Rule 28, 
Idaho Appellate Rules, the Notice of Appeal, any Notice of Cross- 
Appeal, and additional documents that were requested. 
I further certify: 
1. That no exhibits were marked for identification or 
admitted into evidence during the course of this action. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF I have hereunto set my hand and affixed 
M& 
the seal of said court this 4 day of- 2009. 
PATTY 0. WEEKS, Clerk - 
CLERKf S CERTIFICATE 
Deputy Clerk 
In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho 
mEf) J. TAYLOR, an individual, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) O R D E R  
) Supreme Court Docket No. 36130-2009 
) Nez Perce County District Court No. 2008- 
MICHAEL E. MC NICHOLS, an individual; ) 1763 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & h4C NICHOLS, 
F.A., an Idaho professional corporation; JANE ) 
DOES 1 -V, unknown individuals, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
REED J. TAYLOR, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Supreme Court Docket No. 3613 1-2009 
) Nez Perce County District Court No. 2008- 
) 1765 
GARY D. BABBITT, an individual, D. JOHN ) Ref No. 09s-446 
ASHBY, an individual; PATRICK V. 
COLLINS, an individual; RICHARD A. 
RILEY, an individual; WWLEY, TROXELL, ) 
ENNIS & HAWLEY, LLP, an Idaho limited ) 
liability partnership; JANE DOES 1 -X, 
unknown individuals. 
Defendants-Respondents. 
1. A REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE AND PROFERRED RECORD PURSUANT 
TO I.R.E. 201(d) with attachment was filed by counsel for Appellant Reed J. Taylor on 
September 14, 2009, requesting h s  Court take judicial notice of Appellant Reed J. 
Taylor's Notice of Appeal filed on September 8, 2009, a copy of which is attached to 
this motion as Exhibit A. 
2. A RESPONSE TO APPELLANT'S REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE AND 
PROPER RECORD PURSUANT TO I.R.E. 201(b) was filed by counsel for 
Respondents Michael E. McNichols and Clements, Brown & McNichols, P.A. on 
September 18, 2009. 
3. A RESPONSE TO APPELLANT'S REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE AND 
PROFERRED RECORD PURSUANT TO I.R.E. 201(d) was filed by Respondents 
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley on September 21,2009. 
The Court is fully advised; therefore, good cause appearing, 
IT HEREBY IS OWERED that Appellant Reed J. Taylor's REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL 
NOTICE AND PROFERRED RECORD PURSUANT TO I.R.E. 201(d) be, and hereby is, 
GRANTED and this Court shall take JUDICIAL NOTICE of Appellant Reed J. Taylor's Notice of 
Appeal filed on September 8, 2009, in Taylor v. ALA Services, et al., Nez Perce County District 
Court No. CV07-00208, a file stamped copy of which was attached as Exhbit A to the request, and 
Exhibit A shall be placed with the EXHIB$TS for the convenience of this Court. 
DATED this/PHday of October 2009. 
By Order oft& Supreme Court 
- - 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
cc: Counsel of Record 
ORDER - Docket Nos. 36 130-2009/3613 1-2009 
In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho 
REED 1. TAYLOR, an individual, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
CLEMENTS, B R O W  & MC NICHOLS, P.A., ) Supreme Court Docket Nos. 
an Idaho professional corporation; JANE DOES ) 36130-2009 (36131-2009) 
1 -V, unknown individuals, Nez Perce County District Court Nos. 
2008-1 763 (2008-1 765) 
Defendants-Respondents. 
Ref No. 09-342 
REED J. TAYLOR, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
GARY D. BABBITT, an individual, D. JOHN 
ASHBY, an individual; PATRICK V. 
COLLINS, an individual; R I C H D  A. RILEY, ) 
an individual; HAWLEY, TROXELL, ENNIS & ) 
HAWLEY, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnershp; JANE DOES l-X, unknown 
Defendants-Respondents. 
1. A JOINT MOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD and MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS' MOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD were filed by 
counsel for Respondents on July 10, 2009, requesting this Court for an order 
augmenting the appellate record with the opinion of Judge Brudie file stamped June 
2. A RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO RESPONDENTS' JOINT MOTION TO 
AUGMENT RECORD AND OBJECTIONS TO TAKING JUDICIAL NOTICE, 
AND, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION TO STAYlSUSPENDlENLARGE TIME 
AND STAY ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENT was filed by counsel for Appellant 
on July 21,2009. 
In " t h e  Supreme Court of the State of 1dah6 
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual, 
Plaintiff- Appellant, 
) ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 
MICHAEL E. MC NICHOLS, an individual; ) Supreme Court Docket No. 36130-2009/ 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & MC NICHOLS, ) 36131-2009 
P.A., an Idaho professional corporation; JANE ) Nez Perce County Docket No. 2008-17631 
DOES 1 -V, unknown individuals, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
REED J. TAYLOR, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
GARY D. BABBITT, an individual, D. JOHN ) 
ASHBY, an individual; PATRICK V. 
COLLINS, an individual; RICHARD A. 
RILEY, an individual; WWLEY, TROXELL, ) 
ENNIS & HAWLEY, LLP, an Idaho limited ) 
liability partnership; JANE DOES 1 -X, 
imknown individuals. 
Defendants-Respondents. 
A MOTION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD AND STATEMENT IN SUPPORT 
THEREOF was filed by counsel for Respondents Michael E. McNichols and Clements, Brown & 
McNichols, P.A. on September 17, 2009. Therefore, good cause appearing, 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Respondents' MOTION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD 
be, and hereby is, GRANTED and the augmentation record shall include the documents listed . 
below, file stamped copies of which accompanied this Motion, as EXHIBITS: 
1. Satisfaction of Judgment, file-stamped September 3, 2009; and 
cc: Counsel of Record 
For the Supreme Court 
2. Capy of! a check from PlaintiffiAppellmt Reed Taylor to the Respondent 1 s ~  firm 
Clements, Brown & McNichols in the amount of $20,518.00, dated August 12, 2009. 
DATED this 29 ""of September 2009. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, SUPREME COURT N0.36130 
I 
VS. 
MICHAEL E. MC NICHOLS, an 
individual; CLEMENTS, BROWN & 
MC NICHOLS, P .A., an Idaho 
professional corporation; JANE DOES) 
I-V, unknown individuals, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
REED J. TAYLOR, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
VS . 
GARY D. BABBITT, an individual; D. ) 
JOHN ASHBY, an individual; PATRICK ) 
V. COLLINS, an individual RICHARD ) 
A. RILEY, an individual; HAWLEY, ) 
TROXELL, ENNIS & HAWLEY, LLP, an ) 
Idaho limited liability 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Partnership; JANE DOES I-X, unknown) ' 
Individuals, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
I, DeAnna P. Grim, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of 
the Second Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for 
the County of Nez Perce, do hereby certify that copies of the 
clerk' FA~eoord and Reporter's Transcript were delivered on Tile. * 
day April 2009, to Michael S. Bissell, 7 South Howard St, 
-4 
b . - 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
S u i t e  416 ,  S p o k a n e ,  WA 99201 ,  A t t o r n e y  f o r  A p p e l l a n t  a n d  t o  J o h n  
J .  J a n i s ,  P O Box 2582 ,  B o i s e ,  I D  83701-2582 b y  t h e  U n i t e d  
S t a t e s  P o s t a l  S e r v i c e .  
I N  WITNESS WHEREOF, I h a v e  h e r e u n t o  s e t  my h a n d  a n d  a f f i x e d  
t h e  s e a l  o f  t h e  s a i d  C o u r t  t h i s  d a y  o f  A p r i l  2 0 0 9 .  
PATTY 0 .  WEEKS 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
y . @ " c ? ~ . 7 ^ - * '  * - 3 ;&$ 
L ..,- * u - .  - 
BY 
D e p u t y  C l e r k  
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
